TURKEY'S ELECTIONS AS SEEN FROM THE "TRNC"

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 NICOSIA 000594

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E.O. 12958: DECL: 07/13/2017
TAGS: PGOV PREL CY
SUBJECT: TURKEY'S ELECTIONS AS SEEN FROM THE "TRNC"


Classified By: Ambassador Ronald L. Schlicher for reason 1.5 (b) and (d
).


1. (SBU) With only six days until Turkey goes to the polls,
the July 22 election is, perhaps surprisingly, not at the
forefront of everyone's minds in Cyprus's north, the
self-proclaimed, unrecognized "TRNC." This is partly because
ongoing domestic issues, including a "government" financial
scandal and a controversial social security law, have been
grabbing the headlines. But it is also partly because
Cyprus, as an issue, has so far played little role in
Turkey's election campaign; the absence of Cyprus in the
Turkish debate is, as we see it, a good thing, since the
issue would almost certainly because a nationalist football
kicked around by those opposed to a policy of reunification.
Moreover, there is little Turkish nationals on Cyprus can do
to influence the election. Most Turkish Cypriot observers
have taken a fatalist wait-and-see approach, though everyone
appears to have his own differing prediction on how the
election on the mainland should turn out and how that result
will affect this island.

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THE VIEW FROM ABOVE DOWN HERE
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2. (C) Turkish Cypriot political party leaders have
universally expressed to Poloffs their belief that Turkey's
July 22 election will have a significant impact on local
politics and on the prospects for a Cyprus solution. Several
admit that important "government" decisions have been
postponed until after the election results become clear.
They also conveyed unease with the possibility that several
Turkish parties may cross the 10 percent electoral barrier,
making already awkward political alliances between Turkish
and Turkish Cypriot politicians more difficult. Omer
Kalyoncu, Secretary General of ruling CTP, for instance,
commented to Poloff on 21 June that his party hoped for a
strong AKP showing, not because of any natural affinity
between the two parties, but because AKP has a Cyprus
platform compatible with CTP's vision of a Cyprus solution.
He seemed confident that, provided the AKP can hold on to the
Prime Ministry, Turkey's policy on Cyprus will remain much
the same as it is now. However, when asked about a possible
coalition between the AKP and a more nationalist party like
Turkey's MHP, Kalyoncu could only hope that its previously
"responsible," pro-EU policies approach exhibited while in
government (1999-2002) was a good harbinger.


3. (C) Opposition UBP, on the other hand, would prefer that
the AKP be humbled at the polls. The two parties have little
in common ideologically, particularly regarding EU accession;
Turkish Cypriot UBP is stolidly state-focused and suspicious
of the EU and its reforms. One UBP "MP," Hasan Tacoy,
tacitly expressed this view in a 29 June meeting with Poloff,
criticizing the AKP government for being too willing to
sacrifice "TRNC" interests in its EU application process.
The UBP and its labor union allies have also jumped at the
opportunity to protest both summer religious courses and a
new social security law as being alien concepts introduced at
the behest of Ankara. Tacoy and his UBP cohorts were
crossing their fingers for a coalition of Turkey's
state-focused CHP and MHP, both of which have stood firm on
nationalist platforms concerning the "TRNC" as well as
Turkey's relationship with the EU, he noted. Tacoy claimed,
though, that his party would be OK if the AKP were forced
into a coalition with a junior partner that would force it to
take a more guarded stance on the Cyprus problem.


4. (C) Former coalition member and now also in opposition
Serdar Denktash's DP appeared to be the most indifferent to
Turkey's upcoming election, but was eager to get past it so
that local political wheeling-dealing could start up again.
Denktash advisor Kudret Akay was sanguine in a 5 July meeting
with Poloff believing that the AKP cannot repeat its 2002
performance because a third party, if not possibly a fourth
or fifth, was sure to pass the electoral barrier.
Consequently, he said, there will almost surely be a new
political balance in Turkey; Turkish Cypriots, as always,
would be forced to adjust. He was anxious to get on with
this "inevitable adjustment period." According to Akay,
Turkey's election season, coupled with popular discontent
with the local CTP-OP "government," has tied the CTP's hands.

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"Once this election is over," he hoped, "CTP can jettison
its corrupt junior partner," and pass a set of election
reform laws leading to fresh "parliamentary" elections here
on the island.

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WHAT ROLE FOR TURKISH SETTLERS AND TEMP WORKERS?
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5. (C) Elections in Turkey will have a different impact on
the Turkish nationals who live and work on Cyprus. A large
proportion of these Turks settled in Cyprus over the years in
an attempt to flee poverty or discrimination in Turkey.
Though they may not intend to return to Turkey, according to
Mete Hatay of the International Peace Research Institute,
Oslo (PRIO),they realize that Turkey's impact on their lives
is still great. There are also several other groups of
Turkish nationals in Cyprus's north -- students, soldiers,
and temporary workers, particularly in the construction and
tourism industries -- who intend eventually to return to
Turkey and, therefore, might have an interest in the election
results. However, in order to cast their vote, expatriate
Turks would have to report to one of several designated
Turkish ports; the vote would then be counted in the
citizen's province of registration. Given the cost involved,
relatively few Turkish citizens on Cyprus are expected to
actually vote. Hatay, who has compiled demographic research
on Turkish citizens living on Cyprus, told Poloff 11 July
that he has seen little indication that Turkish nationals
here intend to vote in large numbers, thus the absence of
related political campaigning on the island. He noted that,
even if they were to vote, their preferences would probably
not differ significantly from those of the Turkish population
at large; Turkish citizens here come from diverse backgrounds
-- rural Turks, Kurdish villagers, left-leaning Alevis,
military retirees. Hatay doubted that these groups could
have much impact on the province-by-province outcomes, since
they originated from diverse regions on the mainland, Hatay
offered that only a few Turkish provinces, including Hatay
province on Turkey's border with Syria, may be vulnerable to
a targeted campaign because of a disproportionate number of
expatriates on the island. He has seen no evidence of any
Turkish party campaigning, however.


6. (C) When asked if Turkish expatriates, despite the above
turnout prediction, have a particular party preference, Hatay
claimed that they would generally support a return of the AKP
government. He held that his research dispels the common
belief that Turkish settlers tend to be more nationalist;
after all, they now have a direct interest in any Cyprus
settlement and would supposedly support parties in Turkey and
in Cyprus accordingly. But, when compared to Turkish Cypriot
voters, Hatay showed, these Turkish settlers support a range
of parties on the island and are by-and-large pragmatic
voters. He also noted that expatriates split their vote
50-50 in the April 2004 Annan Plan referendum; with the CTP
in power, they have become generally more accepting of the
idea of a possible bizonal, bicommunal solution, Hatay
claimed. He concluded from these data that Turkish citizens
on Cyprus would generally prefer a return of the AKP
government. According to Hatay, even the secular socialists
among the expatriates tend to support the CTP -- and by
extension the AKP -- rather than Turkey's CHP.

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COMMENT
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7. (C) It is impossible for the results of the Turkish
elections to please all sides of the Turkish Cypriot
political spectrum. The guarded optimism expressed by CTP
and UBP members sounds more like positive spin on a
high-variance situation than a reflection of actual
expectations. Even DP's more realistic muddle-through
scenario contains some spin: it assumes that the parties that
enter the Turkish Grand National Assembly will create a
stable, capable government. There is the fear here that a
possible return in Turkey to the acrimonious, unstable
political environment of the 1990s could force it into a
reactive, rather than constructive, position in relation to
the Cyprus problem; the last few months, during which Talat's
latitude to engage on the UN track clearly has been stifled,
is proof of this negative potential. The underlying hope

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among Turkish Cypriot politicians, whether conscious or not,
is that Turkey's election will be decisive one way or the
other, so that the "TRNC" has a familiar and stable political
environment within which to work. End comment.

SCHLICHER