AKEL CONGRESS GIVES GREEN LIGHT TO CYPRUS'S FIRST COMMUNIST

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 03 NICOSIA 000579 SIPDIS SENSITIVE E.O. 12958: N/A TAGS: PGOV PREL CY SUBJECT: AKEL CONGRESS GIVES GREEN LIGHT TO CYPRUS'S FIRST COMMUNIST PRESIDENTIAL CANDIDATE, CREATES COMPETITIVE PRESIDENTIAL RACE ¶1. (SBU) Summary: In a historical first, coalition partner and communist party AKEL decided at its July 8 congress to nominate its own leader, Demetris Christofias, as presidential candidate, either for the pro-government coalition parties jointly or on his own. The decision signals the end of the road for the three-way coalition since the other two partners, DIKO and EDEK, have already endorsed President Tassos Papadopoulos's anticipated reelection bid. Papadopoulos, trying to steal Christofias's platform, is on a spree of new initiatives from the Cyprus issue to relief measures for the poor. The immediate consequence of the two former partners becoming election rivals will be the withdrawal of the four AKEL ministers from the government, including Foreign Minister Giorgos Lillikas, though he will likely take up the job of Papadopoulos's campaign spokesman. As the presidential campaign gets under way, all three main candidates appear to have equal chances to make it to the second round of next February's elections. A brief biography of Demetris Christofias begins in Para 14. End summary. -------------- First Communist Presidential Candidate -------------- ¶2. (SBU) For the first time in the 47-year history of the Republic of Cyprus, the country's strong communist party decided finally and irrevocably to nominate its own leader to stand in next February's presidential election. An overwhelming 92.7 percent majority of AKEL delegates decided to propose Demetris Christofias as the joint candidate of the AKEL-DIKO-EDEK coalition. Should its partners disagree - and they do - AKEL will run independently. Though President Tassos Papadopoulos has not as yet formally announced his candidacy, the competent organs of DIKO and EDEK have already decided to endorse his anticipated reelection bid. So, to keep pretenses, AKEL will present its proposal to its partners before anticlimactically announcing its real decision to go it alone. Christofias will meet Papadopoulos and his former partners on July 10 to discuss the technicalities of the break up, which includes first and foremost the withdrawal of the four AKEL ministers from the government. -------------- --- Focusing on Cyprob Differences With Papadopoulos -------------- --- ¶3. (SBU) Addressing his party congress, Christofias engaged only in indirect criticism of Papadopoulos's handling of the Cyprus problem and domestic policies--a smart choice, believes a veteran AKEL official, since a full-fledged attack could only backfire considering that AKEL participated in and consistently backed the current administration for four-and-a-half years. In his speech, Christofias placed the Cyprus issue at the top of his priorities and "revealed" that he disagreed with Papadopoulos on numerous occasions, both in private and at National Council meetings. He blamed the Turkish Cypriot side's insistence on the Annan Plan for the current stalemate but, at the same time, indicated that the Greek Cypriot side could not afford to sit back and simply defend its April 2004 "no." To prove his point, Christofias highlighted several "worrying" developments, both external and internal, such as EU insistence on direct trade, the German parliament resolution on the lifting of the "isolation" of the Turkish Cypriots, the looming danger of ECHR recognition of the Turkish Cypriot property commission, and the growing anti-federation sentiments in the Greek Cypriot community. Predicting that Turkish PM Recep Tayyip Erdogan will come out with new initiatives on Cyprus if he emerges victorious in Turkey's upcoming elections, Christofias stressed the need for a flexible and pro-active approach that will either "open the way for progress or expose the Turkish side's uncooperative stance." He referred to Papadopoulos's negative reputation abroad and within the Turkish Cypriot community, and argued that his presidency could remedy this bias. On domestic policies, he gave good marks to the current administration, but noted that AKEL had higher expectations. His presidency would follow a socioeconomic policy serving lower income groups and "resisting neo-liberal tendencies," Christofias promised. ¶4. (SBU) Responding to his coalition partners' accusations that his candidacy only helps conservative Ioannis Kasoulides's candidacy, Christofias stressed that DISY was elected to power twice, in 1993 and 1998, not with AKEL's support but with the votes of DIKO and EDEK. He described as repulsive any rumors that AKEL is conspiring with Kasoulides, the Americans or the British, in order to get rid of Papadopoulos and revive the Annan Plan. He further warned his partners not to attempt to blame AKEL for the break-up of the coalition and called on them to support his candidacy, either in the first or the second round, in order to prevent DISY from climbing back into power. He also rejected their accusations that he was driven by personal ambition, saying that the AKEL decision was purely political, and moreover, at 61, he pledged to serve only one term if elected, faithful to AKEL regulations that call for retirement from active political duty at the age of 65. -------------- Building Momentum Key to AKEL's Success -------------- ¶5. (SBU) Christofias's most urgent goal is to rekindle the legendary AKEL discipline and allegiance in order to ensure that he enters the second round. The strong majority secured at the July 8 party congress boosted Christofias's momentum started two months ago when the party asked members to choose between Papadopoulos and Christofias for president. Out of the 1,626 delegates present, 92.7 percent voted for Christofias; only 6.6 percent opted for a continuation of the coalition under the presidency of Papadopoulos; and less than one percent abstained. Of the 37 delegates that addressed the congress, 24 argued in favor of Christofias, and 13 for Papadopoulos. In the end, though, all pledged to support Christofias regardless of their individual votes. -------------- -------------- AKEL Decision Angers DIKO and EDEK, But Thrills DISY -------------- -------------- ¶6. (SBU) Predictably, DIKO and EDEK reacted angrily to AKEL's July 8 decision, immediately launching fresh accusations that AKEL was responsible for the dissolution of the coalition and for injecting life into Kasoulides's listless candidacy. The two remaining coalition parties focused their criticism on Christofias's remark that foreigners and Turkish Cypriots are prejudiced against Papadopoulos. They accused him of sending the message abroad that Greek Cypriots are susceptible to pressure and are willing to even change their president if foreigners and Turkey do not like him. ¶7. (SBU) DISY's Kasoulides concealed his excitement with a mellow statement that the AKEL decision to put forward its own candidate constituted democratic progress. At the same time, though, he noted that Christofias's speech focused on the past and did not make any new proposals for the future. A high-ranking DISY official told Embassy officers that the breakup of the coalition opening of a small road for Kasoulides, which "could be turned into an avenue" if Kasoulides exhibited the necessary leadership in the campaign. ¶8. (SBU) Other possible cracks in Papadopoulos's support also appeared, good news for Kasoulides. Disagreements broke out within right-wing EVROKO despite the party's public statements several weeks ago that it was "inclined" to endorse Papadopoulos's candidacy. The party's Deputy Leader Nicos Koutsou argued that EVROKO, which polled 5.75 percent in the 2006 parliamentary elections, should not commit to any of the main candidates before the second round of the election in order to save its bargaining power. In contrast to earlier statements in support of Papadopoulos, EVROKO leader Demetris Syllouris appeared to move closer to that position, and in press statements on July 9 said the breakup of the coalition had radically changed the election outlook--i.e., his party would now be open to proposals from all the candidates. Similarly, the Green Party, which received 2.0 percent in 2006, had stated recently that it supported Papadopoulos's Cyprus problem policy and was, therefore, very close to supporting his candidacy, but now it is having second thoughts. A party official told Emboff that there is a strong anti-Papadopoulos current within the rank-and-file, and the prevailing view is to wait for AKEL's move before making any final decision. -------------- Papadopoulos Attempts to Steal the Show -------------- ¶9. (SBU) Anticipating this AKEL decision, Papadopoulos and his campaign team planned a series of moves designed to appeal mainly to AKEL's left-leaning supporters. As an opening gambit, Papadopoulos announced July 4 a CYP 111 million (approx. USD 260 million) package of social measures to benefit 112,000 citizens, mainly of lower income groups such as pensioners, large families and people with special needs (i.e. AKEL's national constituencies). Many of the measures were proposed by AKEL two years ago but the Papadopoulos administration turned them down, citing austerity measures necessary for Cyprus's acceptance into the Eurozone. ¶10. (SBU) And on July 5, abandoning his persistent refusal to meet Turkish Cypriot leader Mehmet Ali Talat, Papadopoulos proposed not one but two meetings with Talat: (1) to discuss the stalled July 8 process and (2) to visit together the UN Committee on Missing Persons (CMP) Anthropological Laboratory. AKEL had long advocated a meeting between the two leaders, but Papadopoulos repeatedly rejected the call, arguing that a meeting would give the false impression of progress. -------------- Lillikas: Shall I Stay or Shall I Go? -------------- ¶11. (SBU) AKEL's scheduled meeting with its coalition partners and Papadopoulos on July 10 to present the party decision sealed the break-up of the three-party alliance. As government spokesman Vassilis Palmas was quick to point out on July 8, AKEL will have to withdraw its four ministers from the government, and the president will immediately proceed to replace them. Among the four is Foreign Minister Giorgos Lillikas, a leading AKEL member nominated by the party to serve as government spokesman in the Papadopoulos administration and later as Foreign Minister. A Papadopoulos campaign insider told Emboff that Papadopoulos intended to appoint one minister from the left, one from the far right, one from EVROKO, and another one from the Green Party. ¶12. (SBU) All eyes, though, are focused on Foreign Minister Lillikas, whose future stance remains unclear; for many voters (and commentators) he is a barometer of the presidential election campaign. A professional pollster and ambitious politician, Lillikas is known for easily changing allegiances and successfully clinging to power. Over the past two months he has vacillated between staying in the government or leaving if Christofias and Papadopoulos were both candidates. His final decision was to resign his ministerial seat, but he has yet to clearly choose a side, though the same Papadopoulos campaign insider claimed that Lillikas would become Papadopoulos's campaign spokesman. Last week, Christofias even barred Lillikas from attending a crucial AKEL central committee meeting convened to finalize the proposal to the party congress, a development that left little doubt that Lillikas will once again jump ship, as he did with former President Vassiliou in 2003. Shortly after the latter's failure to get reelected, Lillikas abandoned Vassiliou's newly-formed party to join AKEL. -------------- Comment -------------- ¶13. (SBU) Christofias's entry into the presidential race will tip the balance of the debate in favor of a pro-active, pro-solution policy on the Cyprus issue, now only half-heartedly advocated by DISY and Kasoulides out of fear of attacks by the all-powerful pro-government coalition. In his first televised press conference as a candidate on July 9, Christofias clearly criticized Papadopoulos's downright condemnation of the Annan Plan, sending the message that he intends to stand up for AKEL's 2004 "soft no," i.e., requesting limited changes to specific aspects of the Plan but not rejecting it in its entirety, which was the prevailing sentiment in the pro-Papadopoulos camp. Watching the three main rivals try to outbid each other to be more flexible on the Cyprus issue may well be the changed scene in the months leading up to the presidential elections, a direct result of Christofias's entry into this race. -------------- Bio Note -------------- ¶14. (SBU) Christofias was born in 1946 at Kato Dikomo, a village in Kyrenia district. His father was a construction worker and Christofias joined the communist party at an early age. After completion of his high school studies and his National Guard service, he worked as an accounting clerk in a factory. In 1969, AKEL sent him to Moscow, where he studied for two years at the Institute of Social Science. In Moscow, he met "comrade" Elsi Hiratou, whom he married in the summer of 1972. After graduation in 1971, Christofias continued his studies at the Soviet Academy for Social Sciences, where he received a Ph.D. in History. He returned to Cyprus in April 1974 and was employed by the youth organization of AKEL, EDON. Shortly afterwards he was elected General Organizing Secretary of EDON and later its General Secretary, a position he SIPDIS held until 1987. In 1982 he was elected to the Central Committee of AKEL. Following the death of long-time AKEL General Secretary Ezekias Papaioannou in 1988, Christofias was elected General Secretary of the party. His election caused a rift, however, that SIPDIS resulted in the expulsion of several leading figures of the communist party. In June 2001, Christofias was elected President of the House of Representatives with the votes of his communist party, centrist DIKO and socialist EDEK. He was reelected in June 2006. In the late 1990s, Christofias faced serious health problems. In 1999, he underwent heart surgery and a kidney transplant. SCHLICHER