IN TOURING IRANIAN FACILITY SANS INSTRUCTIONS,

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 NICOSIA 000340 SIPDIS SIPDIS DEPARTMENT FOR ISN/RA, EUR/SE, EUR/ERA E.O. 12958: DECL: 04/16/2017 TAGS: KNNP PARM MNUC TRGY AORC PREL CY SUBJECT: IN TOURING IRANIAN FACILITY SANS INSTRUCTIONS, AMBASSADOR PROVES MFA CONTROLS WEAK REF: A. SECSTATE 45880 ¶B. 06 NICOSIA 1461 Classified By: Ambassador Ronald Schlicher, Reasons 1.4 (b),(d) ¶1. (C) SUMMARY: RoC Ambassador to Iran Charalambos Kapsos, acting without instructions from Nicosia, defied European Union counsel and attended the April 9 ribbon-cutting of Iran's Natanz Fuel Enrichment Plant, according to April 16 local media accounts. A Foreign Ministry official subsequently confirmed the newspaper's story, but emphasized that Cyprus continued to support UN Security Resolutions aiming to prevent Tehran's development of nuclear weapons. Ministry higher-ups already had reprimanded Kapsos, the diplomat assured. The Natanz incident displays an MFA Achilles' heel, its inability to exercise effective control over its field missions. No solution appears imminent. END SUMMARY. -------------- Approach to MFA Too Little, Too Late -------------- ¶2. (C) Ref A, in which the Department instructed addressee Posts to urge host countries not to send representatives to the Natanz inauguration, arrived via normal (vice NIACT) channels during the extended Easter weekend in Cyprus (April 6 - 9). As such, the message was OBE when the Embassy (and Foreign Ministry) re-opened for business April 10. PolChief nonetheless delivered post hoc points to the MFA's Multilateral Affairs division that same day. He received no substantive response. ¶3. (U) Six days later, opposition daily "Politis" screamed that Cyprus "had opened a front with its EU and U.S. allies" over Ambassador Kapsos's "ill-considered" decision to visit Natanz. According to "Politis," Kapsos acted without first seeking instructions from MFA superiors. Further, he had ignored an EU Presidency recommendation, issued via the German Embassy in Tehran, and an alleged "mild U.S. approach" urging states to boycott the event. Washington had scaled back its protests, the article continued, once it learned that Kapsos had acted on his own initiative. -------------- Media Reporting Spot-On -------------- ¶4. (SBU) German DCM Jochen Haidorn confirmed April 16 that his counterparts in Tehran had distributed the EU Presidency communication, which recommended that member-states not send representatives to Natanz. To his knowledge, Cyprus never had bucked EU consensus on Iran, and supported the imposition of tough UN Security Council sanctions over Tehran's uranium enrichment activities. Haidorn therefore believed that, had Kapsos attended the inauguration, he did so of his own volition. ¶5. (C) Multilateral Affairs Deputy Chief Marios Kountarides had not seen the "Politis" article when PolChief telephoned April 16 to follow up. Upon reading it, he requested an immediate face-to-face meeting. Seemingly fearful of repercussions that might beset Cyprus for its ambassador's activities, he inquired as to the Embassy's original instructions. Had the State Department singled out Cyprus in its demarche, worried the RoC would break EU ranks or otherwise voice dissent on Iran policy? Relieved that our message had targeted all EU posts, he commenced to commenting on the meat of "Politis's" allegations. -------------- An Ambassador Gone Bad -------------- ¶6. (C) Kapsos had attended the Natanz festivities, Kountarides admitted, looking exasperated. But the decision had been the Ambassador's own; had he sought instructions, the MFA's "NO" would have rung loud and clear. A policy change had not occurred; Cyprus continued to back to the hilt UNSC sanctions targeting the Iranian nuclear arms program (Ref B). Ministry leaders were aghast over Kapsos's freelancing, Kountarides claimed, which had embarrassed Cyprus before fellow EU member-states. They already had demanded an explanation from their "rogue" ambassador; deeming his response unsatisfactory, they had reprimanded him. ¶7. (C) Kapsos was no stranger to controversy, Kountarides NICOSIA 00000340 002 OF 002 agreed. In early April, "Politis" had published accounts of the ambassador's other misdeeds, most notably skipping his presentation of credentials to Iranian President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad in order to return -- again, without permission -- briefly to Cyprus. Further, media claimed Kapsos had dismissed locally-hired embassy staff without cause, and had issued visas improperly. For these acts, Kountarides asserted, the MFA had dispatched an inspection team to Tehran, led by RoC UN PermRep Andreas Mavroyiannis. Foreign Minister Yiorgos Lillikas and Permanent Secretary ("D" equivalent) Alexander Zenon had ordered Mavroyiannis to conduct a thorough, speedy investigation. Were it to uncover signs of wrongdoing, the MFA would press the Attorney General to file charges against Kapsos, Kountarides promised. -------------- Problems to Worsen Before Getting Better -------------- ¶8. (C) Investigating the Cypriot ambassador's improprieties should prove easy pickings for the MFA. While running Cyprus's mission in Cairo a few years back, for example, Kapsos allegedly imported and re-sold duty-free liquor on the Egyptian market, embarrassing his mission and ministry and straining bilateral relations. Further, his involvement in a tawdry sex scandal there provided the tabloids great headline grist. In neither case does it appear that anything more than a mild letter of rebuke entered the ambassador's personnel file. Returning to Nicosia and a series of office director-type positions, he met regularly with U.S. Embassy staff. Mostly avoiding work-related engagement, Kapsos preferred to discuss ancient cultures and his penchant for acquiring antiquities. We cannot discount the possibility that he sought to pad his Persian collection, openly or illicitly, from his Tehran outpost. ¶9. (C) The Natanz incident reveals that a visible MFA weakness, the lack of effective control over its missions, extends to policy matters as well as administration. On the latter, media have feasted over allegations of cooked books, favoritism in hiring, and sexual misconduct at overseas Cypriot facilities. While a court did find former RoC Ambassador to Sweden Costas Papadimas guilty of sexual harassment in January, sentencing him to seven months' imprisonment, contacts argue that most Ministry perpetrators escape sanction or suffer only wrist slaps. "Effective" employee representation is largely to blame; the same union whose workplace rules ensure that only the highest-ranking officers toil past five (a well-known Lillikas complaint) protects members against all but the most flagrant violations. ¶10. (C) A second factor making Cypriot diplomats difficult to control is their rapid, near-guaranteed progression through the ranks. Comparing the number of career (vice appointee) U.S. Ambassadors to the total count of Foreign Service Officers, for illustration, a raw A-100 recruit stands approximately a three-percent chance of running an Embassy, and promotions become progressively more difficult as rank rises. The RoC reality differs greatly. Owing to the small size of its diplomatic corps and the RoC's desire for broad representation -- to cultivate support for its Cyprus Problem positions, primarily -- many missions operate as one-diplomat shows, their principal officers wearing ambassadorial stripes despite some possessing only FS-1-equivalent experience levels. Most incoming MFA diplomats expect and obtain chief of mission postings before their careers expire, former Multilateral Affairs Chief (and current Cypriot Ambassador to Ireland) Sotos Liassides told PolChief in November. Their futures seemingly assured, he continued, many adopt an arrogant attitude and are difficult to manage. Other MFA officers consulted more recently claim that promotion rates are dropping, but still greatly exceed ours. ¶11. (C) A growing Cypriot diplomatic service would seem to call for greater controls. Media recently reported that the RoC legislature had approved an MFA workplan to open a dozen additional missions by 2009. Twenty new diplomatic positions will materialize to staff them, Kountarides reported, although eighteen months will pass before the new hires came on board. Lillikas and company seem best served by using the interim to rein in their current charges. SCHLICHER