TALAT'S SHOWDOWN WITH TURKISH ARMY OVER LEDRA

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 NICOSIA 000021 SIPDIS SIPDIS E.O. 12958: DECL: 01/05/2017 TAGS: PGOV PREL UNFICYP EUN MOPS TU CY SUBJECT: TALAT'S SHOWDOWN WITH TURKISH ARMY OVER LEDRA STREET CROSSING REF: 05 NICOSIA 1883 Classified By: CDA Jane B. Zimmerman, reasons 1.4 (b/d). ¶1. (C) SUMMARY. "TRNC President" Mehmet Ali Talat's public promise to remove the controversial pedestrian bridge at the Green Line on Ledra Street has put him on a collision course with the Turkish military. The bridge, which crosses over a Turkish army patrol track along the north edge of the Buffer Zone, precipitated a deadlock over a year ago in preparations to open an economically and symbolically important crossing point in the heart of Old Nicosia (reftel). Hoping to prove himself master of his own domain -- and wrongfoot Papadopoulos at the same time -- Talat announced December 28 that he would take down the bridge immediately in order to signal his New Year commitment to making progress toward solving the Cyprus problem. A week later, however, Turkish military resistance has blocked plans to remove the structure, prompting Talat to travel to Turkey to try to break the deadlock in talks with the AKP government and the TGS. Talat has taken a significant political gamble in trying to force the issue over Turkish military objections; his credibility as the leader of his community may be at stake. According to "PM" Ferdi Soyer, Talat has threatened to resign if he cannot make good on his promise to remove the bridge. Soyer told Charge that if Talat is unsuccessful in Ankara, the ruling CTP may well call its supporters onto the streets for protests, which would reflect Turkish Cypriot resentment at the reach of the military and "Deep State" in Cyprus. END SUMMARY. MR. TALAT, TEAR DOWN THIS BRIDGE -------------- ¶2. (C) On December 28 "President" Talat announced he would remove the controversial pedestrian bridge the Turkish Cypriots installed on Ledra Street in 2005 (reftel). Talat's "government," which had scored a propaganda coup by unilaterally opening a checkpoint at Astromeritis/Bostanci earlier that summer, had hoped to pull off a similar stunt on Ledra Street -- the north-south pedestrian/shopping avenue that forms the central artery of Old Nicosia, but has been cut in two since 1974. Most observers agree that an open Ledra Street would provide a real boost to Nicosia's Turkish Cypriot merchants (while some Greek Cypriot shopkeepers are openly concerned about the prospect of low cost competitors, who stay open on Sunday). More importantly, any move toward reopening Ledra Street would signal a renewed commitment to reuniting the island and Europe's last divided capital. ¶3. (C) Unlike other checkpoints already in operation, however, Ledra Street crosses through an east-west patrol track used by the Turkish army (at Ermou/Hermes Street) -- and Talat's decision to open a crossing there alarmed the local force commanders, who take their orders from Ankara and not from the "TRNC." The pedestrian bridge, which would have carried civilian pedestrians over the heads of patrolling Turkish troops, was viewed by "TRNC" officials as a compromise solution that could have allowed the military to enjoy unfettered access to the area even after the checkpoint opened. ¶4. (C) Although the Embassy (together with the UK and the French missions here) warned Talat at the time that putting up a bridge on the site was politically unwise, Talat nonetheless authorized its construction. This drew the predictable howls of protest from the Greek Cypriots who claimed (falsely, according to the UN) that the bridge intruded into the Buffer Zone and (correctly) that the building of a structure for military purposes along the Green Line was a violation of the spirit of the cease-fire agreement. MR. PAPADOPOULOS, TEAR DOWN THAT PLATFORM -------------- ¶5. (C) In the year that followed, the Turkish Cypriots tried -- unsuccessfully -- to draw attention away from their decision to build the bridge and shift blame for the checkpoint deadlock on Papadopoulos. The Turkish Cypriots suggested they would take down the bridge in exchange for the removal of a wall and viewing platform (complete with dramatic pictures of "victims of the occupation") erected by the Greek Cypriot National Guard on the southern end of the Buffer Zone at Ledra Street. The GOC replied, however, that no movement on the checkpoint was possible until the status quo ante was restored and the bridge removed. ¶6. (C) UN sources tell us that although they occasionally raised the subject in their meetings with both sides, diplomacy on the matter has consisted mainly of nasty NICOSIA 00000021 002 OF 003 sound-bites exchanged through the media over the past year. Informal discussions regarding the checkpoint between the two mayors of Nicosia and party leaders from both communities were similarly futile. ARMY TO TALAT: YA FEELIN' LUCKY, PUNK? -------------- ¶7. (C) Talat's December 28 announcement that he would take down the bridge caught most observers by surprise. Although the Embassy (as well as the UK, UN and others) have consistently prodded Talat to make a move on Ledra Street for over a year, his response has been generally tepid; Talat aides have repeatedly said that a simultaneous reciprocal gesture from the GOC would be needed before they could politically afford to back down from their decision to build "the bridge of peace." Talat's personal secretary told us, however, that Talat's change of heart sprung from a series of factors including: 1) the new lull in Turkey-EU tensions, 2) increasing domestic political pressure for the pro-solution Talat to "do something" that might change the parameters of the Cyprus problem and give an economic boost to his voters, and 3) the new AKEL mayor in the south, who might be an easier interlocutor on municipal issues like Ledra because of her long ties to Talat's CTP and her support for the Annan Plan. ¶8. (C) In a private meeting with the Charge, "PM" Ferdi Soyer told us that Talat thought he had reached consensus with the Turkish ambassador and army on the matter just before making his announcement. Subsequently, however, local Turkish force commander Kivrikoglu put his foot down, refused to agree to the dismantling of the bridge, and began "working against Talat" with the TGS in Ankara. Talat, feeling that his credibility as a leader and fully-competent interlocutor was at stake, made the announcement anyway. ¶9. (C) In the subsequent week -- despite encouraging statements from the Embassy, UK High Commission, and UNFICYP -- the Turkish Cypriots have not made any visible progress removing the bridge. "TRNC" leaders publicly blame the delay on "agitation" by local nationalist opposition forces, led by Serdar Denktash, who categorize the unilateral demolition of the bridge as a "concession" to Papadopoulos. The GOC, meanwhile, has alternated between dismissing Talat's bridge announcement as a "ruse" and claiming that, in any case, Talat is a puppet who lacks the authority to act without Turkish direction. President Papadopoulos stated that the removal of the bridge would not be enough for the GOC to agree to the opening of the checkpoint, and has dusted off a series of additional demands including the demilitarization of the Old City and the removal of flags and symbols in the area -- despite their presence at currently-existing crossing points. ¶10. (C) Turkish Cypriot officials have criticized Papadopoulos's "bullying provocation" and promised us that the bridge "would definitely come down soon." They insist that as the "sovereign president of he TRNC", this is Talat's call to make. Off the record, however, "PM" Soyer and Talat's private Secretary Asim Akansoy confess that it is not a done deal. According to them, Talat's January 4 visit to Istanbul was an "emergency consultation" with Turkish PM Erdogan and FM Gul. They reportedly offered their quiet support to the removal of the bridge as a way to stay "on step ahead" of Papadopoulos, but gave no hint of sticking their necks out for Talat with regard to TGS Chief Buyukanit or the military. Talat's January 5 meeting with Buyukanit is, they say, likely to be more difficult -- and constitutes a last-ditch attempt to win military approval to take down the bridge. COMMENT: TALAT'S CREDIBILITY ON THE LINE -------------- ¶11. (C) A fully-functional Ledra Street crossing seems unlikely any time soon, even if the bridge comes down. Although the bridge has distracted attention from this fact for over a year, the GOC remains ambivalent (to say the least) about the wisdom of opening a checkpoint that would be politically and economically very beneficial to the Turkish Cypriots. Papadopoulos's decision to attach additional conditions could easily be viewed as attempt to create fall-back pretexts to delay the checkpoint further. ¶12. (C) The current Ledra Street situation is about more than just another checkpoint. What started as an apparently honest (if clumsy and uncoordinated) attempt by Talat to seize the initiative in the Cyprus problem has quickly lurched into a crisis. After seeking and receiving public messages of support for his decision from us, the UK, and NICOSIA 00000021 003 OF 003 UNFICYP, Talat has yet to deliver. More ominously, Talat has challenged the army in the arena of security, where the Turkish Cypriots have traditionally held very little sway. If he cannot prevail upon them to accept his right to decide in this matter, his legitimacy as a leader, both in the eyes of the international community and here on the island, will be in tatters. Talat could conceivably make good on his (so far private) threat to resign if this episode proves that he is, indeed, merely a Turkish puppet. Even if the talk of resignation is just a bluff, however, a humiliating defeat would severely limit Talat's leeway to engage constructively in the Gambari process. END COMMENT. ZIMMERMAN