HOPES HIGHER FOR LEDRA STREET REOPENING, BROADER

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 NICOSIA 000205 SIPDIS SIPDIS DEPARTMENT FOR EUR/SE, IO/UNP E.O. 12958: DECL: 03/08/2017 TAGS: PREL PGOV UNFICYP CY TU SUBJECT: HOPES HIGHER FOR LEDRA STREET REOPENING, BROADER UN PROCESS REF: NICOSIA 21 Classified By: Ambassador Ronald Schlicher, Reasons 1.4 (b),(d) ¶1. (C) SUMMARY: On President Tassos Papadopoulos's command, Greek Cypriot workers late March 8 demolished a wall and viewing platform on Ledra Street, raising hopes that a Buffer Zone crossing in the heart of Old Nicosia might soon open. T/C leaders greeted the wall's fall with guarded optimism, while the international community welcomed the action and called on the sides to engage immediately with the UN to accomplish the security measures needed to open the crossing point. Most analysts attribute the demolition to Papadopoulos's desire to regain moral high ground, since external parties (the EU and USG, for example) as well as Cypriot coalition mates were blaming RoC intransigence for stalled talks on Ledra and for unclear intentions on broader CyProb negotiations. Taken together with a recent Greek Cypriot effort to jump-start the July 8 process, the President's about-face -- he earlier promised the wall would remain until Turkish troops abandoned the area -- leaves us guardedly optimistic as well. END SUMMARY. -------------- All Were Stunned by the News -------------- ¶2. (U) Night-owls catching the 11 o'clock news March 8 watched with great surprise as RoC-contracted bulldozers and jackhammer-armed work crews began to demolish the barrier, which Turkish Cypriots had called the "Wall of Shame." The structure dated to the early 1960s, when the start of intercommunal violence resulted in the barricading of Ledra Street, Old Nicosia's primary north-south thoroughfare and once the commercial heart of the city. One hundred yards to the north, Turkish Cypriots had erected a similar wall, and the area between the two became a disputed no-man's land and UNFICYP patrol route. ¶3. (U) Buffer Zone crossing points to the east and west opened in 2003 after then-Turkish Cypriot leader Rauf Denktash liberalized "border" regulations. Demand for Ledra Street's reopening subsequently grew among pro-solution forces on the island, both to revitalize commerce in the economically depressed center city and to send a symbolic message of unity. In preparation for an eventual opening and to try to propitiate a balky Turkish Army, Turkish Cypriots constructed a footbridge on Ledra over a perpendicular street on which Turkish Forces patrolled. Greek Cypriots protested, claiming the measure worked against the area's demilitarization, a G/C pre-condition. ¶4. (C) Defying the Turkish military, T/C leader Mehmet Ali Talat succeeded in removing the "offending" bridge in early January. Understandably, he demanded the Greek Cypriots reciprocate, tearing down the "Wall of Shame" and adjoining G/C National Guard post. Papadopoulos, supported by most G/C party leaders, refused. "T/Cs cannot expect a concession from us in exchange for dismantling an 'illegal' structure that never should have been built," they screamed. Only new Nicosia Mayor Eleni Mavrou and parliamentary opposition leader Nikos Anastassiades (DISY) praised Talat for taking on the generals; Anastassiades received withering criticism in the National Council as payback. Papadopoulos later claimed the government remained interested in opening Ledra. He would consider removing the wall, but only after Turkish Forces withdrew from the area and removed all "TRNC" symbols from the crossing route. (In briefing the diplomatic corps today, MFA Cyprus Problem Division Chief Erato Marcoullis, in another apparent G/C concession, stated in response to a question that the RoC "today was not noting" the national symbols issue.) -------------- In Hindsight, However, Something was Brewing -------------- ¶5. (C) Signs were pointing toward some sort of CyProb-related gesture from the Greek Cypriot side. At a working lunch with the Ambassador a week before, G/C negotiator and intelligence service chief Tasos Tzionis, parrying the Ambassador's repeated urgings to take down the wall and find other ways to build confidence between the parties, hinted his community would attempt to spur movement on the stalled July 8 Process track (days later the G/Cs would deliver, via the UN, a bridging proposal which T/C counterpart Rasit Pertev is currently studying.) Regional Affairs Chief subsequently met Tzionis in the latter's intel NICOSIA 00000205 002 OF 003 chief role, and used the opportunity to urge the wall's immediate demolition. ¶6. (C) Tzionis telephoned the Ambassador at 2200 March 8 and broke the news, trumpeting Papadopoulos's decision as a gesture of goodwill toward his Turkish Cypriot compatriots and seriousness of political purpose to the international community. The RoC's press and public affairs staffs had already engaged, and by 2300, as demolition work commenced, both local and international media were on hand for the spectacle. The situation at 0730 March 9 appeared quite subdued in comparison. Replacing the fortress-like wall and visitors platform -- once adorned with "Nothing is Gained Without Sacrifice, or Victory Without Blood" -- was a simple temporary barrier that blocked views into the buffer zone. A handful of police in dress blues milled about, attempting to attract the attention of the few remaining journalists. -------------- Positive Spin on Both Sides -------------- ¶7. (U) Media carried the story front-and-center, reporting early impressions from leaders on both sides. President Papadopoulos, in Brussels for the weekend meeting of the European Council, repeated Tzionis's "goodwill gesture" explanation but cautioned that the RoC's pre-conditions remained: without withdrawal of Turkish troops and removal of symbols, there would be no Ledra Street crossing. Most party leaders welcomed the government's move and demanded the T/Cs reciprocate. Only opposition DISY criticized Papadopoulos, accusing the President of making an unwarranted concession. ¶8. (C) Turkish Cypriot authorities greeted the news optimistically. In comments to media, negotiator Pertev voiced hope that crossings via Ledra might soon start. "It was the Greek Cypriots' turn, and they did the right thing," he added. Pertev later told us that Tzionis had telephoned him with news of the demolition; subsequently, he and other "TRNC officials" visited Lokmaci (Ledra's northern Nicosia extension),where they discussed removing G/C-baiting propaganda banners there. "President" Talat, traveling in Azerbaijan, reportedly delighted in the news, while "PM" Ferdi Soyer labeled the development positive. Nationalist Turkish Cypriot parties termed the wall's removal a "shallow move to obtain political kudos," however, arguing the G/Cs had no intention ever to open the crossing. ¶9. (U) Early March 9, the Ambassador visited Ledra Street to observe developments personally. In an impromptu press conference with dozens of reassembled reporters, he welcomed the wall coming down, as well as the Turkish Cypriots' earlier bridge demolition. The moves were a welcome effort toward opening Ledra and reuniting Europe's last capital; he urged the parties to work with the UN to accomplish the practical steps needed to fully open the crossing point. Concluding, the Ambassador called on both communities to take advantage of the positive momentum by launching the technical talks process envisaged in the July 8 process. The UN, UK, EU Presidency and Perm-5 Ambassadors delivered similar messages locally. -------------- Behind the Scenes Maneuverings -------------- ¶10. (C) Despite Papadopoulos claiming from Brussels that he earlier had consulted UNFICYP, UN personnel informed us they were taken completely by surprise. Briefing PolChief and British DCM Rob Fenn on March 9, Chief of Staff Peter Fraser-Hopewell revealed that the GCNG had alerted UNFICYP at 1900 the previous day, just four hours before demolition commenced. Only four in the government had knowledge of the operation, Fraser-Hopewell learned: Papadopoulos, Tzionis, and the chiefs of the GCNG and Cypriot Police. He commended their operational security. ¶11. (C) The GCNG had come with list of precise demands, Fraser-Hopewell divulged. UNFICYP should brief the Turkish Forces "at the highest levels" of the pending demolition, to ensure the TF would not react rashly. The UN should erect a barrier to prevent the TF from viewing the operation from ground-level. And armed UN troops should be present in the BZ throughout the six-hour duration. As requested, UNFICYP Force Commander MF Rafael Barni delivered the messages to the TF Chief of Staff in Cyprus, MG Memisoglu, one hour before destruction commenced. Fraser-Hopewell claimed that NICOSIA 00000205 003 OF 003 Memisoglu succeeded "in spades" in briefing down the chain of command, and there were no incidents. He thought the Turkish two-star would consult with superiors in Ankara over the weekend to determine next steps. ¶12. (C) Significant work remained before the crossing could open, he noted. UNFICYP experts immediately would deploy to the buildings along the Ledra corridor, searching for (and, if necessary, neutralizing) unexploded ordnance. Engineers from UNDP would began preparations for shoring up the decrepit structures abutting the street. Difficult negotiations awaited as well, Fraser-Hopewell predicted. Just what did troops "withdrawing from the immediate vicinity mean?" for example. And the parties involved continued to dispute "ownership" of 30 meters of the proposed route, an issue relevant to G/C demands to move both sides' security forces back 100 meters from the crossing. MG Barni hoped to raise these issues with Memisoglu the week of March 12. -------------- Why He Acted, and What Comes Next -------------- ¶13. (C) With characteristic bluster, Papadopoulos dismissed Talat's January bridge demolition, assuring Greek Cypriots their wall would stand until Turkish troops departed Ledra's confines. Why, then, the apparent "concession?" Despite Papadopoulos's still-solid polling numbers, more than a whiff of Cypriot dissatisfaction has emerged of late. Party mate and EU Commissioner Markos Kyprianou publicly criticized the President for his handling of the Cyprus Problem; Government Spokesman Christodolou Pashiardis and Tassos's other spin-meisters proved unable to counter the respected Kyprianou's observations. Further, coalition mate Dimitris Christofias, Communist Party AKEL's secretary general, assured media recently that the President should not take his party's support for granted (while we continue to believe AKEL will come around, Christofias is feeling heat from pro-solution AKEL voters angry with Papadopoulos's CyProb slow-rolling.) ¶14. (C) External pressures are mounting as well, demanding the President engage Turkish Cypriots in real dialogue. The Ambassador harangues RoC Foreign Minister Yiorgos Lillikas and Tzionis at every opportunity to make positive gestures to jump-start the UN process. Council of Europe Parliamentary Assembly President Rene van der Linden, visiting Cyprus in late February, called for Ledra's immediate opening. UK sources reveal that Foreign Secretary Margaret Beckett, in a letter to Lillikas, echoed van der Linden's call and urged a quick resumption of UN-brokered negotiations. European Commissioner for Enlargement Olli Rehn is sticking to his "G/C-unfriendly" interpretation of the EU's Direct Trade Regulation, and this week blasted the RoC-dominated Cypriot media for their attacks on his impartiality and professionalism. ¶15. (C) Papadopoulos needed to win back the white hat. Ever the tactician, he has struck on multiple fronts. The latest G/C proposal to end the impasse on the July 8 talks -- in which each side would propose one technical committee and one substantive working group to begin work immediately -- appears difficult for the Turkish Cypriots to dismiss out-of-hand. Similarly, who could criticize his order to demolish the wall, an action he'll no doubt trumpet for weeks to come (regardless of whether he orders the checkpoint to open)? We've even noticed a charm offensive on the RoC's front, evinced best by Tzionis's recent chumminess on political as well as intelligence/law enforcement matters. Unsure how long this opening will last, in public comments and private diplomacy the Embassy will push hard for serious give-and-take in the UN talks and greater bilateral security cooperation. SCHLICHER