HOPES HIGHER FOR LEDRA STREET REOPENING, BROADER

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 NICOSIA 000205

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

DEPARTMENT FOR EUR/SE, IO/UNP

E.O. 12958: DECL: 03/08/2017
TAGS: PREL PGOV UNFICYP CY TU
SUBJECT: HOPES HIGHER FOR LEDRA STREET REOPENING, BROADER
UN PROCESS

REF: NICOSIA 21

Classified By: Ambassador Ronald Schlicher, Reasons 1.4 (b),(d)


1. (C) SUMMARY: On President Tassos Papadopoulos's command,
Greek Cypriot workers late March 8 demolished a wall and
viewing platform on Ledra Street, raising hopes that a Buffer
Zone crossing in the heart of Old Nicosia might soon open.
T/C leaders greeted the wall's fall with guarded optimism,
while the international community welcomed the action and
called on the sides to engage immediately with the UN to
accomplish the security measures needed to open the crossing
point. Most analysts attribute the demolition to
Papadopoulos's desire to regain moral high ground, since
external parties (the EU and USG, for example) as well as
Cypriot coalition mates were blaming RoC intransigence for
stalled talks on Ledra and for unclear intentions on broader
CyProb negotiations. Taken together with a recent Greek
Cypriot effort to jump-start the July 8 process, the
President's about-face -- he earlier promised the wall would
remain until Turkish troops abandoned the area -- leaves us
guardedly optimistic as well. END SUMMARY.

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All Were Stunned by the News
--------------


2. (U) Night-owls catching the 11 o'clock news March 8
watched with great surprise as RoC-contracted bulldozers and
jackhammer-armed work crews began to demolish the barrier,
which Turkish Cypriots had called the "Wall of Shame." The
structure dated to the early 1960s, when the start of
intercommunal violence resulted in the barricading of Ledra
Street, Old Nicosia's primary north-south thoroughfare and
once the commercial heart of the city. One hundred yards to
the north, Turkish Cypriots had erected a similar wall, and
the area between the two became a disputed no-man's land and
UNFICYP patrol route.


3. (U) Buffer Zone crossing points to the east and west
opened in 2003 after then-Turkish Cypriot leader Rauf
Denktash liberalized "border" regulations. Demand for Ledra
Street's reopening subsequently grew among pro-solution
forces on the island, both to revitalize commerce in the
economically depressed center city and to send a symbolic
message of unity. In preparation for an eventual opening and
to try to propitiate a balky Turkish Army, Turkish Cypriots
constructed a footbridge on Ledra over a perpendicular street
on which Turkish Forces patrolled. Greek Cypriots protested,
claiming the measure worked against the area's
demilitarization, a G/C pre-condition.


4. (C) Defying the Turkish military, T/C leader Mehmet Ali
Talat succeeded in removing the "offending" bridge in early
January. Understandably, he demanded the Greek Cypriots
reciprocate, tearing down the "Wall of Shame" and adjoining
G/C National Guard post. Papadopoulos, supported by most G/C
party leaders, refused. "T/Cs cannot expect a concession
from us in exchange for dismantling an 'illegal' structure
that never should have been built," they screamed. Only new
Nicosia Mayor Eleni Mavrou and parliamentary opposition
leader Nikos Anastassiades (DISY) praised Talat for taking on
the generals; Anastassiades received withering criticism in
the National Council as payback. Papadopoulos later claimed
the government remained interested in opening Ledra. He
would consider removing the wall, but only after Turkish
Forces withdrew from the area and removed all "TRNC" symbols
from the crossing route. (In briefing the diplomatic corps
today, MFA Cyprus Problem Division Chief Erato Marcoullis, in
another apparent G/C concession, stated in response to a
question that the RoC "today was not noting" the national
symbols issue.)

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In Hindsight, However, Something was Brewing
--------------


5. (C) Signs were pointing toward some sort of
CyProb-related gesture from the Greek Cypriot side. At a
working lunch with the Ambassador a week before, G/C
negotiator and intelligence service chief Tasos Tzionis,
parrying the Ambassador's repeated urgings to take down the
wall and find other ways to build confidence between the
parties, hinted his community would attempt to spur movement
on the stalled July 8 Process track (days later the G/Cs
would deliver, via the UN, a bridging proposal which T/C
counterpart Rasit Pertev is currently studying.) Regional
Affairs Chief subsequently met Tzionis in the latter's intel

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chief role, and used the opportunity to urge the wall's
immediate demolition.


6. (C) Tzionis telephoned the Ambassador at 2200 March 8 and
broke the news, trumpeting Papadopoulos's decision as a
gesture of goodwill toward his Turkish Cypriot compatriots
and seriousness of political purpose to the international
community. The RoC's press and public affairs staffs had
already engaged, and by 2300, as demolition work commenced,
both local and international media were on hand for the
spectacle. The situation at 0730 March 9 appeared quite
subdued in comparison. Replacing the fortress-like wall and
visitors platform -- once adorned with "Nothing is Gained
Without Sacrifice, or Victory Without Blood" -- was a simple
temporary barrier that blocked views into the buffer zone. A
handful of police in dress blues milled about, attempting to
attract the attention of the few remaining journalists.

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Positive Spin on Both Sides
--------------


7. (U) Media carried the story front-and-center, reporting
early impressions from leaders on both sides. President
Papadopoulos, in Brussels for the weekend meeting of the
European Council, repeated Tzionis's "goodwill gesture"
explanation but cautioned that the RoC's pre-conditions
remained: without withdrawal of Turkish troops and removal
of symbols, there would be no Ledra Street crossing. Most
party leaders welcomed the government's move and demanded the
T/Cs reciprocate. Only opposition DISY criticized
Papadopoulos, accusing the President of making an unwarranted
concession.


8. (C) Turkish Cypriot authorities greeted the news
optimistically. In comments to media, negotiator Pertev
voiced hope that crossings via Ledra might soon start. "It
was the Greek Cypriots' turn, and they did the right thing,"
he added. Pertev later told us that Tzionis had telephoned
him with news of the demolition; subsequently, he and other
"TRNC officials" visited Lokmaci (Ledra's northern Nicosia
extension),where they discussed removing G/C-baiting
propaganda banners there. "President" Talat, traveling in
Azerbaijan, reportedly delighted in the news, while "PM"
Ferdi Soyer labeled the development positive. Nationalist
Turkish Cypriot parties termed the wall's removal a "shallow
move to obtain political kudos," however, arguing the G/Cs
had no intention ever to open the crossing.


9. (U) Early March 9, the Ambassador visited Ledra Street to
observe developments personally. In an impromptu press
conference with dozens of reassembled reporters, he welcomed
the wall coming down, as well as the Turkish Cypriots'
earlier bridge demolition. The moves were a welcome effort
toward opening Ledra and reuniting Europe's last capital; he
urged the parties to work with the UN to accomplish the
practical steps needed to fully open the crossing point.
Concluding, the Ambassador called on both communities to take
advantage of the positive momentum by launching the technical
talks process envisaged in the July 8 process. The UN, UK,
EU Presidency and Perm-5 Ambassadors delivered similar
messages locally.

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Behind the Scenes Maneuverings
--------------


10. (C) Despite Papadopoulos claiming from Brussels that he
earlier had consulted UNFICYP, UN personnel informed us they
were taken completely by surprise. Briefing PolChief and
British DCM Rob Fenn on March 9, Chief of Staff Peter
Fraser-Hopewell revealed that the GCNG had alerted UNFICYP at
1900 the previous day, just four hours before demolition
commenced. Only four in the government had knowledge of the
operation, Fraser-Hopewell learned: Papadopoulos, Tzionis,
and the chiefs of the GCNG and Cypriot Police. He commended
their operational security.


11. (C) The GCNG had come with list of precise demands,
Fraser-Hopewell divulged. UNFICYP should brief the Turkish
Forces "at the highest levels" of the pending demolition, to
ensure the TF would not react rashly. The UN should erect a
barrier to prevent the TF from viewing the operation from
ground-level. And armed UN troops should be present in the
BZ throughout the six-hour duration. As requested, UNFICYP
Force Commander MF Rafael Barni delivered the messages to the
TF Chief of Staff in Cyprus, MG Memisoglu, one hour before
destruction commenced. Fraser-Hopewell claimed that

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Memisoglu succeeded "in spades" in briefing down the chain of
command, and there were no incidents. He thought the Turkish
two-star would consult with superiors in Ankara over the
weekend to determine next steps.


12. (C) Significant work remained before the crossing could
open, he noted. UNFICYP experts immediately would deploy to
the buildings along the Ledra corridor, searching for (and,
if necessary, neutralizing) unexploded ordnance. Engineers
from UNDP would began preparations for shoring up the
decrepit structures abutting the street. Difficult
negotiations awaited as well, Fraser-Hopewell predicted.
Just what did troops "withdrawing from the immediate vicinity
mean?" for example. And the parties involved continued to
dispute "ownership" of 30 meters of the proposed route, an
issue relevant to G/C demands to move both sides' security
forces back 100 meters from the crossing. MG Barni hoped to
raise these issues with Memisoglu the week of March 12.

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Why He Acted, and What Comes Next
--------------


13. (C) With characteristic bluster, Papadopoulos dismissed
Talat's January bridge demolition, assuring Greek Cypriots
their wall would stand until Turkish troops departed Ledra's
confines. Why, then, the apparent "concession?" Despite
Papadopoulos's still-solid polling numbers, more than a whiff
of Cypriot dissatisfaction has emerged of late. Party mate
and EU Commissioner Markos Kyprianou publicly criticized the
President for his handling of the Cyprus Problem; Government
Spokesman Christodolou Pashiardis and Tassos's other
spin-meisters proved unable to counter the respected
Kyprianou's observations. Further, coalition mate Dimitris
Christofias, Communist Party AKEL's secretary general,
assured media recently that the President should not take his
party's support for granted (while we continue to believe
AKEL will come around, Christofias is feeling heat from
pro-solution AKEL voters angry with Papadopoulos's CyProb
slow-rolling.)


14. (C) External pressures are mounting as well, demanding
the President engage Turkish Cypriots in real dialogue. The
Ambassador harangues RoC Foreign Minister Yiorgos Lillikas
and Tzionis at every opportunity to make positive gestures to
jump-start the UN process. Council of Europe Parliamentary
Assembly President Rene van der Linden, visiting Cyprus in
late February, called for Ledra's immediate opening. UK
sources reveal that Foreign Secretary Margaret Beckett, in a
letter to Lillikas, echoed van der Linden's call and urged a
quick resumption of UN-brokered negotiations. European
Commissioner for Enlargement Olli Rehn is sticking to his
"G/C-unfriendly" interpretation of the EU's Direct Trade
Regulation, and this week blasted the RoC-dominated Cypriot
media for their attacks on his impartiality and
professionalism.


15. (C) Papadopoulos needed to win back the white hat. Ever
the tactician, he has struck on multiple fronts. The latest
G/C proposal to end the impasse on the July 8 talks -- in
which each side would propose one technical committee and one
substantive working group to begin work immediately --
appears difficult for the Turkish Cypriots to dismiss
out-of-hand. Similarly, who could criticize his order to
demolish the wall, an action he'll no doubt trumpet for weeks
to come (regardless of whether he orders the checkpoint to
open)? We've even noticed a charm offensive on the RoC's
front, evinced best by Tzionis's recent chumminess on
political as well as intelligence/law enforcement matters.
Unsure how long this opening will last, in public comments
and private diplomacy the Embassy will push hard for serious
give-and-take in the UN talks and greater bilateral security
cooperation.
SCHLICHER