CYPRUS: CIV-MIL RELATIONS HIT NEW LOW, TALAT

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 04 NICOSIA 000140 SIPDIS SIPDIS E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/13/2017 TAGS: PGOV PREL PHUM UNFICYP MOPS TU CY SUBJECT: CYPRUS: CIV-MIL RELATIONS HIT NEW LOW, TALAT IRREVERSIBLY WEAKENED? REF: A. 05 NICOSIA 291 ¶B. 06 NICOSIA 1345 ¶C. NICOSIA 21 ¶D. NICOSIA 126 ¶E. NICOSIA CY IIR 6823005107 ¶F. NICOSIA CY IIR 6823005607 ¶G. NICOSIA 74 ¶H. MACRIS-SILLIMAN EMAIL (2/8/2007) ¶I. LIBBY-SILLIMAN EMAIL (2/7/2007) Classified By: Ambassador Ronald L. Schlicher, reasons 1.4 (b/d). ¶1. (S) SUMMARY AND COMMENT. Relations between the increasingly assertive Turkish military and the increasingly hesitant Turkish Cypriot civilian leadership have taken a definite turn for the worse in recent months. The January contest of wills between "TRNC President" Talat and the generals over the pedestrian bridge at Ledra Street was only the most public manifestation of growing strain in this difficult relationship. Sources close to Talat have expressed anxiety about the new, hard-line commander of Turkish forces on the island and about the AKP-led GOT's apparent unwillingness to "stick out its neck" for pro-settlement Turkish Cypriots. For their part, local military brass (perhaps taking a cue from the TGS in Ankara) have reversed their three-year-old policy of studied political neutrality, openly conveying to us and others their contempt for the center-left Talat and the "sell-out" platform they feel he represents. ¶2. (C) Growing political difficulties at home (polls show Turkish Cypriot opinion has swung sharply away from the pro-unification line on which the CTP was elected) and continued stalemate on the UN settlement track have added to Talat's headaches. Although the current "TRNC government" will probably survive, it is caught in a three-way squeeze between Turkish army bullying, the Greek Cypriot all-or-nothing approach to settlement talks, and a gradual loss of domestic political support. This has undercut Talat's willingness to take any pro-active steps on Cyprus. His reluctant transformation into an intransigent "Denktash II" may be irreversible, and may produce negative fallout for settlement talks, Turkey-EU relations, and USG interests. END SUMMARY AND COMMENT. THE GOOD OLD DAYS -------------- ¶3. (C) After the 2003 elections that brought the CTP of Mehmet Ali Talat to power in the "TRNC," the Turkish army on the island kept an unprecedented low profile (ref a). �A;Reversing years of overt financial and political support for successive hard-line "governments" under "President Denktash," the military largely kept its nose out of Turkish Cypriot politics from 2004-2006 -- opening the door for a series of knock-out election victories by the center-left, pro-settlement CTP, a resounding "yes" vote for the Annan Plan, and a series of confidence-building gestures toward the Greek Cypriots, including the opening of churches in the north for worship and reengagement with the Committee on Missing Persons (ref b). ¶4. (C) According to Embassy contacts close to Talat, the AKP-led Turkish government -- then popular at home and commendably eager to remove the Cyprus irritant from Turkey-EU relations -- openly supported efforts such as these. At the same time, "progressive" CHOD Ozkok (whom Turkish Cypriots say was more a "NATO man" than a "Deep State man") set a positive tone for Turkish forces on the island. Shortly after his election in 2005, "PM" Soyer told us with obvious astonishment how the then-commander of Turkish forces here, Memisoglu, had called on him in his office and said, "My sword is at your service, Mr. Prime Minister." ¶5. (C) Although angry over perceived slights by the "TRNC" civilian leadership (such as when "President" Talat broke with years of tradition by hosting a Bayram holiday reception on his own, without the generals),the military on the island generally held their tongue. Indeed, according to Soyer's private secretary, the three-star force commander continued to participate constructively in weekly policy meetings with Talat, the "PM," then-"FM" Serdar Denktash, and the local Turkish "ambassador." In many cases (such as when Talat engaged in 2005 Luxembourg-sponsored talks on a Varosha/direct trade swap) the generals deferred to the "president" even when they disagreed over issues that came up in this forum -- often after being convinced by the previous Turkish "ambassador" that Talat could be trusted not to give away the store. NICOSIA 00000140 002.2 OF 004 THEY'RE BAAACK: THE ARMY COMES OUT OF THE BARRACKS -------------- -------------- ¶6. (S) Several recent events, however, have suggested that the military has abandoned its light touch: -- Ledra Street Bridge. Despite reports that they had agreed in December to Talat's proposal to take down the controversial footbridge at this long-delayed checkpoint, local commanders backpedaled, forcing Talat to make a humiliating trip to Turkey in January to beg the GOT and TGS for permission to remove the bridge. Subsequent public statements by CHOD Buyukanit reaffirming the Turkish army's final "authority" over security matters along the Buffer Zone undercut Talat's "presidential" stature -- leading observers on both sides of the Green Line to comment that although Talat succeeded in removing the bridge, he had won a Pyrrhic victory, which only underscored the limits to what he can do on his own (ref c). -- Article 10. Subsequent public debate over Article 10 of the "TRNC constitution" (which "temporarily" cedes security oversight from Turkish Cypriot civilians to the Turkish "Peace Forces") has been muted after Turkish army figures, including visiting land forces commander Basbug in January, made it clear they would oppose any move to restrict their powers. The local rumor mill, as well as sensitive reporting, suggest that Turkish security forces have had a hand in organizing pro-Article 10 demonstrations by nationalist opposition parties UBP and DP. -- Green Line Shootings. Later that month Turkish Forces along the Green Line instituted more aggressive rules of engagement, which immediately led to two live-fire incidents in the Buffer Zone the following day. One high-ranking Turkish military officer subsequently told DATT that the new rules of engagement were, among other things, a responsQto Talat's impudence in pressing ahead with the removal of the Ledra Street Bridge over their objections (ref d, e, f). -- Criminal Activity. A December shoot-out between two mainland criminal figures in a Kyrenia casino has embarrassed the hapless "TRNC government" by highlighting its inability to regulate the mafia-infested gambling industry. Sensitive reporting and on-the-street rumors suggest that the police (who answer directly to the Turkish military) were aware of the impending mob showdown but did nothing in order to humiliate the Talat "government." Allegations that the gangsters involved in this incident had ties to the military have led to rumors of a resurgent Susurluk-style alliance between the "Deep State" and criminals operating in Cyprus. -- Missing Persons Threats. Credible rumors (as well as sensitive reporting) suggest that elements from the Turkish security forces played a role in recent threats against Turkish Cypriots working for the Committee on Missing Persons, the only real "bicommunal success story" of the post-referenda period. The CMP had been seeking to exhume Greek Cypriot civilian remains from the village of Serdarli, where they were killed by Turkish and Turkish Cypriot forces during reprisal violence in 1974, but has since postponed its operations in the town (ref g, h) and may be under pressure to slow down new exhumations. -- Public Chest Thumping. For months, military figures have stepped up their use of inflammatory public rhetoric. In addition to Basbug's open political intervention over Article 10, the military turned heads by "hijacking" November's "TRNC Day" celebrations. Master of ceremonies Talat had an open spat with local commanders after they rearranged the ceremonial program without his permission, inserting a speech by a junior officer who repeatedly claimed that the "TRNC would live forever" (with the army's help, of course). Talat's private secretary confided to us that the "president" was furious and humiliated, and predicted the speech would do long-term damage to the dream of reunification in a bi-zonal, bi-communal federation. IT'S POLITICAL -- AND PERSONAL -------------- ¶7. (S) There are several possible explanations for this change in tone. In their contacts with DATT, Turkish military commanders on the island make no secret of their disdain for Talat and the reunification policies he represents, and sensitive reporting suggests they have made a conscious decision to undermine him. But sources close to Talat speculate that there is also a personal element in the NICOSIA 00000140 003 OF 004 army's "vendetta" against Talat. ¶8. (S) Kivrikoglu, the new three-star general who assumed the Cyprus command in August, reportedly worked for military intelligence during a previous, Denktash-era assignment to the island -- and, according to "PM" Soyer's private secretary, was tasked with harassing the then-opposition CTP. SIPDIS Talat's staff and political allies are convinced that Kivrikoglu is "up to his old tricks" (surveillance, supporting the nationalist UBP and DP, etc). "He knows what we do day and night," our contact said. Regardless of whether these allegations are true, the spill-over effect of this mutual mistrust has been significant. The once-weekly coordination meetings between the "TRNC" leadership and the army have reportedly come to a halt. Furthermore, the new Turkish "ambassador" (Turkekul Kurttekin, who took up his duties in January) is either too fresh in his post or too openly nationalistic to perform the mediating role his predecessor did, according to our contacts (ref i). ¶9. (C) In addition to this local/personal dimension, Turkish Cypriot civilians express worry about fallout from the current civilian-military balance in Turkey. Shortly before taking over from Ozkok, Buyukanit's public promise not to remove "a single soldier" from Cyprus sent a chill down spines in the pro-settlement camp. Talat's private secretary told us that the "president" must "negotiate more carefully" with the TGS in Ankara, especially on Cyprus-related matters, now that Buyukanit has assumed command. ¶10. (C) At the same time, the ruling AKP appears to have lost interest in sticking its neck out for the CTP -- or in support of any forward-leaning moves on Cyprus. During the Ledra Street debacle, Soyer confided to us that Erdogan and Gul "privately" supported Talat's initiative to remove the bridge. Soyer's private secretary told us, however, that Gul kept silent during Talat's subsequent meeting with Buyukanit, leaving the Turkish Cypriot to plead on his own. Although AKP leaders subsequently gave Talat their public endorsement, CTP insiders tell us AKP has asked Talat to refrain from making any additional dramatic moves, at least until after Turkish elections. THE THREE-WAY SQUEEZE -------------- ¶11. (C) Continued frosty relations with the Greek Cypriots have compounded Talat's headaches. The July 8 Gambari Agreement (which Turkish Cypriots felt was a concession since it made no reference to the Annan Plan),Talat's politically costly move to dismantle the bridge at Ledra Street, and other steps like the unilateral opening of a Greek school in Karpass were all perceived as goodwill gestures by Turkish Cypriots, who accuse the Greek Cypriots of failing to reciprocate. Reluctantly acknowledging that his side also shared blame for delays in the Gambari Process, one Turkish Cypriot insider nonetheless complained about Greek Cypriot efforts to hassle Turkish Cypriots as a community and belittle Talat as an interlocutor -- rather than engaging seriously on substance. Indeed, as UNFICYP Chief Michael Moller commented to us candidly, the Papadopoulos administration seemed intent on undercutting Talat even though that meant "fouling the well from which they must some day drink." ¶12. (C) This has left Talat weakened at home. Popular discontent with his pro-settlement "government" was thrown into sharp relief by the January publication of a survey suggesting that Turkish Cypriot support for a federal solution to the Cyprus problem had fallen sharply. At the same time, support for the Denktashian "two-state" solution rose to 65 percent (ironically, the same proportion that voted in favor of the Annan Plan). Trust in the EU, UN, and political parties were all low, while a whopping 95 percent people said they trusted the army (far more than any other institution). Talat's party -- which was elected on a pro-EU, pro-settlement platform -- is increasingly vulnerable, according to one CTP insider. Between the army, the Greek Cypriot full-court press, and his frustrated constituents, Talat is caught in a "three-way squeeze." IS TALAT HISTORY? SO WHAT? -------------- ¶13. (C) COMMENT: It seems unlikely Talat or his "government" will fall in the near term. Elections are not due until 2010 and the opposition, despite getting chummy with the security forces, remains in disarray. But Talat is a much-diminished figure. This is largely due to factors outside of his NICOSIA 00000140 004 OF 004 control. Talat's failure to live up to his pro-solution rhetoric has more to do with restrictive Turkish red lines -- and the Greek Cypriot hard line -- than with a lack of good will on his part. But the end result is the same. Hemmed in at home and weakened internationally, Talat has been forced into a defensive, nationalist crouch worthy of Rauf Denktash. The resurgence of military domination of the north, and the resulting recrudescence of Denktash-style politics, bodes ill for the Gambari process, for prospects for serious negotiations to remove the Cyprus problem from the regional agenda, and for managing the next Turkey-EU accession crisis. END COMMENT. SCHLICHER