OPPOSITION PRESIDENTIAL CANDIDATE SOON TO ANNOUNCE

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 NICOSIA 000136 SIPDIS SIPDIS DEPARTMENT FOR EUR/SE E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/12/2022 TAGS: PREL PGOV KDEM CY SUBJECT: OPPOSITION PRESIDENTIAL CANDIDATE SOON TO ANNOUNCE Classified By: Ambassador Ronald Schlicher, Reasons 1.4 (b),(d) ¶1. (C) SUMMARY: European Parliamentarian and former Foreign Minister Ioannis Kasoulides will stand in Cyprus's 2008 presidential elections, with a formal announcement likely in March. Behind the decision to run was his conviction that a new generation of leaders should take command in Cyprus, Kasoulides told the Ambassador February 12. Cognizant that his DISY party remained laden with baggage from its support of the 2004 Annan Plan referendum, Kasoulides would run as an independent, albeit one with ties to the right-wing group. Buoying his electoral chances were the growing percentages of AKEL and EDEK voters unsatisfied with President Tassos Papadopoulos's hard-line Cyprus Problem tactics; Kasoulides saw them as ripe for picking. DISY-conducted polling showed his current electoral support at 40 percent, six points below that necessary to win. Papadopoulos remained a formidable candidate, Kasoulides admitted, aided greatly by his control of the media. The President had other tools at his disposal to sway the electorate at key campaign junctures as well, from manufacturing movement on the CyProb to publicizing the onset of oil exploration. The campaign would be long and hard, Kasoulides predicted, and Papadopoulos looked tough to defeat. ¶2. (C) Under the President's stewardship, chances for a Cyprus settlement had diminished, Kasoulides argued. "Papadopoulos is a wonderful goalkeeper," he expounded, referring to the leader's lawyerly, go-slow bent, "but keepers don't win games." To show contrast, Kasoulides revisited his "two-phased" approach to re-unifying the island, which has generated substantial media play recently. Were he to win office, he would pitch to both sides an arrangement wherein a unified Cyprus would feature a continued role for guarantor powers, a presence of foreign troops, veto powers for the communities, and controls over movement and resettlement, but for a fixed period of time. Afterward, Cyprus could "join the community of fully independent nations," Kasoulides asserted. END SUMMARY. -------------- Throwing the Hat into the Ring -------------- ¶3. (C) Even before the ubiquitous Cypriot coffee had reached the table at their February 12 get-together, Euro MP and former Foreign Minister (1998-2003) Ioannis Kasoulides was telling the Ambassador of plans to contest the 2008 race. "I'm not subtle," he chuckled. "I'm running." Despite considering the campaign a personal gamble -- he was comfortable in Brussels, and had he wanted a change of venue or responsibilities, he could have challenged and defeated Nikos Anastassiades for the DISY presidency -- Kasoulides asserted that Cyprus needed new blood. "Presidents Papadopoulos, Clerides, and Kyprianou all were followers of Makarios and think the same way," he charged. The nation required a generational change of leadership, and Kasoulides believed he fit the bill. ¶4. (C) DISY continued to suffer political repercussions from its support of the 2004 Annan Plan. Leader Anastassiades had "no credibility in Cyprus," Kasoulides argued, "much like Papadopoulos is ignored off of the island." With this in mind, he would run as an independent. He had no illusion or intention of fooling anyone and would not attempt to hide his past connection to the party. Anastassiades could help Kasoulides's chances, however, by toning his anti-Papadopoulos rhetoric, which seemed counter-productive at this point. (Note: Under Cypriot electoral rules, Kasoulides must resign from DISY before standing as an independent candidate) ¶5. (C) Rather than seeking to break the coalition that brought Papadopoulos to power, Kasoulides would attempt to peel off dissatisfied voters from each component party. AKEL had problems within the ranks, he was convinced, with perhaps one-third of its members unhappy with the President's management of the Cyprus Problem. Kasoulides had begun contacts with the disaffected. AKEL bosses Dimitris Christofias and Nicolas Katsourides would not stand idly, however. Kasoulides believed the Communist leaders would stress to the rank-and-file that linking with Papadopoulos, while ideologically hard to swallow, was AKEL's only path to power. As such, the party would not field its own candidate in 2008. ¶6. (C) Socialist EDEK also seemed split, Kasoulides believed, into pro- and anti-coalition ranks. Again, perhaps one-third of its voters opposed the government's policies. Despite a clear inability to advance to the second round, EDEK would field a candidate in 2008, as it had in all prior elections. Rather than leader Yiannakis Omirou, whose personal popularity trailed the party's, EDEK might run octogenarian party founder Vassos Lyssarides, whose numbers were higher. Regardless of candidate, EDEK would shop its support in the second round to the highest bidder. Kasoulides made no secret of the fact that he was counting on Lyssarides's support. ¶7. (C) He also believed he could obtain backing from smaller parties like EUROKO. All told, internal polling was showing support for his presidential candidacy at 40 percent. Taking into account the historical abstention rate on the island, Kasoulides considered 46 percent the winning number. Gaining those six points looked difficult, however. -------------- Incumbent Not Lying Down -------------- ¶8. (C) The President remained popular in Cyprus, the opposition candidate believed, despite the lack of movement toward a settlement. Papadopoulos's hard-line message played well to an electorate growing ever more passive about de facto partition, and his control over media ensured that RoC policies won favorable coverage. That said, to win re-election, Kasoulides thought Papadopoulos would need to feign progress on solving the CyProb. "The President will tout some breakthrough in the July 8 Gambari Process negotiations," he ventured, "timed for maximum political effect." Another weapon at the President's disposal was the bidding process to explore for offshore Cypriot oil -- Kasoulides expected the government to announce a winner in the run-up to the elections, benefiting the incumbent candidate. ¶9. (C) Aware that not all voters were happy with the status quo vis-a-vis the CyProb, Papadopoulos had prepared two divergent messages. To the "no" voters he would play the nationalist card, bashing Turkish intransigence and pooh-poohing the authority of Turkish Cypriot leader Mehmet Ali Talat to negotiate in good faith. For pro-solution types, however, such as the disaffected EDEK and AKEL cadres, he would offer (tepid) support for a bi-zonal, bi-communal federal solution and determination to move the July 8 process forward. -------------- Solving the Cyprus Problem in Two Phases -------------- ¶10. (C) Unlike "goalkeeper" Papadopoulos, who could only "not lose" the big game, Kasoulides hoped to score the winning goal. In his own approach to resolving the Cyprus Problem, he, too, sought to satisfy two camps. Populating the first were Cypriots who, troubled by the specter of imminent partition, believed the RoC should ink an immediate deal that gave numerous concessions to the Turkish Cypriot community. On the opposite side were island residents who had grown comfortable -- and wealthy -- with the status quo and thus saw no urgency in reaching a settlement. Turkish Cypriots likely fell into one or the other category as well, he thought. Youth from both sides tended to favor the latter, having had little inter-communal exposure. ¶11. (C) A two-phased solution was in order, Kasoulides argued. In Phase One, the new Cyprus government would grant numerous protections to the Turkish Cypriot community, such as a continued role for guarantor power Turkey, the imperative of dual (Greek Cypriot and Turkish Cypriot) majorities for certain legislation, and limits over refugee returns. Such concessions were necessary to win T/C buy-in to the new state of affairs, but they could not be permanent, else deadlock and conflict would occur (as it did under the 1960 Constitution). ¶12. (C) Phase Two would see great changes on Cyprus. Foreign troops would depart the island, for one. Veto rights by community would disappear, and all displaced persons could return to their homes. Cyprus would become a fully independent nation, not a protectorate. Kasoulides gave no timelines for the transition, implying it was open for negotiations. Early versions of the Annan Plan contained similar provisions, he claimed, but did not survive the later rounds of talks. He sought the Ambassador's impressions on his initiative. ¶13. (C) A sound Greek Cypriot negotiating strategy must be flexible and not maximalist, the Ambassador responded. The government should cooperate on confidence building measures like the Ledra Street checkpoint, which could build momentum and help along the July 8 process. Finally, the RoC must avoid the temptation of thrashing Talat at every opportunity. The Turkish Cypriot leader had taken a risky step in challenging the Turkish generals on Ledra, for example, and what was his reward? Derision from the other side that weakened him further and has him playing to his own nationalist elements. -------------- COMMENT: -------------- ¶14. (C) For months if not years, Kasoulides's candidacy has been an open secret in Nicosia, although scuttlebutt said he would announce in summer, more the Cypriot norm. With Papadopoulos playing "will he or won't he" regarding re-election and with AKEL announcing it won't show its cards until June, perhaps the DISY candidate saw an opportunity to become the man of the hour -- not a bad strategy, really. But can he win? While the most popular politician from the opposition, respected even by his political foes, those distinctions mean little when the three-party governing coalition controls over sixty percent of registered voters. From our small sample of contacts, we agree a minority of AKEL voters are unsatisfied with the President, but that party is legendary at enforcing voter discipline come Election Day, and Christofias seems satisfied with the current power-sharing arrangement. Nor is Kasoulides likely to win many votes on the CyProb, since, despite a clear lack of progress, polled citizens continue to appraise positively Papadopoulos's hard-line handling of the national issue. Taken together, the challenger's chances for 2008 seem slim. SCHLICHER