CYPRUS SKITTISH OVER POSSIBLE TURKISH ROLE IN

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 NICOSIA 000127 SIPDIS SIPDIS DEPARTMENT FOR EUR DAS MATTHEW BRYZA, EUR/SE E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/13/2012 TAGS: PREL PARM UNIFIL CY LE TU SUBJECT: CYPRUS SKITTISH OVER POSSIBLE TURKISH ROLE IN UNIFIL REF: NICOSIA-EUR/SE EMAIL OF 2/9/07 Classified By: Ambassador Ronald L. Schlicher for Reasons 1.5 (b) and (d). ¶1. (C) Summary and Action Request: The MFA summoned DCM February 12 to voice "serious concerns" over reports from UN DPKO that Turkey sought to take over Germany's leadership of UNIFIL naval operations. Post appreciates Department information on Turkey's possible role in UNIFIL naval operations and guidance on responding to the ROC's concerns. End Summary. ¶2. (C) MFA Political Director (and former Ambassador to the United States) Euripides Evriviades summoned DCM February 12 concerning information from the UN's Department of Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO) that Germany may relinquish command of UN Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL) naval operations and that Turkey -- with a list of caveats -- had reportedly volunteered to take over Germany's role. Though not a formal demarche, Evriviades was "under instructions from the Foreign Minister to approach P5 missions" about the "unacceptability" of Turkey taking over command from Germany. Evriviades stated that the ROC PermRep in New York would also contact USUN (if he had not already) to pass the same message. ¶3. (C) The UNIFIL naval component included Germany, Netherlands, Denmark, Norway, and Sweden, Evriviades noted, and Cyprus had Status of Forces agreements with each. Bilateral cooperation with Germany had been excellent throughout the Lebanon operation. Evriviades listed several problems with a Turkey-led UNIFIL naval component, many related to the Cyprus issue but some due to Turkey's operational caveats. Supporting ground operations in south Lebanon from distant (six hours away) Adana was one. Similarly, should another non-combatant evacuation become necessary, Adana's distance from the Lebanese coast was problematic. On the other hand, Cyprus's location "was crucial for an effective UNSCR 1701," allowing UNIFIL naval assets to intercept and later inspect ships suspected of arming Hizbollah. ¶4. (C) Evriviades claimed that Turkey, in its offer to UN DPKO, continued to flagrantly disregard international law -- that is, UNSCRs on the Cyprus Problem -- and supposedly stated to UN DPKO that it would "use any place convenient" to conduct its UNIFIL operations, including Famagusta port and Ercan airport in the area administered by Turkish Cypriots. Using ports in the north would violate International Maritime Organization (IMO) regulations, he warned. Turkey would also ignore Flight Information Region (FIR) rules in violation of Cypriot air control responsibilities, Evriviades charged, and possibly use "illegal" Ercan Airport in violation of International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO) regulations. Last, in its offer to UN DPKO, Turkey apparently excluded use of Greek Cypriot-contolled ports and airports and reiterated its non-recognition of ROC-flagged vessels or even ships related to Cypriot interests, irrespective of their potential use in UNIFIL support ops. ¶5. (C) Evriviades expressed hope that Germany would continue in its current UNIFIL role. He had made this pitch to German Ambassador Rolf Kaiser, who committed to obtaining Berlin's guidance but had not yet responded with his government's answer. (NOTE: In a February 13 call to German DCM Joachim Haidorn, the Embassy learned that the German government viewed with great concern Turkey's efforts to win the UNIFIL naval command. The German Parliament had approved a one-year Lebanon mission, Haidorn revealed, and likely would extend it NICOSIA 00000127 002 OF 002 another six months or more. Further, his government in October 2006 had leased facilities in Limassol for twelve months, with the German command expected to last until July ¶2007. Turkey's eventual assumption of UNIFIL's naval command -- with its accompanying caveats regarding Cyprus's participation -- thus threatened Germany's investment and participation in the high-profile operation. END NOTE.) ¶6. (C) DCM replied that this was the first we had heard of this issue. She noted that she therefore did not have guidance or instructions but that the U.S. was well aware of the critical role and excellent support that Cyprus had given to UNIFIL and its naval operations. She agreed to follow up and seek further information and guidance on this potential issue. SCHLICHER