NEW TURKISH ENGAGEMENT REGS; LIVE FIRE IN BUFFER

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 NICOSIA 000126 SIPDIS SIPDIS DEPARTMENT FOR EUR/SE, IO/UNP E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/09/2017 TAGS: PREL PGOV UNFICYP MOPS CY TU SUBJECT: NEW TURKISH ENGAGEMENT REGS; LIVE FIRE IN BUFFER ZONE. REF: A. NICOSIA CY IIR 6 823 0056 07 ¶B. EMBASSY NICOSIA - EUR/SE EMAILS OF 1/31/07 ¶C. 2/6/07 Classified By: Ambassador Ronald Schlicher, Reasons 1.4 (b),(d) ¶1. (U) UN Force in Cyprus (UNFICYP) military informed Embassy DAO January 31 that Turkish Forces (TF) a day earlier had fired on Greek Cypriot farmers in or near the Buffer Zone (BZ). Two separate incidents had occurred, in Astromeritis, west of Nicosia and the site of a BZ crossing point, and in Atheniou, southeast of the capital. ¶2. (U) UNFICYP Civil Affairs Chief Kyoko Shiotani informed the Embassy January 31 that UN forces were investigating the two live-fire incidents (Ref B). In Astromeritis, a Greek Cypriot farmer had told local UNFICYP personnel that the TF fired six shots at him, although the UN troops in the area had heard no gunfire (a Turkish Army officer and a Turkish diplomat separately confirmed the account, however). Shiotani considered the second incident, in Atheniou, even more worrisome. There, the UN was investigating reports that the TF had fired on a black jeep that reportedly had encroached to within a few meters of the Turkish Cypriot cease-fire line (CFL, the northern edge of the BZ). Shiotani fretted that similar encounters with potentially lethal outcomes were imminent. Expounding, she claimed that Greek Cypriot farmers were routinely ignoring the UN's "Farming Security Line" that roughly bisected the BZ, tilling fields that nearly reached the T/C CFL. ¶3. (C) DAO confirmed the shooting accounts February 1 in a meeting with a senior Turkish Army colonel (Ref A). The officer, who advises Turkish Forces Commander in Cyprus LTG Kivrikoglu, asserted the TF had deliberately staged the incidents to express displeasure with G/C farming practices within the BZ. Kivrikoglu on January 29 had ordered changes to a long-standing policy of restraint and non-confrontation, the staff officer revealed, in response to "UNFICYP encouraging (sic) the G/Cs to normalize activities within the BZ by allowing its increased civilian use." The Turkish Forces regarded the BZ as purely a security zone; any changes to the permitted activities regime could occur only as part of a comprehensive Cyprus solution. Under the TF's new rules of engagement, the officer continued, troops would first offer verbal warnings (in Turkish, usually),then fire warning shots in the air, shots in the ground near the perpetrator(s),and finally, shots intended to wound. ¶4. (C) UNFICYP is growing increasingly worried that hardening attitudes in both communities threatens its ability to carry out the UN's security mandate in the BZ, Shiotani noted February 9. Especially since the 2005 reduction in force numbers, each side was trying to exert authority in territory the UN patrolled, the Greek Cypriots with their farmers and civilian construction and the Turkish troops with their aggressive posturing and cocked rifles. She asked for USG assistance in bringing both sides to heel. The UN's preferred mechanism was a late 1980s aide memoire that specified UNFICYP's rights and activities within the BZ (Post will attempt to secure a copy to deliver to EUR/SE.) For years, both sides had respected the document in principle, but never had formally accepted it. UNFICYP had instituted a full-court press to convince both sides to sign, but was making no headway, she lamented. ¶5. (C) Greek Cypriots sought to assert full authority over the BZ, Shiotani asserted, despite numerous UNSCRs giving UNFICYP control over certain functions. She understood that G/Cs needed the ability to manage villages scattered the length of the 180-kilometer strip; that said, their maximalist demands were excessive. Expecting the UN to bow out completely from the construction permit process was a non-starter, for example. Turning to UNFICYP's relations with Turkish Forces, a different set of problems arose. Rather than promoting the BZ's return to normal conditions -- as reads the UN Civil Affairs mandate -- the TF hoped to freeze it in time. They interpreted any new construction as a violation of the status quo and bone for immediate contention, Shiotani revealed. Maintaining equilibrium between the divergent stances was consuming more and more UNFICYP energy and putting peacekeepers in a riskier and more difficult position. ¶6. (C) The UN is fighting the BZ battle in New York as well (Ref C). According to UNFICYP DCM Wlodek Cibor, a UN DPKO official has summoned the Turkish PermRep to a February 14 NICOSIA 00000126 002 OF 002 meeting, at which the Secretariat will protest formally the TF's aggressive new Buffer Zone SOP. Cibor believed that Cyprus had come up in the February 9 meeting in New York between Turkish FM Abdullah Gul and new SYG Ban Ki-Moon, although the two-para unofficial readout he had read did not provide much detail. ¶7. (C) COMMENT: These activities are worrying in their own right; at the same time, they come in the context of lingering, possibly even increasing tension between the Turkish military and the Talat "administration" in northern Cyprus. SCHLICHER