ISLAM IN NIGER (2): STUMBLING BLOCKS FOR IZALA IN

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 NIAMEY 000076 SIPDIS SIPDIS AF/W FOR BACHMAN; INR/AA FOR BOGOSIAN; PARIS FOR AFRICA WATCHER; PASS TO USAID FOR AMARTIN E.O. 12958: DECL: 01/26/2017 TAGS: PGOV PTER PINR EAID SOCI KDEM NG SUBJECT: ISLAM IN NIGER (2): STUMBLING BLOCKS FOR IZALA IN THE "EXODE ZONE" REF: 06 NIAMEY 1193 Classified By: POLITICAL OFFICER ZACH HARKENRIDER FOR REASON 1.4 (D) -------------- SUMMARY -------------- ¶1. (C) Reftel offered several themes to be examined in a series of cables on Islam in Niger. In this edition, Poloff reports on conversations with a prominent Imam that illuminate the extent of fundamentalist penetration into the central Nigerien region of Tahoua - an area linked by proximity and language both to northern Nigeria's Sharia states and Algeria / Mali. We examine the role of Middle Eastern and South Asian clergy in spreading fundamentalist doctrine, the strength of traditional Sufi clergy, and the effects of economic migration on religious practice. Conclusions defied certain expectations. ¶2. (C) Poloff discovered some very simple but effective barriers to the spread of foreign Islamic fundamentalism in Niger. While trade and economic migration transmit new interpretations of Islam, they do not do so consistently; where Nigeriens go determines what they bring back, and Tahoua Hausas usually give the fundamentalist zone of Nigeria a pass. Foreign preachers are spreading fundamentalist doctrines, but their influence and effectiveness are limited by language barriers and the reluctance of moderate establishment clergy to give them space. Traditional authorities remain strong, and their moderate, Sufi Islam is holding fast in this part of Hausaland. END SUMMARY -------------- TAHOUA AND THE "EXODE:" A LEGACY OF ECONOMIC MIGRATION -------------- ¶3. (U) Tahoua is an interesting test case by virtue of its role as a conduit for north / south trade and its peoples' tradition of seasonal economic migration toward coastal Africa. Both, presumably, would make Tahoua's Hausa villagers less isolated than other Nigeriens and more likely to come into contact with foreign theologies. The city of Tahoua sits on the main north / south highway that runs from Nigeria toward Algeria. The region of Tahoua extends from the border town of Birni N'Konni in the south to isolated nomadic communities bordering Algeria and Mali in the north. When people and goods move between the West African coast and the Mahgreb, they move through Tahoua region. Seasonal economic migration or "exode" by Tahoua region's mostly Hausa population is a phenomenon of long standing. While exode is a national phenomenon, Tahoua is widely acknowledged to be the principal source of migrants. Traditionally, the migrant route led to the West African coast. More recently, Libya has become a favored destination. These Nigeriens villagers return home with money and ideas from the country's near abroad, often building houses or improving their farms with their savings. The scale of exode here means that ordinary villagers from Tahoua spend less time at home and enjoy more contact with neighboring cultures than their counterparts from other regions. -------------- IMAM MOUSTAPHA: SUFISM AND IZALA IN THE "EXODE" ZONE -------------- ¶4. (U) Poloff examined the implications of this contact for the region's religious culture during a December trip there. Our concern was with the spread of fundamentalist Islamic doctrines in a cultural zone traditionally dominated by moderate, syncretistic Sufi theology. This can be defined more specifically as the challenge posed to the dominant Tidjaniya and Quadiriyya Sufi orders and their Maliki (Egyptian origin) jurisprudence by "Ihiyaus Sunnah wa Ikhmatul Bidi'ah," or Izala, and its Hanbali (Saudi origin) jurisprudence. NOTE: The foregoing translates from Hausa as "in favor of Sunna and against innovation." Ironically, this derives from the title of a book, famous in Hausaland, by the 19th century Fulani cleric Ousmane Dan Fodio. Dan Fodio, who founded the Sokoto Caliphate, was a Quadiriyya Sufi. END NOTE ¶5. (C) In Tahoua on December 8, Poloff met with Imam Ahmed Moustapha, who, at only 40 years of age, is the region's most NIAMEY 00000076 002 OF 003 prominent cleric. The Imam of the city's Grand Mosque and an emerging leader of the moderate, GON affiliated Islamic Association of Niger (AIN),Moustapha has been a mission contact for the past few years. He preaches to a few thousand worshippers each Friday, and hosts a radio show through which he dispenses spiritual advice to a broad listenership. Like most Nigerien religious leaders, he can be broadly described as a Tidjaniya Sufi. ¶6. (C) Our relationship with Imam Moustapha is a testament to the value of the public diplomacy (PD) efforts from which it derives. The Imam had participated in a PD "caravan," in 2006, traveling to various cities for discussions on Islam keynoted by an American Islamic scholar. In 2005 he hosted an American Imam - Bachir Arafat - who lectured on Islam in the US, and served as his Hausa translator during a service at Tahoua's Grand Mosque. During his discussion with Poloff, Moustapha stressed the importance and desirability of further cultural exchanges on religion, noting that a true understanding of Islam was best arrived at via a discursive, participatory process such as that of the PD caravan lecture tour. ¶7. (C) While our discussion was wide-ranging, the most important elements pertained to the Sufi / Izala dynamic in Tahoua. Poloff was interested to see what inroads fundamentalist theology was making in this famous exode center. Imam Moustapha argued that Izala played only a limited role in the spiritual life of the people, noting that the sect could claim only one mosque out of twelve principal mosques in the city. He estimated that the Izalas only attracted ten or twenty regular parishioners, mostly young people of a more absolutist disposition. He traced their development in Tahoua back to the late 1980s, and speculated that they received money from Nigeria and from their national association. ¶8. (C) The Imam offered two explanations for Izala's limited role in Tahoua: that Sufi traditional chiefs still exercise a veto over mosque construction, sermon content, and the right to preach. Any foreign preacher who wishes to work in Tahoua must pre-clear his sermon content with traditional chiefs and Imam Moustapha. The Sufi orders monitor the preaching and will expel those who preach heresy, violence, or intolerance from the city's principal mosques. Moustapha also argued that most foreign preachers who came bearing fundamentalist theology were from the Middle East or South Asia, not, interestingly enough, from Northern Nigeria. He noted that the effectiveness of foreign preachers from Pakistan, Saudi Arabia, or India is limited by the language barrier. Able to communicate only in Arabic, South Asian languages, or possibly English, these foreign preachers depend on the good offices of locals for the Arabic to Hausa translation that would render their messages intelligible. Arabic speakers (like English speakers) are few and far between in Niger, and tend to be well educated and therefore moderate Sufi Muslims. Usually, such scholars hail from moderate "establishment" theological institutions like the Islamic University of Say in Niger, or Al-Azhar University in Cairo. These clerics are theological opponents of Izalist fundamentalism. COMMENT: This theory implies that the quality of Arabic language instruction in Niger's numerous French/Arabic medium high-schools is rather poor. That is an assumption that Post may examine at greater length as part of PD section's reporting on education in Niger. END COMMENT. ¶9. (C) In any event, this linguistic "hedge" may constitute a barrier to the importation of extremist theology from the Middle-East and South Asia, but it would not blunt the impact of Izalists from Hausa speaking Northern Nigeria. This is where the particularities of the Tahoua exode come into play. While Hausas from Maradi or Zinder tend to migrate to and trade with Nigeria, Tahoua Hausas have traditionally been attracted to Cote d'Ivoire. Poloff's visit to Tahoua and some of its principal exode towns suggests that this tradition persists in spite of the troubles in Cote d'Ivoire. Missing the "Izala zone" by dint of historical happenstance, Tahoua's Hausas lack the historical, economic, and cultural contacts that transmit change. This strange lacuna explains the Imam's claim that Tahoua sees few Nigerian preachers, and qualifies an old axiom, which holds that Niger and Nigeria are so closely linked that when the latter gets a cold, the former sneezes. ¶10. (C) Imam Moustapha capped off our discussion of Sufism by NIAMEY 00000076 003 OF 003 taking Poloff to visit the city's chief Marabout, or religious teacher / witch-doctor, the Sarkin Malamye. In a testament to his popularity and political pull, the residential street leading to Malamye's compound was blocked to all but VIP vehicles. His house, like that of a traditional chief in Hausaland, had a small mosque at the front. Poloff was pleased to see a PD produced "Mosques of America" calendar inside, likely a gift from Imam Moustapha. After a brief conversation, the Sarkin blessed us with prayer and invited Emboffs to visit again. -------------- COMMENT: SUFISM & SYNCRETISM ALIVE AND WELL IN HAUSALAND -------------- ¶11. (C) The Sarkin Malamye, regarded by local Sufis as rich in religious and magical knowledge, personifies the syncretism that lies at the heart of Niger's African Islam. Nigeriens believe in their Marabouts; in the Sufi theology they teach, and in the charms and amulets they bless and dispense. It is this fusion of Islam and traditional cultural practice that Izalists seek to expunge in favor of a more globally consistent Islamic culture grounded exclusively in fundamental texts. This ideological conflict has led a prominent academic observer of Hausaland to characterize Islamization as "de-Africanization." Efforts to de-Africanize Nigerien Islam appear to face an up-hill battle in Tahoua, where figures like Imam Moustapha and Sarkin Malamye enjoy a great following. ¶12. (C) A trading town in the Hausa zone with a mobile population, Tahoua should be wide-open for Nigerian style fundamentalism. Izala's weak performance there shows how patchy the spread of theology from Nigeria and the Near East can be. Thwarted in Tahoua by circumstances of history and language and by the tenacity of tradition, Izala's reach appears limited even in Hausaland. Perhaps the example of Ousmane Dan Fodio, unwitting contributor of Izala's full name, is apposite. He too waged a "jihad" to de-Africanize Islamic practice, but two centuries later it is his spiritual legatees who keep African style syncretism alive and well in Niger. END COMMENT. ALLEN