ISLAM IN NIGER (4): ATTITUDES TOWARD IZALA IN

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 07 NIAMEY 000739 SIPDIS SIPDIS DEPT AF/W FOR BACHMAN DEPT INR/AA FOR BOGOSIAN PARIS FOR AFRICA WATCHER PASS TO USAID FOR AMARTIN AND KTOWERS EUCOM FOR POLAD E.O. 12958: DECL: 05/29/2017 TAGS: EAID KDEM PGOV PINR PTER SOCI KISL NG SUBJECT: ISLAM IN NIGER (4): ATTITUDES TOWARD IZALA IN HAUSALAND REF: A. 06 NIAMEY 1193 ¶B. NIAMEY 76 ¶C. NIAMEY 123 ¶D. INR BRIEF 11/14/00 ¶E. NIAMEY 713 ¶F. NIAMEY 714 ¶G. NIAMEY 703 NIAMEY 00000739 001.2 OF 007 Classified By: POLITICAL OFFICER ZACH HARKENRIDER FOR REASON 1.4 (D) ¶1. (U) NOTE: This is the fourth in a series of cables (reftels A,B,C) reporting on the changing nature of Islam in Niger. END NOTE -------------- SUMMARY -------------- ¶2. (C) Previous cables in this series examined the rise, in Niger, of a Wahhabist-inspired form of Islamic fundamentalism from the Shari'a states of northern Nigeria. This edition examines the reasons why Nigeriens -- particularly the country's Hausa majority -- embrace or reject it, and assesses its future here by assessing it in its heartland. Izalat'bid'a - "the exclusion of all that is superfluous" (Izala for short),is strongest in Niger's "Hausaland." In the Hausa cities of southern Niger, elites have embraced Izala and many ordinary Nigeriens have rallied to its lavishly endowed mosques and social services. Middle-Eastern money and the rise of new elites, it seems, are enabling the importation of an ideology variously described as "anti-western modernization," "Islamic globalization," and "de-Africanization" of the faith. Each of these is a fair description of Izala's effects, and each label describes an important change in contemporary Niger. Yet, Poloff's examination of Hausaland attitudes toward Izala over time and during recent travel suggests some important limits to its growth, political influence, and long-term prospects. ¶3. (C) The Government of Niger (GON) is hostile to divisive ideologies, and has the means and inclination to control them. While Izala produces tensions elsewhere, in Maradi, where it first entered Niger and is strongest, traditional leaders appear either comfortable with it or dismissive of it. Many parishioners and patrons are attracted to Izala less by genuine belief than by various opportunities for material gain. Many traditional Nigerien Muslims, having flirted with Izala, drift back into their old sects, no more radical for the experience. Many of northern Nigeria's Izalists have gone from being the revolutionaries and radicals of the 1980s to the establishment figures of today. In Nigerien Hausaland, which lags behind metropolitan Nigeria, Izala still seems radical to many, but it may already be past its prime in Niger. Izala's association with a small segment of an already narrow commercial elite, and ordinary Nigeriens' ambivilent reactions to the sect may contain its radicalizing potential until time and familiarity entirely defuse it. END SUMMARY. -------------- AT HOME IN HAUSALAND: IZALA'S GEOGRAPHY -------------- ¶4. (C) While most of Niger's Hausa (fifty-three percent) majority lives in the southern regions of Maradi, Tahoua, and Zinder, Hausas also dominate northern cities like Agadez and Arlit. Hausa ethnic identity and Izalist practice seem to correlate strongly, although some minority groups are attracted by the practices of their Hausa neighbors (reftel C). The southern "Hausaland" states are home to roughly half of the country's population. They contain cities of historical and cultural importance like Zinder, and major commercial centers like Maradi and Birni N'Konni. The Nigeria border and trade routes heading north across the Sahara define Hausaland. Wealth derives from commerce and trans-shipment. As much as goods and persons, ideas flow up from Kano, Katsina, and Sokoto. Niger watchers have long felt that Nigerian Izalat'bid'a and its divisive politics could infect Niger's Hausa belt. Fundamentalist-inspired riots over a fashion show and attacks on Christian churches in Maradi NIAMEY 00000739 002.2 OF 007 earlier in this decade (reftel D) suggested that Niger's Hausaland was starting to suffer some of the religious violence common south of the border. Theory and practice suggested that "it could happen here." -------------- IZALA'S EFFECTS (1) IN THEORY: BEING MODERN IN MARADI -------------- ¶5. (C) In Poloff's meetings with traditional Islamic clergy and chiefs in Hausaland we asked what sort of people followed Izala. Responses clustered around two descriptions: "intellectuals," (meaning better-educated Nigeriens with jobs in the formal sector),and "those who value or have money." Accustomed to thinking of Izala's allure as being strongest for the disenfranchised (like unemployed young people),we wondered why the system's comparative winners would opt out of traditional religious practice. ¶6. (U) Academic analysis and Emboffs' observations of the Nigerien scene offer some answers. In a 2004 "Africa Today" article, Northeastern University political scientist William F.S. Miles, a Niger expert, characterized fundamentalist practice as a "de-Africanization" of African Islam. He also cited other sources which described Izala as a form of "anti-western modernization," or a compelling "global brand" of Islam with a strong Middle Eastern flavor. These academic labels appear valid when one examines the demographics of Nigerien Izala. ¶7. (U) Local contacts' descriptions and our experience of Izala and its followers suggest who the "global brand's" consumers are. Upwardly mobile Nigeriens generally come in two flavors: fonctionnaires (civil servants) and commercants (traders). Both are uniquely positioned to profit in the world's least developed country, though for different reasons. The fonctionnaire class has led Niger since independence. Teachers and civil servants, executives in para-statal enterprises, they got where they were by virtue of being among the few who had access to modern education. While many remain on the top, this elite's intake is limited. With the collapse of Nigerien public education in the 1990s and the degradation of the civil service through budget cuts and the elevation of political appointees, entry into this class was shut off and its remunerations and prestige were greatly lessened. The boubou-clad commercant replaced the safari-suited fonctionnaire as the image of success, and commercial acumen replaced Francophone liberal education as the road to wealth. ¶8. (U) Superficial differences aside, wealthy fonctionnaires and commercants both face a common enemy in tradition. The Hausa practice of gift giving and societal expectations that a successful member of a family will provide for multiple relatives and loosely defined "cousins," militate against capital formation. Massive expenditures on baptisms, marriages, and dowries, and various expectations for "zakat" beyond the literal Koranic tithe constrain successful Nigeriens. Yet, these practices have more to do with African cultural traditions than with Islam. Izala, by denying a theological basis for such expenditure and welfare arrangements, frees successful Nigeriens from them. ¶9. (U) Modernity is as much a preoccupation as money. The popularization of Hadj travel (a status symbol for Nigeriens who have arrived economically) and commercial voyages to Saudi Arabia and the U.A.E have exposed a large number of Nigeriens to more developed and affluent Muslim societies. Hadjis and Saudi-trained clerics return to Niger with an expanded view of the world and a more contemptuous view of "backward" local Islamic practice. By adopting Izalist practice, these Nigeriens buy into what Miles describes as a "more advanced and mature version of Islam, as practiced internationally." Modern technology finds the same customers as "modern" theology. The expansion of satellite TV (usually via brands that feature Arab channels) is another symptom and agent of modernization in Niger. Arabic TV shows (watched for their song and dance routines and glitz even by non-Arabic speakers) glamorize the "modern" Islamic powerhouses of the NIAMEY 00000739 003.2 OF 007 Middle East. Nigerien elites' embrace of the new, global "Brand Islam" manifests itself in different ways. More veils, beards, and public events begun and concluded with prayers are suggestive developments. ¶10. (C) "Being modern" in commercial towns like Maradi involves a complex blending of technology, travel, and religiosity. Affluent Nigerien Izalists are connected with a larger Islamic identity that allows consumption of western goods, while shielding them from impiety by a rejection of western mores. Individualistic in practice, Izala frees its adherents from traditional financial obligations to the community and deference to the Imam and the chief. According to Izalists, the Koran can be translated into Hausa, and every Muslim can read and understand it, and seek divine aid without clerical intermediation. Accepting Izala is a way for young people and individualistic businessmen to throw off the social and financial constraints imposed by elders and traditional authorities. Izala provides a window onto a world of Middle-Eastern glamour, and a channel by which Arab funds can flow to Nigeriens. It facilitates commerce with Arab and northern Nigerian adherents, and places no limits on personal consumption. It is a sect for society's winners. -------------- IZALA'S EFFECTS (2) IN PRACTICE: TRADITION AND TENSION IN ZINDER -------------- ¶11. (C) In the court of the Tidjaniyya Sultan of Zinder, Poloff found little respect for Izala. Meeting with twenty courtiers, associated religious leaders, and sub-chiefs on May 9, Poloff listened to their attitudes toward a sect described as "troublemakers" and, again, "intellectuals." The Izalists consider other Muslims to be animists, and deny the authority of traditional preachers and chiefs. An Imam noted that the Sultan does not have anything to do with the Izalists, and that the latter "don't even dare to come to this house." Our interlocutors stressed that the traditionalist majority in Zinder would not "rise to the provocations offered by the fanatics," but noted that if they did "there would be war." The court further claimed that all fundamentalists got their teachers and materials from the Middle East, and attributed the rise of Izala to Nigeriens who took religious instruction in Arab countries. In a common Hausaland refrain, the traditionalists denounced Izala as a religion for the young and those who sought material wealth. They noted that Izala was led by educated, modern middle class adherents and rich businessmen, but that it sought to attract foot-soldiers by offering material aid and small jobs to unemployed youth. ¶12. (C) Imam Mounirou Issoufou, a traditional Tidjaniyya cleric and Koranic educator in Zinder, built on this. He again claimed that Izala appealed to "intellectuals," who used its teachings as a pretext to withdraw from the common-life of the community. Izalists do not honor traditional African ceremonies, or show sufficient deference to elders, Mounirou claimed. While he noted Izala's small size in Zinder -- one mosque out of eleven principal houses of worship in the city, and even that usually half-full -- Mounirou noted that Izalists gained at least superficial acceptance through philanthropy. Mounirou particularly condemned Izalists for their refusal to dialogue with other religions, and for their expectation "that everyone will live like in Prophet Mohammed's time." -------------- MITIGATING FACTORS (1): SURVEILLANCE AND CONTROL; RADICAL RELIGION UNDER THE "ETAT DIRIGISTE" -------------- ¶13. (C) Across Hausaland secular and religious contacts cited the role played by the GON in policing religious expression. Several comments were typical: referring to the Nigerian preachers who sometimes come to their town, clergy in Birni N'Konni noted that they are ready to "call out to the authorities" to prevent subversive preaching that "raises social and ethnic tensions." The Prefect of Magaria (a border NIAMEY 00000739 004.3 OF 007 town between Zinder and Kano) told Poloff that, in spite of Nigeria's proximity, there was no Islamic fundamentalism in his town. The GON was opposed to it, he noted, and "Nigerians don't come here to preach." When Nigerian Imams come to Niger they risk expulsion unless they have their papers in order and a clear destination and sponsorship. Maradi police chief Boube Souley said that Izala benefactor Rabi Dan Tchadoua dutifully brings foreign preachers he invites to Niger to the police station to be examined and registered. Souley noted that "'(Dan Tchadoua)' knows that as a commercant the state could get him at any time." NOTE: Souley noted that more than fifty Saudi and Pakistani preachers passed through Maradi in 2006, heading into the interior to preach. END NOTE Maradi Provincial Chief Ali Zaki, who seemed generally tolerant of Izala, stated to Poloff on May 13 that the GON and the chiefs would not tolerate any preaching that inspired violence or hatred. His counterpart Abdoul Kadre Amadou Issaka, Canton Chief of Kantche (Zinder),was more explicit in a May 12 meeting: Nigeriens returning from studies in Nigeria must abide by traditional rules, he said. Izala preaching is not allowed. Though he had not yet had occasion to do so, the Chief of Kantche noted that he would ban Izala preaching or refer it to GON authorities if he heard of it. ¶14. (C) Traditional chiefs in Niger are agents of the state. Since the colonial period they have acted as eyes, ears, and local enforcers for national authorities. Under the military governments of Seyni Kountche (1974-1987),and Ali Saibou (1987-1991) the state monitored religious practice for signs of radicalism just as it monitored all other sectors of society. The Association Islamique du Niger (AIN) -- Niger's only Islamic association prior to 1991 -- was established by the military regime to keep tabs on the content of preaching and Koranic teaching. Old habits die hard. The military regimes' legacy of infiltration, exploitation, and monitoring of religious sects and practices persists to this day. Traditional chiefs still assert the right to control local religious expression (reftel C),either on their own behalf or that of the government. The Chief of Kantche spoke for many traditional rulers when he noted that "not a brick '(of a new mosque)' can be laid without the chief's permission." He claimed that his court would investigate the sources of funding for new mosques, the background of their donors and proposed Imams, and how the construction money was spent. Only then would a mosque be authorized to open. With the creation of an Islamic Council in 2006 and the establishment of a Ministry of Religious Affairs on March 1 (reftel E), secular authorities too seem ready to clamp down on radical Islam in a style reminiscent of Kountche. ¶15. (C) COMMENT: The GON is neither secular (the Constitution officially declares the state to be "non-confessional"),nor particularly liberal. Most of Niger's leadership class is composed of conservative and traditional Tidjaniyyas (reftel A). But the GON's opposition to inflammatory preaching is part and parcel of a determination to avoid ethnic or religious incitement in general. This determination has been central to every post-independence government and has manifested itself in occasional limitations on freedom of expression and the press. While many of its sources lie in the politics of 1960s Niger (when a government led by minority Djermas faced threats from a Hausa-led political movement),it also derives from the French-colonial tradition of "direct rule," and is one of the country's most durable political traditions. END COMMENT -------------- MITIGATING FACTORS (2): BORDERS AND IDENTITY IN HAUSALAND -------------- ¶16. (U) Just as the border between Nigerien and Nigerian Hausas yields two different systems of government and two different reactions to Izala Islam, it defines Hausa identity to a surprising extent. Post will examine the effect of the border on Hausa identity septel. With respect to religion, it is relevant in so far as Hausas perceive Izala as a foreign import rather than a genuine Nigerien belief system. While Tidjaniyya and Quadiriyya's respective Algerian / Senegalese and Iraqi origins (Tidjaniyya's spiritual head until 1975 was NIAMEY 00000739 005.3 OF 007 Sheik Ibrahim Niasse of Senegal) make them "foreign" as well, no one has ever described them as such to Poloff. Everyone describes Izala as "foreign," meaning either Nigerian or Arab in inspiration and patronage. Indeed, if Izala's linkages to foreign money and foreign images of success help to sell the sect to a small number of upwardly mobile Nigeriens, those same foreign associations also raise suspicions among a far greater number of average folks in insular Niger. -------------- ENDING WHERE IT BEGAN?: ACCOMMODATING IZALA IN MARADI AND KONNI -------------- ¶17. (C) Poloff's interactions with another royal court offered a very different perspective from the hostile and threatened reactions of Zinder clergy and nobles. Birni N'Konni is a Hausa town and trade-hub three kilometers north of the Nigerian border and ninety kilometers north of Sokoto. On May 8, Poloff met the Alkali (religious judge),Grand Mosque Imam, and other community notables associated with the court of the traditional chief of Konni Canton. Sitting on an animal skin rug and writing in a Harry Potter notebook, the Alkali described religious relations in Konni as cordial. Izalists and traditional Muslims pray together in the same mosques (although in slightly different style) and interact comfortably. Among the dozen persons in the room, the Imam noted that he was a Quadiriyya, the Alkali a Tidjaniyya, and another (bearded) participant, an Izala. The court of the chief was non-sectarian. While everyone attends Izala mosques, our interlocutors admitted that Izalists will not usually attend other sects' mosques. Beyond that, there was no talk of tension. ¶18. (C) Maradi's Provincial Chief, Ali Zaki, is a former diplomat. His characterization of sectarian relations was likewise diplomatic. Zaki stressed his role as a moderator and guide for all groups. Izalists and traditional orders alike respect his authority and come to him for judgment and reconciliation. Though he stated that "we will not accept problems in our province'...'preaching here cannot insult or provoke," he did not direct his comments specifically toward Izala or single it out for condemnation. Nor did he claim broad power or desire to stamp out Izala. In fact, Zaki noted that his role in coordinating mosque construction was based on non-theological considerations, such as physical distance between mosques and the number of parishioners that a new mosque might serve. He claimed that these powers derived entirely from the new GON created Islamic Council. He claimed no other precedent for control of mosque construction, Imams, or sermon content. ¶19. (C) Not all of our contacts in Maradi were so accepting, but even those critical of Izala tended to treat it dismissively, rather than as a threat. Maradi's Grand Mosque Imam, the Tidjaniyya cleric Imam Moustapha Antoma, described Izala Islam as weak in intellectual grounding and noted that its advocates were routinely out-debated by traditional Muslims. It won itself few friends in the early years when it adopted a confrontational approach to inter-faith relations. That rubbed most locals the wrong way, but Izala appears to have matured. Antoma noted that many Izalists now come to his mosque as they respect his preaching and Islamic scholarship. Local Izalists have learned from experience to be team players. ¶20. (C) Antoma questioned Izala's size and influence in Maradi. He credited the sect with no more than five percent of Maradi's Muslims. He noted that Izala patron and local businessman Rabi Dan Tchadoua was funding the construction of a third Izala mosque, but doubted that the they would be able to fill it. Antoma described Dan Tchadoua as "rich but lacking in Islamic knowledge." Antoma claimed that Izala initially attracted parishioners because it gave them money and had glamour, but its resources are now declining and many erstwhile parishioners are jumping ship. He noted that those who give money and social services can easily attract a crowd in Niger, but money in the absence of genuine belief is weak glue. NIAMEY 00000739 006.4 OF 007 ¶21. (C) This view was shared by most secular observers. Mahaman Laouali, a local representative of Niger's largest human rights NGO, noted that Maradi's people are "pragmatic mercantilists, who take advantage of what Izala offers and, two or three years later, come out of it and go back to their old ways." Izala, he argued, was not deeply anchored: "people don't really believe in it, it is against their traditions." Maradi's police chief, Boube Souley, advanced an interesting theory. He said that rich Izala commercants were trying to win hearts and minds through philanthropy as a prerequisite to seeking political power. He also stressed the Izala's popular appeal derived from largesse, not conviction, noting that "in Africa, ninety-eight percent of belief is food." -------------- IZALA AND RELIGIOUS FRAUD -------------- ¶22. (C) Religious and secular observers suggested other material incentives for following Izala. Antoma shared the view that commercants embrace Izala because its theology enables them to dodge costly social obligations imposed by the traditional sects. Some, like Dan Tchadoua, also enjoy more direct financial benefits. Antoma alleged that Dan Tchadoua and other Izala leaders were able to steal substantial quantities of Arab or Nigerian money sent to them for mosque construction and proselytization. The Secretary General of the Chamber of Commerce, Abdou Hassane, noted that materials destined for mosque construction could be imported duty free. Often, he argued, Maradi commercants would use this provision to bring in materials sufficient for a small Izala mosque (which they could build without authorization and control by the local chief) -- and for a palatial house as well. Secular NGOs and the civil society advise people to look at what Izala Imams do and how they live. -------------- COMMENT: SHOULD WE WORRY? -------------- ¶23. (C) Academics like Miles rue the passage of African tradition and its replacement by Izala's global "Brand Islam" for aesthetic reasons. The security and political implications of Izalist expansion in Niger are harder to discern. So too are the sect's real prospects in Niger. Ousmane Dan Fodio's shadow still falls on Hausaland. People recount stories of his 1804--1812 jihad against un-Islamic syncretism, and the eventual institutionalization of the revolutionary jihadis in the Sokoto Caliphate. Looking south of the border today, Nigerien Hausas see Izala in a similar process of institutionalization and moderation. There is a perception that, as Izala radicals become "the man" even the adoption of Shari'a has changed little (reftel F). NOTE: A USAID funded "Northern Nigeria Muslim Outreach Assessment Desk Study," published in draft form on May 26, 2006, describes the co-optation and infiltration of the Izala sect by traditional elites and the Nigerian state in the early 1990s. The study notes that some Izalas then united with other radicals like the Muslim Brothers (or Ikhwan) in continuing opposition to the state. At present, Post is unaware of any Ikhwan presence in Niger. END NOTE. ¶24. (C) As the "Izalist jihad" loses steam in Nigeria, it seems to have even dimmer prospects in Niger. Hostility from the central government, resistance from locals, its foreign (though Hausa) origins, and association with corruption and opportunism limit Izala's appeal. So too does the small size of the Nigerien elite, from which Izala seems to draw most of its devotees. Ordinary Nigeriens, drawn in temporarily by the promise of material gain, do not seem to stick or buy into the theology. Without their support, the movement stands little chance of obtaining political power or radicalizing the Nigerien state. Even among its elite supporters, the incentives for following Izala seem more material than theological. While some Izala commercants are major contributors to political parties, they seem to be cashing in their political chips for lucrative government contracts rather than Shari'a. The prospects for an Izala-inspired political party appear nil. For their part, Nigerien politicians' relations with Izala seem just as pragmatic and NIAMEY 00000739 007.3 OF 007 mercenary as those of most ordinary people. They will take Izalists' money, but crack down if "national unity," seems threatened. Meanwhile, many of the public manifestations of faith that Izala would impose -- veils, beards, public prayers, Koranic education, and opposition to gender equity -- are already here and endorsed equally by Izalists and traditional orders (reftel G). Some foreign observers of Izala argue that the sect is just laying low until its numbers increase, at which point it will shoot for political power. In Poloff's judgment, it is just as likely that Izala reached its high water mark here some time ago. END COMMENT MINIMIZED CONSIDERED ALLEN