NIGER: FRENCH AMBASSADOR ON THE SECURITY SITUATION

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 NIAMEY 000639 SIPDIS C O R R E C T E D C O P Y - SIPDIS CAPTION ADDED SIPDIS E.O. 12958: DECL: 05/07/2017 TAGS: PREL PGOV MOPS MASS FR NG SUBJECT: NIGER: FRENCH AMBASSADOR ON THE SECURITY SITUATION IN THE NORTH NIAMEY 00000639 001.4 OF 002 Classified By: Ambassador Bernadette M. Allen, reasons 1.4 (b/d) ¶1. (C) Summary: The French Ambassador to Niger believes a GON attempt to defeat Tuareg dissidents risks turning bandits and drug smugglers into something much worse, possibly to include allies of AQIM. The Nigerien Armed Forces (FAN) cannot defeat the Mouvement des Nigerien pour la Justice (MNJ),but they may think they can. The GON may be involved in indirect negotiations with the MNJ through intermediaries, and the Libyan and Algerian governments. End Summary. ¶2. (C) In a May 7 meeting with Ambassador Allen and the DCM, French Ambassador to Niger Francois Ponge said the Nigerien government was correct in characterizing those responsible for recent attacks in the North as bandits and drug traffickers, but added that Nigerien government mishandling of it could make the situation much worse. He said that President Tandja was personally handling the issue, and was siding with the military leadership on the need for a military solution. The Prime Minister was more inclined to negotiate. ¶4. (C) Ponge does not believe the FAN is currently in a position to defeat the MNJ. Morale among the FAN rank and file is low as they have suffered casualties in the fighting and believe that some of their senior officers are getting rich through involvement in trafficking. The FAN is looking for materiel from China and elsewhere. It is particularly interested in helicopters. Ponge's fear is that the FAN thinks it can defeat the MNJ military, and in trying to do so it might create broader Tuareg support for the MNJ. Moreover, it risked creating an alliance between AQIM and the MNJ. There may be links to a former FAN officer who had been associated with former President Barre. The officer is not a Tuareg, but has been involved in smuggling in the Lake Chad area for some time. The conflict was linked with others in the region, including Darfur, Chad and the Central African Republic. Ponge said his government is urging negotiation. ¶5. (C) Ponge dismissed most of the known MNJ leaders as not particularly well educated or prominent. The most prominent is Aboubacar Alambo, who does not always get along with his younger brother, Agali, also an MNJ member. Amouman Kalakouwa has little education and has never been "integrated" in anything. Cherif is a crook who stole from every pot of money to which he had access. Ponge said that none of them could have authored the communique posted on the MNJ web site. Referring to MNJ claims that it has evidence linking senior GON officials to corruption, Ponge quipped that those claims may help prompt the GON to negotiate. Ponge compared negotiating with the Tuaregs to dealing with Corsican separatists; nobody speaks for all factions and there is a lot of overlap between political and criminal motivations. ¶6. (C) Ponge alluded to GON negotiations with the dissident Tuaregs through intermediaries. He also noted Algerian and Libyan mediation efforts. While the GON claims that the MNJ is comprised of drug traffickers, Ponge said that a well known Algerian drug ring is responsible for most of the drugs trafficked through Niger, with Algerian government complicity. Moreover, the Algerian government has largely suspended military cooperation with Niger because of a Nigerien UN vote (on the Western Sahara). Libya's role is also problematic given its longstanding ties with various Tuaregs, but Ponge thought it may be playing a positive role now. He found it interesting the that there were many indicators of a Libyan involvement in the initial February 8 attack on security forces in Iferouane, and speculated that another party may have staged it to look like Libya was involved to cover its own involvement. If Algeria or Libya are behind the MNJ, they may be creating something they can't control. ¶7. (C) Ponge said the MNJ's complaints about how few Tuareg's were employed by the uranium mines were accurate, but largely the fault of the Tuaregs themselves; Tuaregs initially disdained working in the mines, forcing the mines to recruit in the south. Moreover, Tuaregs traditionally put little value on education, so there are not many Tuaregs with the qualifications necessary for the more skilled mine work. Security has been stepped up at the mines, with the construction of berms and the deployment of a detachment of FNIS (a paramilitary unit under the Interior Ministry) troops. ¶8. (C) If the security situation is not resolved, it will devastate Niger's tourism industry (based largely in the NIAMEY 00000639 002.4 OF 002 north) next season (beginning around November). Tourism has been good the last two years, and people in the north would suffer from a drop in tourists. (Unlike mining, tourism is a sector that employs a disproportionately large number of Tuaregs.) ¶9. (U) Tripoli minimize considered. ALLEN