INDIAN JOURNALISTS AND POLITICAL WATCHERS

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 NEW DELHI 000974 SIPDIS SIPDIS E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/27/2017 TAGS: PREL PGOV AF IR PK IN SUBJECT: INDIAN JOURNALISTS AND POLITICAL WATCHERS CRITICIZE IRAN,S NUCLEAR PROGRAM AND USG NEGOTIATION STRATEGIES Classified By: PolCouns Ted Osius for Reasons 1.4 (B, D) Summary -------------- ¶1. (C) On February 16, a group of distinguished Indian journalists and political strategists gathered in Delhi for a digital video conference (DVC) discussion of Iran,s nuclear program with U.S. Permanent Representative to the UN Mission in Vienna Ambassador Schulte. With two IAEA votes and many months of debate since a similar November 2005 DVC, the participants avoided the contentious debate that had previously occurred. In particular, they refrained from bringing up more sensitive topics like the proposed Iran-to-India oil pipeline and second-guessing India,s IAEA votes. Our Indian interlocutors did not dispute Iran,s pursuit of nuclear weapons or that an Iranian weapons program would destabilize the region, but they did question the US negotiation strategy, particularly our insistence that Iran suspend its uranium enrichment program before multi-lateral talks begin. Overall, their comments reflected a growing acknowledgement among Indian experts that Iranian acquisition of nuclear weapons is unacceptable to India. Support for the GOI,s policy of lukewarm engagement on this issue seemed uniform among the group. End summary. Growing consensus on Iran -------------- ¶2. (SBU) On February 16, a group of distinguished Indian journalists and political strategists gathered in Delhi for a DVC discussion of Iran,s nuclear program with U.S. Permanent Representative to the UN Mission in Vienna Ambassador Gregory Schulte. With two IAEA votes and many months of debate since a similarly themed DVC in November 2005, the participants avoided the contentious debate that had previously occurred. In particular, they refrained from bringing up sensitive topics like the proposed Iran-to-India oil pipeline and second-guessing India,s IAEA votes. ¶3. (SBU) Ambassador Schulte began the conference by emphasizing 1) Iran had the right to benefit from a peaceful nuclear program, but violated its Nonproliferation Treaty obligations; 2) as a result, Iran incurred sanctions similar to a pariah state like North Korea; and 3) Iran could still choose to suspend all uranium enrichment activities, in which case the US would agree to suspend current UNSC sanctions and participate in multi-party talks on Iran,s nuclear program ) a scenario Schulte termed &double suspension.8 US negotiation strategy questioned -------------- ¶4. (SBU) Indian participants did not dispute Iran,s pursuit of nuclear weapons or that this would destabilize the region, but they did express uncertainty about the US negotiation strategy described by Ambassador Schulte. Vice Admiral (ret.) K.K. Nayar, Chairman of the Forum for Strategic and Securities Studies, suggested that back-channel bilateral discussions would be more effective than public multilateral talks. Schulte responded that because Iran,s nuclear program affected the world, the better diplomacy was to pit Iran against the larger community of nations through the mechanism of multi-party negotiations, citing recent success NEW DELHI 00000974 002 OF 002 in curbing North Korea,s nuclear arms development in such a forum. ¶5. (SBU) Schulte also underlined that Iran is destabilizing the region and might trigger a nuclear arms race. The world needs to hear the Gulf States confirm this threat, C. Raja Mohan, Strategic Affairs Editor of the Indian Express, argued. Ambassador (ret.) G. Parthasarthy, Senior Fellow at the Center for Policy Research, on this note, recommended expanding the other side of the table, so that instead of just Iran,s program, the multi-party talks could include the de-nuclearization of the entire Persian Gulf. ¶6. (C) Indrani Bagchi, Foreign Affairs Editor of the Times of India, who had just returned from accompanying External Affairs Minister Mukherjee on his visit to Tehran, noted that Iran was not prepared to accept suspension of enrichment as a condition precedent to talks and asked why the USG is insisting on this double suspension formula. In the past, Iran has used negotiations to stall for time while it moves forward with its uranium enrichment program, Schulte explained, making complete suspension of all enrichment a necessary precondition for future talks. ¶7. (C) Finally, several participants asked about the possibility of a US military action against Iran. Schulte acknowledged that there has been a lot of &noise8 on this issue in the media, but that the USG wants a diplomatic solution. Comment -------------- ¶8. (C) Overall, our interlocutors, comments reflected a growing acknowledgement among Indian experts that Iranian acquisition of nuclear weapons is unacceptable to India. Support for the GOI,s policy of lukewarm engagement on this issue seemed uniform among the group. End comment. ¶9. (U) This message has been cleared by UNVIE. MULFORD