INDIA APPEASES LEFT AND MUSLIMS WITH TEHRAN VISIT,

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 NEW DELHI 000786 SIPDIS SIPDIS UNVIE FOR AMBASSADOR SCHULTE DEPT OF ENERGY FOR A/S KAREN HARBERT, TOM CUTLER, MOLLY WILLIAMSON STATE EEB FOR DAS PAUL SIMONS, STEVE GALLOGLY, JAMES EIGHMIE STATE SCA FOR PDAS STEVE MANN E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/15/2017 TAGS: PREL PGOV EPET PARM KNNP IR PK IN SUBJECT: INDIA APPEASES LEFT AND MUSLIMS WITH TEHRAN VISIT, BUT TIES DEVOID OF CONTENT SAYS TOP JOURNALIST REF: NEW DELHI 00663 NEW DELHI 00000786 001.2 OF 003 Classified By: PolCouns Ted Osius for Reasons 1.4 (B,D) ¶1. (C) SUMMARY: "Times of India" diplomatic correspondent Indrani Bagchi, who accompanied Foreign Minister Mukherjee on his visit to Tehran February 6-7, told Deputy PolCouns that the visit had been an exercise by the government of India (GOI) to garner headlines that would please the Indian Muslim vote bloc and the Left. She said the Liquefied Natural Gas (LNG) deal would not happen, the Iran-Pakistan-India (IPI) pipeline was going nowhere and that Indo-Iranian cooperation on the port at Chabahar was "dead in the water." Mukherjee's visit had been "all about headlines and political comfort," according to Bagchi, who advised that, while it is good for the Indians and Iranians to talk, the U.S. need not worry too much about the rhetoric in the Indo-Iranian relationship. END SUMMARY. Pleasing the Muslim Voters and the Left -------------- ¶2. (C) Indrani Bagchi, "Times of India" diplomatic correspondent, told Deputy PolCouns February 14 that Foreign Minister Mukherjee's visit February 6-7 to Tehran had been primarily for the sake of pleasing the Muslim vote bloc and the Indian Left. (Note: In official statements, the MEA maintained the visit was part of the regular process of high-level exchanges between the two countries. End note.) Bagchi, who accompanied Mukherjee on the visit, asserted that the GOI's goal was to appease opposition forces in the face of upcoming elections in Uttar Pradesh province, which has a large Muslim minority population that acts as a swing constituency. The visit was "a cynical exercise on the part of the Indian government" to garner headlines at home and keep the Muslim voters (both Shia and Sunni) happy. IPI and LNG Deals Dead -------------- ¶3. (C) On the IPI pipeline, Bagchi opined that it would never come to fruition. "The deal has been on the table since 1995, it is still where it was in 1998 when I began reporting on it, and in 2015, it will still be in the same place," Bagchi emphasized. "While it is good for India and Iran to talk," she added, "it is impossible to sell the idea of India paying Pakistan's army $100 million per annum to protect the pipeline." The LNG deal "is dead," she said, noting that the best technology for such a project would come from Japan and the U.S., but neither country is willing to NEW DELHI 00000786 002.2 OF 003 provide it given the current political climate. "There is no way Iran has the technology to get the gas into a pipeline," Bagchi argued. Iranians were the world's worst negotiators and deal-makers anyway, she added, indicating that the U.S. should not be concerned about either the IPI pipeline or the LNG deal. "The U.S. should low-ball it," asserted Bagchi, underlining that Mukherjee's visit and the proposed projects were "all about headlines and political comfort." Deputy PolCouns recited our many concerns about Iran. Mukherjee's Message - Flexibility, Restraint, Transparency -------------- ¶4. (C) Mukherjee's message to the Iranians had been to be flexible, exercise restraint, take the views of the international community into account, and to "be more convincing" concerning its willingness to negotiate, Bagchi outlined. Regarding Mukherjee's statement that the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) should play a central role, Bagchi suggested that India was being typically Brahmanical in "reading the fine print to the Iranians" by helping them to see that, if they engage in dialogue, open their facilities, and cease the reprocessing of spent fuel, the IAEA would then verify that Iran had ceased uranium enrichment, thereby eventually freeing Iran of UNSCR 1737 sanctions. At that point, the IAEA would, in fact, be taking the central role, explained Bagchi. India was trying to help Iran see the way out, but the Iranians "are not linear in their thinking," bemoaned Bagchi, adding, "they think in circles." Asked if India could play an intermediary role with Iran, Bagchi replied, "No, they can not play the role of intermediary." Chabahar Port Cooperation "Dead in the Water" -------------- ¶5. (C) Indo-Iranian cooperation on development of the Iranian port complex of Chabahar, an entry to Afghanistan in lieu of transit across Pakistan, was "dead in the water," according to Bagchi. "Iran denied India equipment or personnel" for the development of the port, said Bagchi, claiming that the Iranians had told the Indians that they had to provide their own supplies and manpower if they wanted to use the port, which they then tie up in red tape. Mottaki Keeps His Distance -------------- ¶6. (C) Bagchi noted with interest that Iranian Foreign Minister Mottaki had declined to invite the visiting Indian NEW DELHI 00000786 003.2 OF 003 foreign minister to lunch. She theorized that this was in retaliation for Mukherjee having failed to invite Mottaki for a meal when he visited New Delhi in November 2006. "It is possibly the most important barometer for the decline of the relationship," Bagchi emphasized, suggesting that Mukherjee had not wanted to appear too close to the Iranians when Mottaki was in town. This protocollary snub, she added, stood in contrast to the warmth of the Iranian relation with Mukherjee's predecessor, Natwar Singh. Comment: You've Lost That Loving Feeling -------------- ¶7. (C) Certainly Bagchi does not speak for the GOI, but her refreshing candidness and privileged access reveal the changes taking place in the Indo-Iran relationship. Bagchi's comments echo the "what has Iran done for India lately?" sentiment Emboffs have heard from other civilian experts recently. Certainly the GOI would never admit to the charge Bagchi makes that the trip was to cover domestic election concerns, nor that bilateral relations are as empty as Bagchi suggests, but Post notes that both official feedback (reftel) and press accounts downplay any forward progress between India and Iran. The trip appears to have produced little of substance. India has significant potential energy interests in Iran to be sure, and has a degree of influence with Tehran, but Bagchi's insider report suggests the platitudes of a friendly joint statement may be hiding problems in this regional relationship. End comment. MULFORD