INDIA TALKS 123 WITH PAKISTAN DURING CBM DIALOGUE

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 NEW DELHI 004899 SIPDIS SIPDIS E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/07/2017 TAGS: PREL PGOV KNNP MARR MNUC MOPS KTIA PK IN SUBJECT: INDIA TALKS 123 WITH PAKISTAN DURING CBM DIALOGUE Classified By: PolCouns Ted Osius for Reasons 1.4 (B,D) ¶1. (C) SUMMARY: Ministry of External Affairs Disarmament and International Security (DISA) Director Amandeep Singh Gill gave PolOffs a read-out November 6 of the fourth round of Conventional and Nuclear Confidence Building Measures (CBMs) held in New Delhi October 18-19. During the nuclear CBM discussion Gill confided that the Indians had given the Pakistani side a basic briefing on the India-U.S. civil nuclear initiative. The Indians sought to allay Pakistani concerns that India would use nuclear material and technology it gained from the civil nuclear cooperation to augment its strategic program. On nuclear CBMs, Pakistan gave India an overall briefing on the security of its nuclear material. On conventional CBMs, the two sides made headway on a variety of smaller matters, including incidents at sea, inadvertent line crosses, military exchanges, building defensive structures on the border and the Line of Control, notification of military exercises, and the emergency hotline. The Government of India (GOI) declined Pakistan's proposal for a bilateral agreement on the non-weaponization of space, opting instead for a multi-lateral discussion on the issue. END SUMMARY India Briefs Pakistan on the Indo-U.S. Civil-Nuclear Deal -------------- ¶2. (C) Following an internal debate within the MEA, Additional Secretary K.C. Singh, who led the Indian side for nuclear and missile dialogue, decided to brief the Pakistanis on the Indo-U.S. nuclear deal as part of the Nuclear CBM discussion, according to Gill. "We decided it was best to be up front," he stated. The Indians emphasized that the deal was about civilian nuclear energy, said Gill, adding, "we took them through the basics." The Pakistanis, led by Additional Secretary Khalid Aziz Babar, voiced concerns that India would divert fissile material and nuclear technology - received through civil-nuclear cooperation - to its strategic nuclear program. Gill related that the Indian side pointed out that the separation plan was put in place in order to prevent civil nuclear cooperation from increasing India's nuclear strategic capacity. If Pakistan was so concerned about fissile material, the Indians had asked, why didn't Pakistan support a Fissile Material Cut-off Treaty? "We explained that the technology required for civil nuclear energy is already available to us and that we are not interested in augmenting our strategic program," disclosed Gill. Indian officials also cited India's no first use and credible deterrent policies, Gill recalled. Pakistan raised its own energy needs, but "in the end, they ran out of arguments," Gill observed. He told Poloffs that the 123 element of the India-Pakistan dialogue should remain confidential. SIPDIS Nuclear CBMs -------------- ¶3. (C) Regarding other nuclear CBMs, Gill reported that Pakistan provided an overall briefing on its control of nuclear material, with a focus on the implementation of the 1997 agreement on CBMs. Gill remarked that this was the first time since the Lahore Memorandum of Understanding of 1999 that the two sides had held a discussion on general nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament. Neither side proposed a date for the next round of nuclear CBMs, and Gill surmised that they would decide upon that after the current round of the Composite Dialogue ended. Gill did not know whether the current crisis in Pakistan had caused the delay of any dialogue between the two countries. Conventional CBMs - Sea Incidents, Inadvertent Line Crosses, Military Exchanges and Notifications -------------- ¶4. (C) In the conventional CBM dialogue led by MEA Joint Secretary for Pakistan, Afghanistan and Iran T.C.A. Raghavan SIPDIS on the Indian side and Ministry of Foreign Affairs Director for South Asia Aizaz Ahmad Choudhary on the Pakistani side, Gill said the two sides had made headway on a number of NEW DELHI 00004899 002 OF 002 issues, underlining that "this is not a cold war, but a step by step process." Pakistan had given what Gill referred to as its standard line of "we have to look at restraint, conflict prevention, and the deployment of artillery." Pakistan gave suggestions to the Indian drafts of an agreement on prevention of incidents at sea; the Indians subsequently made a list of discrepancies between the two texts which they plan to discuss at the next round of CBMs, according to Gill. In what he described as more of a humanitarian issue than a CBM, Pakistan and India discussed a draft agreement on inadvertent line crossers. India proposed military exchanges and exchanges of ideas between organizations such as Pakistan's National Defence Complex and India's Institute for Defence Studies and Analyses. Additionally, the two parties discussed the building of defensive structures on the border and the line of control. They reviewed the existing agreement on the advance notification of military exercises, the Director General hotline established between the two countries, and the ballistic missile notification agreement. Gill reported that the talks had gone well, with many break-out sessions and "forthright discussion." Pakistan Proposes Missile Defense -------------- ¶5. (C) Turning to outer space issues, the Pakistanis raised missile defense and proposed a bilateral agreement on the non-weaponization of space, Gill conveyed. The Indians told the Government of Pakistan that the GOI is against the weaponization of outer space, and that it was something they looked at with concern. However, the Indians made clear to the Pakistanis that the issue had a larger dynamic which could not be handled bilaterally, according to Gill. "Our energy would be better spent in multilateral discussions," he asserted. Comment: Slow and Steady Progress Continues -------------- ¶6. (C) While India and Pakistan continue to talk and make headway on small matters, they are potentially paving the way to deal with the bigger issues that loom in the background, such as the civil nuclear initiative. It is a good sign that the Indians decided to address the elephant in the room and brief Pakistan on the deal. India's apparent willingness to be transparent, if it is a trend that continues, bodes well for future talks between the two governments. More frustrating, the lack of progress in both the conventional side, which retread old ground without finalizing any of the existing drafts, and the nuclear side, which lacks ideas for new CBMs, reflects the political crises that have gripped both nations. In light of Musharraf's recent call for a state of emergency in Pakistan, the Indians are likely to lie low for the time-being, but we expect that India and Pakistan will come together again after the dust settles and continue on their path of slow but sure dialogue. WHITE