JASWANT SINGH SUPPORTS THE NUCLEAR DEAL BUT

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 NEW DELHI 004857 SIPDIS SIPDIS E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/05/2017 TAGS: PREL PARM TSPL KNNP ETTC ENRG TRGY IN SUBJECT: JASWANT SINGH SUPPORTS THE NUCLEAR DEAL BUT YASHWANT SINHA STICKS TO BJP POSITION REF: NEW DELHI 4803 Classified By: Ambassador David Mulford for Reasons 1.4 (B and D) ¶1. (C) Summary: In separate November 5 meetings with senior BJP leaders and former Foreign Ministers Yashwant Sinha and Jaswant Singh, the Ambassador argued that the 123 Agreement and Hyde Act had no impact on India's strategic program and urged them to take a statesmanlike attitude towards the nuclear initiative. Sinha contended that the 123 Agreement gave the U.S. leverage over India's strategic program. After the Ambassador explained that Indian negotiators carefully shielded the strategic program, Sinha stressed that the BJP could not reverse its position after expressing its reservations about the initiative from the very beginning in July 2005. Although he also regretted the UPA government's mishandling of the political crisis, Singh said that he supports the initiative and hoped to find a solution to get it done. The two conversations confirm that the BJP may come to a position in which the party continues to oppose the initiative but allow the IAEA talks to go forward. End Summary. Ambassador Urges BJP to Rethink Its Position - - - ¶2. (C) In separate November 5 meetings with senior BJP leaders and former Foreign Ministers Yashwant Sinha and Jaswant Singh, the Ambassador cautioned that BJP opposition to the civil nuclear cooperation initiative threatened to derail the coherent direction that successive Indian administrations have taken towards the U.S. In fact, the Ambassador continued, the BJP has put at risk the rise of India to become a major player on the world stage. The Ambassador walked them through the provisions of the Hyde Act and 123 Agreement, and explained that negotiators had stayed away from any discussion about India's strategic program. He recounted that since July 2005 the President had stepped in at key moments to craft the fuel supply assurances for the March 2006 separation plan and give India up-front reprocessing consent rights in the 123 Agreement. "Those were decisions based on his trust in India," the Ambassador underlined. He recalled that Republicans and Democrats had stood together and voted for the Hyde Act, even after a bruising mid-term election. He encouraged the BJP to put the party on the right side of history. �00A;Jaswant Singh Laments Government Mismanagement - - - ¶3. (C) Responding to the Ambassador's case, Singh noted that the BJP was the only political party in Indian history to stand clearly for a nuclear weapons program. He described the Congress Party's position of calling for universal nuclear disarmament and building a nuclear weapons program, which he dated back to Nehru, as "dishonest." He took pride in India's ability to build an indigenous program, especially when contrasted with China's program, which received help from the Russians, and the Russian program, which drew on German expertise. The BJP also stood for strong U.S.-India relations, Singh asserted, as illustrated by former Prime Minister Vajpayee's 2004 "natural allies" phrase to describe the partnership. He cited the "great goodwill for India in the mass of U.S. citizenship" as the greatest achievement of the 1998-2004 BJP-led government. Singh bemoaned that both the U.S. and Indian governments ignored their respective legislatures. "We are an extremely sensitive lot," Singh quipped. He complained that Prime Minister Manmohan Singh has let the civil nuclear initiative become the "icon" of the U.S.-India relationship. He also cautioned that many Indian politicians continue to "live in the shadow of the past." ¶4. (C) Revealing that he will meet leader of the BJP opposition L.K. Advani later November 5, Singh promised to convey the Ambassador's message accurately. He stated that the BJP cannot stand with the UPA government unless the UPA attempts to contact the BJP leadership. He told the Ambassador that he had urged the Prime Minister not to rush the initiative. He had advised PM Singh to "just hold it, take the tension out of it, don't make this a do or die effort," he recalled. The Ambassador outlined the tight timeline in the U.S. Congress that required quick action by the government. Singh said he was not optimistic and warned NEW DELHI 00004857 002 OF 003 that the government should not rely on BJP support to complete the nuclear deal. ¶5. (C) Singh divulged that some elements of the government have realized that the government can no longer function with the Left, but the UPA faces a "very real political difficulty" because it must pass its budget in February. Singh also noted that he has yet to receive the starting notice for the winter session of Parliament, which he should have received November 5, ten days before the first day of the session. (Note: Emboff has confirmed that the Parliament will begin November 15. End Note.) Singh also related that, having just returned from his Rajasthan constituency, his voters only care about consumer prices and law and order. The Ambassador countered that the most recent public opinion poll showed that the already high approval for the U.S. in India spiked because respondents perceived that the nuclear deal improves India's standing with the rest of the world. Yashwant Sinha Doubts BJP Will Change Its Tune - - - ¶6. (C) In response to the Ambassador's pitch to stand above the political fray, Sinha stated that the BJP position against the nuclear deal dated to a statement from former Prime Minister Atal Vajpayee just after the release of the July 18, 2005 Joint Statement. He described the careful, bureaucratic process that the Party underwent to examine and explain the implications of the nuclear deal. "Whatever the BJP has said and whoever has said it, it has been a considered response," he asserted, and noted that the BJP has stated its position in every session of Parliament since July ¶2005. He claimed that the Prime Minister had briefed the BJP leadership just after the 123 negotiators returned to India in July 2007, and when the government released the text publicly, the BJP again studied it assiduously before reiterating its opposition. Sinha took issue with the Prime Minister's statement that the 123 Agreement was "cast in stone" and "a done deal" that cannot be renegotiated. ¶7. (C) Sinha contended that BJP support would not necessarily move the deal forward. He conceded that "our support might strengthen the case for a national consensus," but as long as the Left stood against the nuclear initiative, the government would fall if it proceeded with IAEA talks. He also dismissed the notion that the BJP would reverse its position after 28 months of opposing the civil nuclear initiative. Sinha Outlines Problems - - - ¶8. (C) Sinha contended that the nuclear deal will, in effect, "put an embargo on nuclear testing," which would impact both the size and quality of India's credible deterrent. Moreover, he believed that the 123 Agreement postponed aspects of civil nuclear cooperation, including the fuel supply assurances, into a future agreement. The Ambassador and Poloff clarified that the fuel supply assurances did not require a separate 123 Agreement, as Sinha had misconstrued from the verbatim inclusion of the fuel supply assurances in the 123 Agreement. Sinha also claimed that the Explanatory Notes that accompanied the Hyde Act made clear that the annual reporting requirement would allow the U.S. to punish India if it built up its strategic program using domestic fuel. The Ambassador countered that the Hyde Act and 123 Agreement contained no provisions for penalizing India if it chose to increase its deterrent. Sinha also complained that the up-front reprocessing right was "futuristic" because it depended on a follow-on arrangement as well as the construction of a new facility. The Ambassador told him that the 123 Agreement had in fact given India the consent to reprocess spent fuel under certain conditions, which is more than the U.S. had given to most countries. ¶9. (C) Sinha also carped that officials have based the U.S.-India relationship on the single issue of the civil nuclear initiative. "It is very unfortunate that we have reached a point in which you tell me that if the deal doesn't go through, it will impact the relationship," he said. The Ambassador responded that the lack of trust engendered by a failure to move the deal forward will impact critical, discretionary elements of the relationship, such as the release of technology for India. Citing the Secretary's NEW DELHI 00004857 003 OF 003 statement that India was not a Nuclear Weapons State and the Prime Minister's comment that the U.S. recognized India as a nuclear weapons state, Sinha worried that the differing perceptions will grow as the two countries implement the agreement. The Ambassador disagreed, and said that he expects the disagreements to lessen substantially. ¶10. (C) The Ambassador pressed Sinha on which kind of India the BJP would like to rule; an India that participates in the global mainstream or an India that remains isolated? Sinha responded that he would like to have a separate conversation on his vision for the future of India. He claimed that if the BJP supported the government, "we will be ridiculed." However, he conceded that the BJP will likely allow the nuclear debate to occur in the winter session under no-voting rules, and left open the possibility that IAEA talks could occur after the Parliament debate. Comment: BJP Could Allow Way Forward But Still Oppose the Government - - - ¶11. (C) Having met the entire BJP leadership over the past two weeks (except for ailing Atal Vajpayee),it appears that the BJP has begun to search for a face-saving way to retain its pro-U.S. platform and soften its opposition to the nuclear deal without giving the appearance that it has conceded to the UPA government. Since the Ambassador's meeting with BJP President Rajnath Singh (reftel),his assistants have contacted the Embassy several times asking for information, so they can prepare the party leader to withstand the criticism of skeptics like Sinha, who cling to willful misperceptions in their argument against the nuclear deal. But even Sinha realizes that his stand against the civil nuclear initiative is at odds with the BJP's history, and all the BJP has to do is refrain from blocking the government's talks with the IAEA. A non-voting debate during the November 15-December 7 (winter) session of Parliament could finally clear the way for the government to approach the IAEA. MULFORD