BJP LEADERS RESPOND POSITIVELY TO AMBASSADOR'S

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 NEW DELHI 004803 SIPDIS SIPDIS E.O. 12958: DECL: 10/29/2017 TAGS: PREL PARM TSPL KNNP ETTC ENRG TRGY IN SUBJECT: BJP LEADERS RESPOND POSITIVELY TO AMBASSADOR'S PITCH FOR NUCLEAR SUPPORT Classified By: Ambassador David Mulford for Reasons 1.4 (B and D) ¶1. (C) Summary: During a series of separate meetings October 24-30, the Ambassador encouraged senior BJP leaders Brajesh Mishra, L.K. Advani and Rajnath Singh to set aside their political differences with the ruling Congress Party and recognize that the civil nuclear cooperation initiative was firmly in India's national interest. Advani listened attentively and confirmed that the BJP Party remained supportive of strong U.S.-India relations. Mishra confirmed that he backed the initiative, but cautioned that the UPA government owed the opposition BJP a briefing about what the UPA has done to strengthen India's strategic program. Singh reiterated that the UPA should agree to the BJP request for a Joint Parliamentary Committee, but confided that he will hold a Party meeting to take the Ambassador's views into account on the BJP position on the nuclear deal. After the meeting with the Ambassador, Singh told the press that the 123 Agreement remained unacceptable to the BJP, but that may be posturing prior to the opening of Parliament on November 15. Ambassador will continue to engage in BJP outreach to appeal to whatever statesmanship there may be left in that divided party. End Summary. Ambassador Makes the Pitch - - - ¶2. (C) The Ambassador met with former Deputy Prime Minister L.K. Advani October 24, former National Security Advisor Brajesh Mishra October 26 and BJP President Rajnath Singh October 29. He began each meeting by recounting that the strong U.S.-India relationship took roots during the BJP-led NDA government, which laid the groundwork for the partnership. When President Bush came to office in 2001, he made clear that the U.S. wanted to assist in India's rise to a world power, which he saw as vital for global stability and security. Following the completion of the Next Steps in Strategic Partnership (NSSP),the President focused on the importance of nuclear power to meet India's energy needs and offered what became the U.S.-India civil nuclear cooperation initiative, the Ambassador recalled. The initiative had the potential to remove the isolating civil nuclear barriers that constrained India's program, as well as facilitate India's multilateral relationship with the broader global nuclear market, he noted. While the U.S. acted as the key to opening up that market, the relative influence of the U.S. would decline as many other countries entered India's market, he observed. The Ambassador stressed that the nuclear initiative would be the start of many positive steps to come, and would help transform U.S.-India relations for decades to come. He added that time was running out for passage in the U.S. Congress and supporters of better ties with the U.S. needed to stand up to help or this opportunity would slip away for at least the present life of each government. Singh Harps on Details and Parliament Problems - - - ¶3. (C) Singh replied that the BJP opposition had expressed its concerns in Parliament about the impact on India's foreign policy and its strategic program. He also cited the 123 Agreement that the U.S. signed with China, which contains a clause that states that international commitments take precedence over domestic laws, and therefore China could test while India could not. Singh also complained that the BJP had called for a Joint Parliamentary Committee (JPC) to examine the Agreement and Hyde Act, but the UPA government ignored the request. The Ambassador stressed that the 123 Agreement does not limit India's strategic program at all, and pointed to the unique consultative feature in the 123 Agreement that would provide a "cooling off" period if India tests. Singh cited other U.S. laws that penalize India in the event of a test, to which the Ambassador responded that those apply universally, with or without a 123 Agreement. ¶4. (C) Singh reiterated that the BJP wants a strong relationship with the U.S., but questioned why the government did not allow a JPC. "In the present circumstances, a solution can only be obtained through a JPC," he repeated, and clarified that such a process could take a month at most. The Ambassador walked Singh through the tight timeline that India now faces, and stressed that the deal can only occur "now or never." He underlined that the initiative would NEW DELHI 00004803 002 OF 003 strengthen India and position it in the world in a way that the BJP once supported. "This is not a question of U.S.-India relations, it is a question of an emerging India," he pressed. Singh responded that he will call a party meeting to discuss the issue, and clarified that he had a "subsidiary problem in accepting the text as it is." ¶5. (C) Following the meeting, Singh divulged to The Hindu that BJP still rejected the 123 Agreement. "I told him that it is not possible for us to accept the 123 Agreement as it is," he stated. He noted that the BJP has not reconsidered its stance against the Agreement. "We are in the opposition. We will oppose it if a vote is taken," he said. BJP convenor Nalin Kohli, who had interpreted during the Singh meeting, told POLOFF to ignore the press. "It was a good meeting and received well, so don't go by the press coverage," he said. Mishra Supports the Deal, But Needs UPA Fig Leaf - - - ¶6. (C) Brajesh Mishra, the National Security Advisor under the NDA government, contended that the UPA government has mismanaged the nuclear initiative and refused to consult the BJP from the beginning. Moreover, the U.S. has "muddied the waters" by bringing up Iran constantly, he asserted. However, he noted that he has softened his position in the press. "I want to save the deal and I'm trying to show them a way out," he explained. He outlined two measures for the UPA to take that could assuage BJP concerns. First, he pressed that the UPA leadership, not the Foreign Secretary, must reach out to the BJP. Second, he contended that the UPA must brief the BJP on the current status of the strategic nuclear program. "What does the separation plan mean for our strategic program?" he asked, and clarified that only the government could provide a full, classified response to such a sensitive question. While Mishra encouraged the Ambassador to meet senior BJP members, he surmised that an offer of a UN Security Council seat would elicit BJP support. Advani Listens Carefully, Encourages More BJP Meetings - - - ¶7. (C) Former Deputy Prime Minister and current leader of the opposition L.K. Advani listened carefully to the Ambassador's points and promised to think carefully about his presentation. Advani was curious as to the impact of the Hyde Act on India,s ability to manage its strategic program. He also mused that the deal could be construed as a back door into the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty. Advani quizzed the Ambassador closely on the Congressional timeline, as well as the steps needed at the IAEA and NSG, and admitted that Foreign Secretary Menon, National Security Advisor Narayanan, and PM,s Special Envoy Shyam Saran were all mindful of the time pressure. Commenting that the BJP felt that what was happening to the deal was harmful to the country,s reputation, Advani added that the Left was opposing the deal because of its antipathy to America, not because of the elements within the deal. They fear becoming subordinate to the U.S., he added, but he disagreed with such notions. After the second Pokhran test, he reminisced, the BJP had successfully preserved warming trends in Indo-US relations despite the turbulence. He stressed that the BJP,s policy of friendship to the U.S. remain unshakeable, and recommended that the Ambassador convey the same points to former External Affairs Minister Jaswant Singh, Arun Shourie, and Mishra. Advani cautioned that Shourie would quiz the Ambassador closely on the 123 Agreement,s possible impact on India,s strategic programs. Advani closed by saying the deal was important to those who understood it, but reminded the Ambassador that the masses see other issues as more important. The BJP had accused the UPA government of letting the country down on so many issues, so it was tough now to bail it out when the UPA had failed to engage in even the minimum consultation on the deal. Comment: BJP Engagement Could Yield Results - - - ¶8. (C) The BJP opposition to the nuclear initiative, which runs counter to its modernizing, pro-U.S. image, has essentially allowed the Left to exert influence and stall the deal. Without the BJP on its side, the Left would have NEW DELHI 00004803 003 OF 003 little leverage over the UPA government in Parliament and would certainly lack the votes if a no-confidence motion came to the floor. However, with the BJP party position against the nuclear deal, the Left can credibly claim that a majority of the Parliament has sided against the deal. Neutralizing the BJP antipathy towards the deal will defang the Left, making its hostility to the deal irrelevant. The problem is the leadership divide in the BJP, which makes decision-making so fraught with risk for its senior people. We will continue to engage with the BJP leadership while taking pains to stay clear of India's internal politics. The key now is to appeal to whatever vestiges of statesmanship remain in this badly divided party. MULFORD