NEPAL ELECTIONS - NOW OR NEVER ACCORDING TO THE MEA

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 NEW DELHI 004493 SIPDIS SIPDIS E.O. 12958: DECL: 10/03/2017 TAGS: PREL PGOV MASS NP CH IN SUBJECT: NEPAL ELECTIONS - NOW OR NEVER ACCORDING TO THE MEA REF: NEW DELHI 4473 Classified By: PolCouns Ted Osius for Reasons 1.4 (B,D) ¶1. (C) SUMMARY: Ministry of External Affairs Joint Secretary for Nepal and Bhutan Preeti Saran told PolCouns October 3 that it would be difficult for the Government of Nepal to switch to a proportional representation system now, as the Maoists are demanding, but that the Interim Parliament might hold a special session in order to consider the matter. If the government of Nepal decided to change the system from mixed to direct proportional representation, she estimated that the Maoists stood to gain twenty seats, versus five to ten, in the Constituent Assembly. If Constituent Assembly elections did not happen as scheduled on November 22, Saran opined, they would not happen at all. She said she awaited instructions from Foreign Secretary Menon, now on his way back from New York, before she could clarify India's position on whether to extend the UN mandate in the event elections were postponed, but indicated that the GOI had not been happy about the UN Mission in Nepal (UNMIN) meddling in Nepal's internal politics. Asked if the GOI had a back-up plan in the event the Government of Nepal (GON) could not hold elections, she said in a week or two it might be time to have a discussion on Plan B. END SUMMARY. Proportional Representation -------------- ¶2. (C) In an October 3 meeting, MEA Joint Secretary for Nepal and Bhutan Preeti Saran confirmed GOI support for PM Koirala's decision to reject Maoist demands for immediate declaration of a republic and a switch to a fully proportional electoral system. She told PolCouns that the GOI did not have a position on the proportional representation system proposed by the Maoists, but she agreed that it would be difficult for the Election Commission to change the system at this point. Referring to Kathmandu as a "city of rumors," she said she had been told that the Interim Parliament might hold a special session in order to change the current system to one of proportional representation (PR). The current system had not been imposed, she pointed out, but was mutually decided by all parties. However, the Maoists had calculated that they stand to lose with the mixed system of first-past-the-post and proportional representation. She speculated that the Maoists would gain up to twenty seats, versus five to ten, if the system were changed, noting that there were areas with strong Maoist support where the Maoists would win seats with a PR system that they would otherwise lose. (Comment: Even if a special session of the Interim Parliament were to be called, it is unlikely that there would be enough time left to amend election laws to allow for a change to a pure proportional system. End comment.) ¶3. (C) PolCouns informed Saran that CPI-M leader Sitaram Yechury had weighed in with the Maoists in favor of the idea of a total PR system. Saran replied that it was up to Nepal to decide, adding that they were running out of time. If the Election Commission were to make any compromises, she predicted, it would agree to a special parliamentary session on the PR system. In every agreement they had made thus far, the Maoists had changed their minds and shifted the goal posts, Saran lamented, adding, "They don't care if the whole process gets disrupted." The fear in Nepal, she said, was that the Maoists' behavior would become worse if they felt they were being marginalized and not allowed to be a part of the mainstream. Elections: Now or Never -------------- ¶4. (C) "If there are no elections in November, they will not happen," maintained Saran. Asked if India had a Plan B in the event elections were postponed, Saran suggested meeting again with the U.S. in a week or two to talk about a back-up plan, since by then the fate of elections would be more clear. "Whenever I'm asked about Plan B, I say let's look at NEW DELHI 00004493 002 OF 003 Plan A," she said, implying that the GOI was not prepared for a possible collapse of plans for November elections. PolCouns pointed out that the Maoists cannot be relied upon to remain committed to elections, and questioned whether the GOI would be prepared to assist the Nepal Army in a worst-case scenario. Saran responded that it was premature to decide, and that the GOI would, in any event, wait for the GON's request for assistance to its military. "At this point, we don't see the Nepal Army taking unilateral steps. It is only the Maoists and the Young Communists League (YCL) that have gone off track," Saran elucidated. Extending the UN Mandate -------------- ¶5. (C) Asked if the Government of India (GOI) would consider allowing the UN to extend its mandate beyond January 22, 2008, in the event elections were postponed, Saran responded that she needed to wait for Foreign Secretary Menon to return from New York to "talk this out." She understood that Menon had spoken with Under Secretary Burns about Nepal on the sidelines of the UN General Assembly, but had not yet heard what they had discussed. She stressed that, whether the GOI would agree to extend the date of the UN mandate or not, UN Mission in Nepal (UNMIN) would have to limit itself to three areas of responsibility: arms management, technical assistance, and election observation. She voiced concern that UNMIN had already overstepped its boundaries by trying to negotiate directly with Madhesi factions in the Terai region (Note: Madhesis are Nepalis of ethnic Indian origin. End note.),and that UNMIN officials had traveled to India on tourist visas and "interfered in the internal politics of Nepal." The GOI had been "offended" and unhappy with that action, and had blacklisted the officials in question, Saran asserted. Terai Crisis -------------- ¶6. (C) "We can't afford to have unrest in the Terai," Saran emphasized, noting that it would be difficult to give refuge to all who sought it, considering that most of the Indo-Nepal border were densely populated, poor regions. 18,000 Nepalis alone had fled to the Indian town of Gorakhpur when unrest in the Nepali district of Kapilvastu erupted last month, she indicated. (See reftel for greater detail.) China's Influence in Nepal -------------- ¶7. (C) Asked if China was looking for opportunities to influence Nepal at this stage, Saran assessed that India and the U.S. should look carefully at what role China would play in Nepal's future. Publicly, China has said it would not interfere in Nepali politics, she observed, but Maoist leader Prachanda had already been invited to visit China. The Chinese had close links with both the King and the Maoists, she noted, though India had much closer overall relations with Nepal. Nepal's Congress Party had its roots in support from India's Congress Party, and Nepal's Maoists were influenced by China. "Nepal looks to India for democracy, and to China for communism," she theorized. Comment: Preparing for Plan B -------------- ¶8. (C) Saran's suggestion that elections would not take place at all if not in November was consistent with what we have been hearing from our contacts, who range from doubtful that elections will be held as scheduled to adamant that they will not. It is increasingly important that the GOI focus on a back-up plan for Nepal, considering the issue of security along the Indo-Nepal border, and the influx of refugees that might pour over it in the event an armed conflict breaks out in Nepal. Saran confirmed GOI support for Koirala's decision to reject Maoist demands for immediate declaration of a republic and a switch to a fully proportional electoral system. We will continue to press them to accept an extended NEW DELHI 00004493 003 OF 003 UN mandate in the event elections are delayed. ¶9. (U) This message has been coordinated with Embassy Kathmandu. MULFORD