CONCLUSION OF THE SEVENTH US-INDIA WORKING GROUP

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 07 NEW DELHI 002916 SIPDIS SIPDIS E.O. 12958: DECL: 06/22/2017 TAGS: PREL KPKO MARR UNGA IN SUBJECT: CONCLUSION OF THE SEVENTH US-INDIA WORKING GROUP ON PEACEKEEPING REF: A. STATE 92154 ¶B. NEW DELHI 1325 Classified By: Political Counselor Ted Osius for Reasons 1.4 (B, D) ¶1. (C) SUMMARY: The seventh annual US-India Joint Working Group on Peacekeeping on June 19 focused on opportunities for the U.S. and India to work together to meet new challenges in global peacekeeping capacity. IO PDAS James Warlick led the US delegation, and Joint Secretary Sanjiv Arora of the MEA led an 11 member delegation comprised of MEA, MHA, and military staff officers with UN involvement. Arora confirmed that the GOI will participate in this year's capstone Global Peacekeeping Operations Initiative (GPOI) event, "Khan Quest 2007" in August in Mongolia. He also confirmed that the GOI would like to host the joint GPOI/DPKO-created Senior Mission Leader Course (SMLC) training event at its Center for UN Peacekeeping (CUNPK) in January 2008. Warlick explored whether the GOI would also consider contributing troops for middle ring security for the UN Assistance Mission in Iraq (UNAMI),and Arora stated that he was not authorized to commit at this time. The Indians expressed concern about the proposed reorganization of the UNDPKO, expressing hope that the split between operations and support would help streamline and speed up peacekeeping decision-making, but cautiously withheld its full support for the Secretary General's proposal. Major General V. Bhatnager emphasized that any proposed splitting of responsibility must not result in ambiguity in UNDPKO command and control. ¶2. (C) Warlick urged India to be prepared for the possibility of peacekeeping operations in Darfur, Chad, and Somalia. Arora restated the GOI's position that UNDPKO must consult with all stakeholders before initiating new PKOs. The GOI pointed to its great success with the deployment of all-Indian Female Formed Police Units (FFPU) to Liberia this past year. The Indians briefed on their police and military contributions to UN Peacekeeping, emphasizing Indian operational successes in the UN Mission to the Democratic Republic of the Congo (MONUC) and Lebanon (UNIFIL). The US delegation praised the Indian Center for UN Peacekeeping for its comprehensive and high standards in training. During a dinner hosted by DCM, Special Envoy Chinmaya Gharekhan proposed that India and Africa work together to enhance African peacekeeping capabilities. END SUMMARY. ¶3. (U) Issues discussed at the Peacekeeping Joint Working Group included: -- Department of Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO) Reform (paras 6 - 9) -- Command and Control of PKO (para 10) -- Peace Building (paras 11 - 12) -- DPKO Capacity Building (paras 13 - 16) -- Meeting the challenges of the surge in PKO (paras 17 - 20) ¶4. (C) Joint Secretary for United Nations (Political) Sanjiv Arora began by stressing the importance of the peacekeeping dialogue facilitated by the bilateral Joint Working Group (JWG). Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary James Warlick responded by recognizing that India, with its enormous contribution to missions across the globe, was crucial to UN peacekeeping efforts and largely responsible for their success. Warlick went on to identify the JWG as a valuable opportunity to establish a mutual understanding of Peacekeeping operations, and to compare notes with regard to the future of the program, given the "extraordinary challenges in the future." Arora concurred, noting the importance of both the US, a member of the UN Security Council and India, one of the largest contributors of troops to Peacekeeping operations, respectively. ¶5. (C) Arora expressed his hope that the two delegations could exchange views on conceptual operational issues, potential areas of cooperation, and perceptions regarding major developments in the realm of UN Peacekeeping. Arora emphasized that the success of the India ) US JWG was not NEW DELHI 00002916 002 OF 007 determined by "action points," but by the "larger utility of having an exchange of information and notes regarding major challenges." DPKO REFORM ) DEBATING THE PROPOSED SPLIT ¶6. (C) Arora raised the issue of the new UN Secretary General's idea to restructure the UN Department of Peacekeeping Operations (UNDPKO),noting that although the effort has received a green light from member states and other UN departments, more details on the restructuring process needed to be established before India would decide to lend its full support. ¶7. (C) Warlick affirmed that restructuring the UNDPKO was understandable due to the "enormity" of Peacekeeping operations, and added that UN members need to assess the DPKO structure and ask of themselves: &does it make sense?8 especially considering budgetary implications. Warlick indicated that the US Government was prepared to support the Secretary General in his decisions regarding the DPKO and SIPDIS secretariat, but cautioned that the USG was wary of SIPDIS undercutting the ability of the DPKO to successfully carry out operations. Arora reiterated that the GOI supports the DPKO restructuring in principal, although it cautions against "reform for the sake of reform." The GOI hopes that through streamlining, the DPKO will be made more efficient and lag time will be reduced. He noted that in the annual GOI dialogue reviewing Peacekeeping commitments, the issue of DPKO restructuring was brought up; until a more concrete proposal is made, the GOI will refrain from making a final judgment. ¶8. (C) Director of International Organization Affairs, Peacekeeping, Sanctions, and Counterterrorism Douglas Wake informed the Indian delegation that while in New York, he had been assured that any restructuring would not result in increasing resource allocations. This led Wake to raise the question of what new resources might be necessary, given ongoing and future peacekeeping operations. Wake identified procurement, oversight, and staff support as issues that warranted particular attention. Furthermore, he asserted that every DPKO project or mission should be judged on its own merits, and that compromise would be necessary; certain missions would be approved, while others would be turned down. ¶9. (C) Warlick urged particular attention be paid to the issue of sexual exploitation and abuse connected to peacekeeping operations. While stressing that the issue was not directly related to the conduct of Indian peacekeepers, he noted that any such acts or allegations "taint the entire DPKO," which could do more to address problems with post-incident follow up. Arora noted that the GOI is "making new arrangements accordingly" regarding allegations of sexual exploitation, but added that, the human rights record of Indian peacekeepers "is commendable." COMMAND AND CONTROL MUST REMAIN CLEAR ¶10. (C) The US delegation next stated that efforts to alter the Command and Control structure of Peacekeeping operations should be thoroughly considered, especially in terms of future operations, before concrete change is effected. JS Arora declined to comment on Command and Control reform in the case of a UN-AU hybrid force in Darfur, noting it is "premature to indicate what the GOI thinks." MAJGEN V. Bhatnager (Chief of Indian UN Peacekeeping Forces) weighed in, stating that in his experience, soldiers should ideally be under one distinct command; dual control can lead to "ambiguity and confusion." To mitigate this problem, Bhatnager proposed delimiting specific areas of responsibility, but acknowledged that further examination was necessary. Bhatnager concluded by stressing that Troop Contributing Countries (TCCs) must retain the prerogative of selecting which soldiers would be deployed to Peacekeeping operations. He briefly described the extensive training that Indian peacekeepers are subjected to prior to deployment, and NEW DELHI 00002916 003 OF 007 noted that problems, while few, were dealt with harshly. PEACE BUILDING MUST FACTOR IN ¶11. (C) Warlick stated that the UN Peace-building Commission (PBC) must plan for stabilization and reconstruction, opining that where PBC proves ineffective, peacekeeping operations may again be needed. He noted the success stories of Sierra Leone and Burundi, where the military PKOs have been withdrawn, noting a desire to extend this scenario to Cote D,Ivoire and the Congo as conditions allow. Arora stated that PBC is still groping for a role to play, and should be used as a donor-driven process. Warlick noted that new challenges in Africa, including new and continuing Peacekeeping missions, must also be addressed. ¶12. (C) Separately, during a dinner conversation at the DCM's residence, Special Envoy to the Middle East Ambassador Chinmaya Gharekhan proposed that India and the US work together to enhance African peacekeeping capabilities. He stressed that, in view of China's energetic efforts to woo African countries for their natural resources, India needs a way to engage more deeply with Africa. While India has strong cultural,,historical and colonial linkages with Africa, it has a markedly weak diplomatic presence on the continent, Gharekhan noted. (see ref B. for fuller discussion.) HOW INDIA VIEWS DPKO CAPACITY BUILDING ¶13. (C) Arora drew attention to the new concept of "enhanced rapidly deployable capacities," which could eventually replace the UN Strategic Reserve. He admitted that these proposals were mostly in conceptual stages, and that not much has been made operational ) for example, the UN still lacked a standing police force. The GOI stated its satisfaction that the discussions regarding C-34 (UN special committee on PKO) had been resolved. Warlick concurred that the USG is also pleased with the outcome of the C-34 talks, and that the USG considers it an example of how India and the US can work together not just in Peacekeepig, but in larger contexts. ¶14. (C) Warlick asked how India would suggest building up DPKO capacity, and Arora replied that the process could be streamlined if the DPKO would double-track both political and operational deliberatios simultaneously, rather than sequentially. He also stated the GOI preference for a formal DPKO request for troops, but noted that when this is not possible, that the informal process should be more fluid. Arora added that India supports the UN stand-by arrangement system (UNSAS). ¶15. (C) General Bhatnager noted the large number of Indian forces readily available for PKOs, but added that it would be useful to partially supplant troops by use of high-technology alternatives. He noted that at a recent multinational PKO seminar at Germany's Center for Peacekeeping (ZDF) in Berlin, Germany pointed to its focus on providing appropriate available technology, such as Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (UAV), sensors and imaging equipment to supplement and reduce the number of actual boots on the ground when making assessments of DPKO troop contribution requests. General Bhatnager noted appreciatively that the Germans successfully augmented their PKO troop contribution in Sudan with Unmanned Aerial Vehicle (UAV) sorties. The GOI delegation noted that for the first time, elements of the Indian Air Force have been deployed to serve in a Peacekeeping capacity, and authorities are considering possible future roles for Indian naval forces. ¶16. (C) Arora confirmed that the GOI would like to host the joint GPOI/DPKO-created Senior Mission Leader Course (SMLC) training event at its Center for UN Peacekeeping (CUNPK) in January 2008. MEETING THE CHALLENGE OF THE SURGE IN PKO ¶17. (C) Warlick remarked that the UNDPKO needs to begin NEW DELHI 00002916 004 OF 007 exploring options and contingencies for peacekeeping well in advance of any deployment. Senior Military Advisor to the International Organizations Bureau COL Larry Mrozinski noted that currently the DPKO requires an average of 180 days to respond to a crisis, and said there needs to be a way to streamline the process to reduce this delay. He suggested using trained professional police forces, which India has in abundance, as advance forces. He warned of the danger of "spillover" of conflicts, as in the case of the Darfur conflict spilling over into Chad. MoD Joint Secretary (General Staff) Julka noted that before coming onboard with a new PKO suggestion, India would desire a threat assessment from DPKO and even from the USG, along with the request. ¶18. (C) Arora agreed on the potential need for new Peacekeeping operations, but underlined the GOI position that all stakeholders must be consulted before starting a new operation. He noted that there had been much talk of a mission in Darfur in the wake of UNSCR 1706 of August 2006; deployment of the light support packages is now almost complete, while it is still not clear whether President Bashir will accept the UN-AU hybrid force. Beyond Sudan, observers have raised the possibility of peacekeeping operations in Somalia, Chad, and the Central African Republic. He added that potential roles for the UN in Nepal and East Timor are also recent causes of concern. ¶19. (C) Warlick noted that the surge of expected PKO plans have not materialized as quickly as expected, and urged India to join US efforts to push for UNPKO to explore contingencies in Sudan, Chad, and Somalia. He also expressed concern about the lack of movement on transitioning a UNPKO to replace the African Union Mission to Somalia (AMISOM) force currently in place. Arora restated the GOI's position that UNDPKO must consult with all stakeholders before initiating new PKOs. Julka added that the PKOs in Congo and Liberia have not fully utilized available air force resources. ¶20. (C) Warlick stated that the UN is actively involved in a political support mission in Iraq (UNAMI). Warlick asked if the GOI would also consider contributing troops to provide "middle ring" or perimeter security for UNAMI. Arora hedged and stated that he was not authorized to give any commitment as a reply. INDIA OUTLINES ITS PKO READINESS ¶21. (C) Ministry of Home Affairs (MHA) Inspector General (UN Police Forces) RR Bhatnager outlined PK capabilities of Indian paramilitary police units, noting that service in the troubled, insurgent-rife state of Kashmir gives Indian police and military superior suitability for service in UN Formed Police Units (FPU). He noted that Indian police and troops often serve in Indian states where the locals have vastly different cultures, dress, customs and even language, and this experience readies the police for PKO in foreign countries. He also noted that Indian paramilitary police regularly perform missions quite similar to PKO duties, such as roadblocks, IED detection and removal, border sealing and patrolling and regular engagements with heavily armed terrorists. Indian paramilitary police are also armed and proficient with a wide array of advanced weaponry not readily available to most countries, police, including light and medium machine-guns, mortars and sniper rifles. ¶22. (C) Bhatnager outlined India's participation in international police training, such as participation in the Center of Excellence for Stability Police Units (COESPU) in Italy, and noted that India has trained 590 international police officers at its National UN Civilian Police seminars since 2003. He added that the number of Indian police participating in UN FPUs has decreased from 303 in 2000 to 98 in 2007, but he pledged India's ability and willingness to contribute more, both at the lower and senior police levels. MHA Director (UN Police Forces) Inderjeet Kaur added that the GOI also has vast reserves of ready-trained female officers who are willing to participate, noting the deployment of NEW DELHI 00002916 005 OF 007 all-Indian Female Formed Police Units (FFPU) to Liberia this past year. Ministry of External Affairs Deputy Secretary (International Organizations) Manish noted that some Liberian women have expressed a wish to become police officers after positive interactions with the Indian FFPU. INDIA DETAILS ITS UN PKO CONTRIBUTIONS ¶23. (C) COL Vijay Singh (Director, UN Army HQ) gave an overview presentation of India's military UN Peacekeeping activities and current contributions, underlining that target countries of UNPKO especially welcome Indian military peacekeepers, valuing them for their neutrality and high standards of professionalism. He pointed to great Indian success in the UN Mission to the Democratic Republic of the Congo (MONUC) describing how three Indian peacekeeping brigades thwarted the Congo rebel leader Napunda in his attempt to take the city of Goma. He also noted that the 4th Sikh regiment participating in UNIFIL stood its ground despite sustaining casualties, and for this was singled out for praise by UNPKO Under Secretary Jean-Marie Guehenno. ¶24. (C) COL D.S. Gill (Director, Center for UN Peacekeeping) gave a presentation on the military training conducted by the Center for UN Peacekeeping, underlining that alone among all the international UN Peacekeeping centers worldwide, India's CUNPK fully funds the transportation, lodging and training of 15 foreign officers per annum. He pointed to cultural sensitivity training, as well as HIV/AIDS awareness training. Gill noted that six US military officers have trained at CUNPK. ¶25. (C) Warlick praised the superb CUNPK training center, and underlined the need for closer interaction between NATO and UNDPK. Arora noted that the CUNPK recently hosted an ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF) seminar, and that Indian and African PK officials have gone to the German ZDF for training. Inspector General Bhatnager noted that the CUNPK hopes to be recognized by UNDPKO as an official Asia-Pacific regional police training center. Mrozinski urged COL Gill and CUNPK reach out to offer training for members of the Kosovar Police Service School (KPSS),if they have not already done so. Gill replied that CUNPK has not contacted KPSS yet, as they are not members of the International Association of Peacekeeping Training Centers (IAPTC),but Arora agreed that it would be a good idea to reach out to them. NEED TO PHASE OUT OBSOLETE PKO MISSIONS ¶26. (C) Arora reiterated the GOI commitment to Peacekeeping operations, and stated the GOI,s willingness to participate in discussions on possible draw-downs of certain missions. He observed that the process would benefit from more information from the various stakeholders. More broadly, the GOI expressed its interest in energizing consultations between troop contributing countries (TCCs) and Security Council members. Arora emphasized the utility of such consultations and, while noting that they are occurring more frequently and with more substantive proceedings, stated that India would still like to see "more effort" to that end. ¶27. (C) Warlick questioned the need for continued UN Peacekeeping operations where they were no longer needed. He stated a "need for an exit strategy" in certain countries. He also questioned the further need for certain legacy missions. Arora noted that UNMOGIP is defunct, and an "aberration" that should be canceled, but underlined that India is "not playing the numbers game" when considering downsizing and withdrawal of PKOs, stating that such cases should be deliberated carefully, and shouldn't take any of the stakeholders by surprise. ¶28. (C) BGEN Dalbir Singh, (Deputy Chief of Indian UN Peacekeeping Forces) noted that India still has Military Observers (MILOB) in Cote D,Ivoire, and asked how soon this PKO could be concluded. Warlick replied that Cote d,Ivoire still lacks stability, and that a UNPKO needs to remain until NEW DELHI 00002916 006 OF 007 the country is more stable. Wake added that it may be possible to draw down following elections next year. Arora noted that a peace agreement on Cote D,Ivoire was reached a while back, but agreed that after the upcoming UN visit all would have a better idea of when a pull-out might be appropriate. RULES OF ENGAGEMENT: CHAPTER VI VERSUS CHAPTER VII ¶29. (C) Mrozinski asked if the GOI was satisfied with the Rules of Engagement (RoE) in the UNIFIL mission, to which General Bhatnager replied that Indian troops were merely observers there. Mrozinski emphasized that the UNFIL RoE give individual unit commanders authority to interpret the mandate as a field decision, and asked if the Indian commanders employ this discretion. General Bhatnager hedged, stating that it depends on the situation, yet finally underlined that this decision should only be taken by the overall UN Mission force commander, and any unit commanders who violate the mandate by using their own discretion should be reported. Arora added carefully that "it was perceived" that there was ambiguity intentionally added to UNSCR 1701 in order to blur the line between Chapters VI and VII. Arora underlined that India did not hesitate to contribute troops to UNIFIL, as (then Defense Minister) Mukherjee had promised to UNSYG Kofi Annan, but admitted that there was much deliberation both within India and with the UNDPKO about the interpretation of UNSCR 1701. ¶30. (C) Director Wake underlined that a lack of a clear mandate can constrain UNPKO, with frustrating results. Wake emphasized that India, as a major troop contributing country, and the US, as a UN Security Council member, need to demand clearer mandates, specifying either Chapter VI and VII, before committing troops to the proposed new hybrid mission to Darfur. Arora demurred, noting that India is not a player in the decision-making of defining the UNPKO mandate for Darfur, and used the opportunity to get in a plug for India's aspiration to a permanent seat on the UNSC, noting, "Maybe we should be allowed into the UNSC, so that we can see for ourselves how the mandates are decided." He added that often a lack of information or appreciation of ground realities causes the confusion in choosing the appropriate mandate for a particular mission. General Bhatnager noted the importance of giving a clear, unambiguously worded mandate to the ground commanders, to avoid confusion. Wake pointed to UNSCR 1706, authorizing the Darfur PKO, noting that the mandate must be worded to give the PKO troops the authority to take any means needed to fulfill their mission tasks, especially protecting civilians, underlining, "we'll need a Chapter VII mandate." Arora noted that the African Union (AU) and the Government of Sudan are both stakeholders in the Darfur conflict, and need to be consulted before this mandate is finalized. ¶31. (U) Participants: USG: James Warlick, Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary, Bureau of International Organizations (IO) Affairs Douglas Wake, Director of Peacekeeping, Sanctions and Counterterrorism Office, Bureau of International Organizations (IO) Affairs COL Lawrence Mrozinski, Senior Military Advisor to Peacekeeping, Sanctions and Counterterrorism Office, Bureau of International Organizations (IO) Affairs Geoffrey Pyatt, DCM, US Embassy New Delhi Ted Osius, Political Counselor, US Embassy New Delhi LTC Brian Hedrick, Deputy Chief, ODC, US Embassy New Delhi Joel Ehrendreich, POL/MIL Section Chief, US Embassy New Delhi India: MEA Joint Secretary (International Organizations) Sanjiv Arora, Indian delegation head MEA Deputy Secretary (International Organizations) Manish MEA Deputy Secretary (International Organizations) Surinder Dutta MEA Deputy Secretary (Americas) Prashant Agarwal NEW DELHI 00002916 007 OF 007 MHA Inspector General (UN Police Forces) RR Bhatnager MHA Director (UN Police Forces) Inderjeet Kaur MoD Joint Secretary (General Staff) Julka MAJGEN V. Bhatnager (Chief of Indian UN Peacekeeping Forces) BGEN Dalbir Singh, (Deputy Chief of Indian UN Peacekeeping Forces) COL Vijay Singh (Director, UN Army HQ) COL D.S. Gill (Director, Center for UN Peacekeeping) ¶32. (U) IO PDAS Warlick cleared this cable. MULFORD