INDIA REQUESTS FORMAL TERRORISM WATCH LIST EXCHANGE

S E C R E T NEW DELHI 002247 SIPDIS SIPDIS E.O. 12958: DECL: 05/07/2017 TAGS: PREL PGOV PTER PINR PBTS MOPS KDEM KISL ASEC IN SUBJECT: INDIA REQUESTS FORMAL TERRORISM WATCH LIST EXCHANGE Classified By: PolCouns Ted Osius, Reason 1.5 (B,D) ¶1. (S) This is an ACTION request for the Department S/CT and SCA. Please see paragraph 4. ¶2. (S) Summary: Indian MEA Counter-Terrorism Cell Director I M Pandey passed a request to Poloff that the U.S. and India sign an agreement to create a formal and continuous channel to exchange terrorism watch lists, including "no fly" lists, FBI wanted lists, and other intelligence-based terrorist lists. Pandey indicated that the lists should include more information than simply names and birth dates, since South Asian names are often very similar. End Summary. ¶3. (S) Poloff met with Indian MEA Counter-Terrorism Cell Director I M Pandey on May 8th to discuss follow-up steps to the Counter-Terrorism Joint Working Group. Pandey said that he had been working to establish a point of contact for U.S. officials to follow up on arrests of terrorism suspects reported in the newspaper. He said, however, that this may be the wrong avenue to help the U.S. ensure that terrorists do not receive U.S. visas. Instead, he said the Ministry of Home Affairs was asking for a formal bilateral agreement to exchange terrorism watch lists on an ongoing basis. These would include "no fly" lists, FBI wanted lists, and additional lists derived for intelligence purposes. After all, he explained, some of the people who appear in the newspaper may be innocent, so it is important that we exchange information about the real terrorists. He was also concerned that some South Asian names are very common, such as Singh and Patel, leading to confusion about who is really on the list. He suggested that the lists should include more information than simply names and dates of birth, if it is available, to avoid this kind of confusion. ¶4. (S) ACTION REQUEST: Post requests guidance on how to respond to Pandey's request, particularly whether this kind of information, including names at a SECRET level, can be shared with the GOI on a continuous basis. Can the information be gathered into a single database? Legatt comments that Homeland Security Presidential Directive/Hspd-6 may apply if India is formally included in the list of certain foreign governments that should receive this information. ¶5. (S) Comment: India has a wealth of information about Foreign Terrorist Organizations (FTO) Lashkar-e-Taiba and Jaish Muhammad, including names of terrorists involved in the groups at an operational level, so India's lists may be of high intelligence value for the United States. Further these lists may be of high value for the Visa's Viper program at Embassies across South Asia. As with any exchange with India, we have to watch that this formal mechanism does not become an excuse for the Ministry of Home Affairs to stall in providing reciprocal information. The steps necessary to negotiate this agreement may, themselves, prove to be a long and drawn out process. End Comment. PYATT