CODEL LOWEY DISCUSSES 123 AGREEMENT, CONGRESSIONAL

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 NEW DELHI 001676 SIPDIS SIPDIS E.O. 12958: DECL: 04/09/2017 TAGS: PREL PGOV PARM TSPL KNNP ETTC ENRG TRGY IN SUBJECT: CODEL LOWEY DISCUSSES 123 AGREEMENT, CONGRESSIONAL ROLE WITH MENON AND SARAN NEW DELHI 00001676 001.2 OF 003 Classified By: Ambassador Mulford for Reasons 1.4 (B,D) ¶1. (C) SUMMARY: In a joint meeting with Foreign Secretary Shiv Shankar Menon and Special Envoy to the Prime Minister Shyam Saran, Codel Lowey outlined their concerns on the civil-nuclear agreement, including fears that the Government of India (GOI) had come to the conclusion that the U.S. Congress could be ignored and that the agreement could be pushed through with changes to which they had not consented. Warning that the GOI should not assume that there had been automatic support for the agreement, the Codel expressed that the GOI and the U.S. had not had good dialogue on the agreement since the Hyde Act had passed. Saran responded that the GOI was still negotiating on the agreement, warning that no one should jump to conclusions on its status. Citing India's excellent record of non-proliferation and its own technological advances, Saran indicated that the U.S. would benefit more from having India as a partner in the realm of civil nuclear technology, rather than an outsider. On the recent indictment of an Indian-related company for illegally obtaining sensitive technology, Menon reassured the delegation that the Government of India was working with the U.S. to investigate the situation, and that the GOI had no interest in breaking U.S. law. Members of the Delegation included: Congresswoman Nita Lowey, Chairwoman of the Foreign Operations, Export Financing and Related Programs Sub-committee Congressman Edward Royce Congressman Adam Schiff Congressman Steve Israel Congressman Ben Chandler Congressman Timothy Ryan Congressman Cliff Stearns END SUMMARY. ¶2. (C) Codel Lowey's meeting with Foreign Secretary Shiv Shankar Menon and Special Envoy to the Prime Minister Shyam Saran began on a strained note. When Ambassador Mulford arrived at the Ministry of External Affairs (MEA),he learned that the Codel was not coming to the meetings as a protest against the fact that meetings with Congress Party President Sonia Gandhi and Prime Minister Singh had not come through. (Note: Gandhi was campaigning in Uttar Pradesh, and the Prime Minister is in Assam. End note.) The Ambassador assured Chairwoman Lowey by telephone that the Codel should come meet Menon and Saran, and then explained to the Foreign Secretary what had transpired. Menon said the MEA had SIPDIS scheduled the Prime Minister and Foreign Minister meetings for Friday, April 6, and then the delegation changed their schedule. (Note: These meetings were never confirmed to the Embassy. End note.) ¶3. (C) Chairwoman Lowey opened the meeting by strongly expressing her disappointment that Prime Minister Singh was unable to meet with her delegation. Congressman Edward Royce NEW DELHI 00001676 002.2 OF 003 echoed Lowey's disappointment to the Foreign Secretary, stating that the delegation had been asked by Congressional leadership to come to India to discuss the civil nuclear agreement, of which all members of the delegation had voted in favor. Menon emphasized that both the Prime Minister and Foreign Minister Pranab Mukherjee wanted to meet with the Codel, but that it had been physically impossible due to the Prime Minister being out of town and Mukherjee's serious car accident, which had taken place two days earlier. ¶4. (C) Royce indicated that he thought the GOI had come to the conclusion that the U.S. Congress could be pushed aside on the civil-nuclear agreement, and that the U.S. Administration could instead support the initial agreement that had not been approved by Congress. He reiterated that the Hyde Act language dictates that there be no changes in the legislation when the 123 Agreement comes to Congress for approval. He expressed concern that Congress thought the issue of India not conducting nuclear testing had been resolved, and underlined that U.S. law was very clear on why the U.S. could not cooperate on civil nuclear energy with countries that conduct nuclear tests. He added that it seemed that the GOI did not view the judgment of the U.S. Congress as pivotal, and that Members of Congress felt that they were being asked to change the Hyde Act. ¶5. (C) Congressman Adam Schiff stated that he believed the Hyde Act would not be amended prior to signing the 123 Agreement, and said he would not have voted for it otherwise. He maintained that Congress wanted a strong relationship with India, but added that Congress was concerned that China could promote a similar exception for Pakistan, which he said would be disastrous and would render the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) worthless. Many Members of Congress would have preferred to strengthen Indo-U.S. relations via means other than nuclear technology, Schiff said, noting that accusations of having a double standard had been leveled at the U.S. The vote in favor of the Hyde Act had been strong initially, he said, but warned against assuming that the 123 Agreement would get a passing vote. ¶6. (C) Congressman Steve Israel added his observation that the vote in favor of the Hyde Act had not reflected automatic support for the 123 Agreement, and complained that the GOI and the U.S. Congress had not had a good dialogue about the Agreement since the vote had passed, though the relationship had been good before. He then reconveyed the delegation's dismay at not having gotten a meeting with PM Singh, noting that the delegation, which had been in Pakistan just before arriving in New Delhi, had been immediately ushered to a meeting with President Musharraf upon landing in Islamabad, and reconveyed the delegation's dismay at not having gotten a meeting with PM Singh. ¶7. (C) Saran, who came from the Prime Minister's office to the Ministry of External Affairs (MEA) to accommodate the delegation despite the fact that he had a separately scheduled meeting with them later, responded to the NEW DELHI 00001676 003.2 OF 003 delegation's concerns by first reinforcing that it was not in the GOI's interest to deny the Codel any of the appointments they had requested. Saran emphasized strongly that the GOI was not taking the U.S. Congress for granted, but noted that both the Indian and U.S. sides would have to reconcile very divergent positions on the Agreement within both of their constituencies. Whether or not those different views could be overcome "remains to be seen," said Saran, adding that, "any perception that the Indian side is trying to change what Congress has in mind is not an accurate reflection." The U.S. and India were two independent, sovereign governments who must both answer to their own legislative bodies as well as public opinion in their countries, he contended. ¶8. (C) The civil-nuclear agreement was only possible due to the U.S. recognition that India had a fifty-year, impeccable record of non-proliferation, averred Saran, noting that neither Pakistan, nor China, nor "some other NPT members" could boast of that. He argued that India, in spite of having been denied nuclear technology, had developed on its own a large range of high technology, including a nuclear program. Would the U.S. rather have a country with such a wide range of dual-use technology available as a partner or a target of non-proliferation, he asked. It would be better to have India as a partner in a nuclear agreement than to keep them on the outside, he declared. The civil nuclear agreement had a broad range of support within India, he said, urging the Codel not to rush to judgment while the agreement was still in the negotiation process. ¶9. (C) Schiff raised the issue of the recent indictment of three Indian nationals for illegally obtaining sensitive technology from the U.S., noting that one concern of the U.S. Congress was that U.S. assistance not be used for the advancement of India's military program. This indictment would significantly raise an alarm among Members of Congress who were already concerned about the 123 Agreement. Menon assured him that India's civil and strategic nuclear programs were completely separate, and that the GOI was working with the U.S. to examine the case and determine exactly what had transpired. "We have no interest in breaking your laws," he stated, adding that the GOI would get to the bottom of the incident. "Our record and our interest argue against any involvement," Menon maintained. ¶10. (C) Menon told the Codel that he had heard their message of "don't take us for granted" loud and clear, and asked them to extend the same courtesy to the GOI, noting that it was trying to arrive at an Agreement that would benefit both the U.S. and India. He thanked the delegation for their frankness, indicating that it was useful to know what their concerns were. The GOI had every intention of bringing this agreement to fruition, he reassured them. MULFORD