Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
07NEWDELHI1517
2007-03-30 10:25:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Embassy New Delhi
Cable title:
INDIA "WILL CONSIDER" IRAN REQUEST TO BECOME SAARC
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C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 NEW DELHI 001517
SIPDIS
SIPDIS
DUBAI FOR RPO
E.O. 12958: DECL: 01/11/2012
TAGS: PREL PGOV IR IN
SUBJECT: INDIA "WILL CONSIDER" IRAN REQUEST TO BECOME SAARC
OBSERVER
NEW DELHI 00001517 001.2 OF 002
Classified By: Ambassador David Mulford for Reasons 1.4 (B, D)
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 NEW DELHI 001517
SIPDIS
SIPDIS
DUBAI FOR RPO
E.O. 12958: DECL: 01/11/2012
TAGS: PREL PGOV IR IN
SUBJECT: INDIA "WILL CONSIDER" IRAN REQUEST TO BECOME SAARC
OBSERVER
NEW DELHI 00001517 001.2 OF 002
Classified By: Ambassador David Mulford for Reasons 1.4 (B, D)
1. (U) This is an action request for the Department - please
see paragraph six.
2. (C) Indian Foreign Secretary Shiv Shankar Menon announced
on March 28 that the SAARC (South Asian Association for
Regional Cooperation) Council of Ministers, during its April
2 meeting in New Delhi, will consider Iran's application for
observer status in the organization. India, as sitting chair
of SAARC, "is neutral," however "like(s) the idea of more
involvement by our friend," Menon was quoted as saying.
According to press reports, Iran formally applied for
observership in the first week of March, and while Pakistan
has some reservations about giving observer status to Iran,
it is unlikely any member will oppose the move enough to try
to block it. Current observers are the U.S., Japan, South
Korea, European Union and China.
3. (C) Comment. This is a highly disappointing development.
Not only does Iran not belong in an observer group that
includes the economic giants listed above, the announcement
comes as Iran continues to defy UN and IAEA resolutions,
faces stiffening sanctions, and holds 16 British sailors in
detention. Furthermore, the "close relations" with SAARC
countries, which Iran cites as a benefit to itself and SAARC,
are exaggerated. To be sure, there are historical links
between Iran and the region, and geographically Iran sits on
SAARC's western border with Pakistan and the newest member
Afghanistan. However, none of that was compelling enough to
get Iran involved in SAARC in its first 22 years of
existence. As the U.S. prepares for its first turn as a
SAARC observer, Post suggests the USG take a public stance
respectful of SAARC's right to decide its membership, while
critically questioning BOTH the timing of the pending
decision and the appropriateness of Iran as an observer on
par with the existing observers.
4. (C) Comment continued. Privately, we should be even more
critical, noting that India, as SAARC chair and global power,
should recognize the unhelpful signal this sends that it's
all right to continue "business as usual" with Tehran, even
while signaling compliance with UN resolutions on Iran.
Similarly, SAARC, as a whole, risks becoming discredited if
seen as embracing Iran while the rest of the international
community is moving to isolate it.
5. (C) Comment continued. Finally, if Iran were to become an
observer, we should consider what role the U.S. will continue
to have in SAARC should Iran be given observer status. Post
believes that withdrawing from the group would be seen as
NEW DELHI 00001517 002.2 OF 002
reactionary and only elevate Iran's status; however,
downgrading our participation to the lowest possible level at
each SAARC event may be an appropriate register of our
displeasure. While on paper SAARC has the potential to
become an effective vehicle for regional integration, it has
an ineffective history and stands to lose more than it could
gain by jeopardizing the support of the U.S. and the other
powerful observers. We should not help SAARC discredit
itself by condoning the inclusion of Iran at this time.
Rather, the most helpful thing we could do is to make it
clear to SAARC members and observers, through our private
meetings, that adding Iran is a bad idea, and one that will
have consequences in terms of U.S. and international support.
That said, we do not expect our intervention to prevent
Iran's bid from being approved; noted security expert Manoj
Joshi reminded Poloff that India believes it has vital
national interests at stake in its relationship with Iran,
and used the example of the debate over the
Iran-Pakistan-India pipeline as an example of U.S. pressure
causing India to assert its independence in foreign policy.
Though we may not stop it, we do not have to condone it. End
comment.
6. (C) Press guidance: If this is debated at the SAARC
summit next week, this issue could generate considerable
public attention. Post requests the Department prepare press
guidance that can be used on an if asked basis during the
SAARC summit next week.
MULFORD
SIPDIS
SIPDIS
DUBAI FOR RPO
E.O. 12958: DECL: 01/11/2012
TAGS: PREL PGOV IR IN
SUBJECT: INDIA "WILL CONSIDER" IRAN REQUEST TO BECOME SAARC
OBSERVER
NEW DELHI 00001517 001.2 OF 002
Classified By: Ambassador David Mulford for Reasons 1.4 (B, D)
1. (U) This is an action request for the Department - please
see paragraph six.
2. (C) Indian Foreign Secretary Shiv Shankar Menon announced
on March 28 that the SAARC (South Asian Association for
Regional Cooperation) Council of Ministers, during its April
2 meeting in New Delhi, will consider Iran's application for
observer status in the organization. India, as sitting chair
of SAARC, "is neutral," however "like(s) the idea of more
involvement by our friend," Menon was quoted as saying.
According to press reports, Iran formally applied for
observership in the first week of March, and while Pakistan
has some reservations about giving observer status to Iran,
it is unlikely any member will oppose the move enough to try
to block it. Current observers are the U.S., Japan, South
Korea, European Union and China.
3. (C) Comment. This is a highly disappointing development.
Not only does Iran not belong in an observer group that
includes the economic giants listed above, the announcement
comes as Iran continues to defy UN and IAEA resolutions,
faces stiffening sanctions, and holds 16 British sailors in
detention. Furthermore, the "close relations" with SAARC
countries, which Iran cites as a benefit to itself and SAARC,
are exaggerated. To be sure, there are historical links
between Iran and the region, and geographically Iran sits on
SAARC's western border with Pakistan and the newest member
Afghanistan. However, none of that was compelling enough to
get Iran involved in SAARC in its first 22 years of
existence. As the U.S. prepares for its first turn as a
SAARC observer, Post suggests the USG take a public stance
respectful of SAARC's right to decide its membership, while
critically questioning BOTH the timing of the pending
decision and the appropriateness of Iran as an observer on
par with the existing observers.
4. (C) Comment continued. Privately, we should be even more
critical, noting that India, as SAARC chair and global power,
should recognize the unhelpful signal this sends that it's
all right to continue "business as usual" with Tehran, even
while signaling compliance with UN resolutions on Iran.
Similarly, SAARC, as a whole, risks becoming discredited if
seen as embracing Iran while the rest of the international
community is moving to isolate it.
5. (C) Comment continued. Finally, if Iran were to become an
observer, we should consider what role the U.S. will continue
to have in SAARC should Iran be given observer status. Post
believes that withdrawing from the group would be seen as
NEW DELHI 00001517 002.2 OF 002
reactionary and only elevate Iran's status; however,
downgrading our participation to the lowest possible level at
each SAARC event may be an appropriate register of our
displeasure. While on paper SAARC has the potential to
become an effective vehicle for regional integration, it has
an ineffective history and stands to lose more than it could
gain by jeopardizing the support of the U.S. and the other
powerful observers. We should not help SAARC discredit
itself by condoning the inclusion of Iran at this time.
Rather, the most helpful thing we could do is to make it
clear to SAARC members and observers, through our private
meetings, that adding Iran is a bad idea, and one that will
have consequences in terms of U.S. and international support.
That said, we do not expect our intervention to prevent
Iran's bid from being approved; noted security expert Manoj
Joshi reminded Poloff that India believes it has vital
national interests at stake in its relationship with Iran,
and used the example of the debate over the
Iran-Pakistan-India pipeline as an example of U.S. pressure
causing India to assert its independence in foreign policy.
Though we may not stop it, we do not have to condone it. End
comment.
6. (C) Press guidance: If this is debated at the SAARC
summit next week, this issue could generate considerable
public attention. Post requests the Department prepare press
guidance that can be used on an if asked basis during the
SAARC summit next week.
MULFORD