INDIA "WILL CONSIDER" IRAN REQUEST TO BECOME SAARC

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 NEW DELHI 001517 SIPDIS SIPDIS DUBAI FOR RPO E.O. 12958: DECL: 01/11/2012 TAGS: PREL PGOV IR IN SUBJECT: INDIA "WILL CONSIDER" IRAN REQUEST TO BECOME SAARC OBSERVER NEW DELHI 00001517 001.2 OF 002 Classified By: Ambassador David Mulford for Reasons 1.4 (B, D) ¶1. (U) This is an action request for the Department - please see paragraph six. ¶2. (C) Indian Foreign Secretary Shiv Shankar Menon announced on March 28 that the SAARC (South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation) Council of Ministers, during its April 2 meeting in New Delhi, will consider Iran's application for observer status in the organization. India, as sitting chair of SAARC, "is neutral," however "like(s) the idea of more involvement by our friend," Menon was quoted as saying. According to press reports, Iran formally applied for observership in the first week of March, and while Pakistan has some reservations about giving observer status to Iran, it is unlikely any member will oppose the move enough to try to block it. Current observers are the U.S., Japan, South Korea, European Union and China. ¶3. (C) Comment. This is a highly disappointing development. Not only does Iran not belong in an observer group that includes the economic giants listed above, the announcement comes as Iran continues to defy UN and IAEA resolutions, faces stiffening sanctions, and holds 16 British sailors in detention. Furthermore, the "close relations" with SAARC countries, which Iran cites as a benefit to itself and SAARC, are exaggerated. To be sure, there are historical links between Iran and the region, and geographically Iran sits on SAARC's western border with Pakistan and the newest member Afghanistan. However, none of that was compelling enough to get Iran involved in SAARC in its first 22 years of existence. As the U.S. prepares for its first turn as a SAARC observer, Post suggests the USG take a public stance respectful of SAARC's right to decide its membership, while critically questioning BOTH the timing of the pending decision and the appropriateness of Iran as an observer on par with the existing observers. ¶4. (C) Comment continued. Privately, we should be even more critical, noting that India, as SAARC chair and global power, should recognize the unhelpful signal this sends that it's all right to continue "business as usual" with Tehran, even while signaling compliance with UN resolutions on Iran. Similarly, SAARC, as a whole, risks becoming discredited if seen as embracing Iran while the rest of the international community is moving to isolate it. ¶5. (C) Comment continued. Finally, if Iran were to become an observer, we should consider what role the U.S. will continue to have in SAARC should Iran be given observer status. Post believes that withdrawing from the group would be seen as NEW DELHI 00001517 002.2 OF 002 reactionary and only elevate Iran's status; however, downgrading our participation to the lowest possible level at each SAARC event may be an appropriate register of our displeasure. While on paper SAARC has the potential to become an effective vehicle for regional integration, it has an ineffective history and stands to lose more than it could gain by jeopardizing the support of the U.S. and the other powerful observers. We should not help SAARC discredit itself by condoning the inclusion of Iran at this time. Rather, the most helpful thing we could do is to make it clear to SAARC members and observers, through our private meetings, that adding Iran is a bad idea, and one that will have consequences in terms of U.S. and international support. That said, we do not expect our intervention to prevent Iran's bid from being approved; noted security expert Manoj Joshi reminded Poloff that India believes it has vital national interests at stake in its relationship with Iran, and used the example of the debate over the Iran-Pakistan-India pipeline as an example of U.S. pressure causing India to assert its independence in foreign policy. Though we may not stop it, we do not have to condone it. End comment. ¶6. (C) Press guidance: If this is debated at the SAARC summit next week, this issue could generate considerable public attention. Post requests the Department prepare press guidance that can be used on an if asked basis during the SAARC summit next week. MULFORD