INDIA AND U.S. HOLD COUNTER-TERRORISM JOINT

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 07 NEW DELHI 001050 SIPDIS SIPDIS E.O. 12958: DECL: 03/01/2017 TAGS: PREL PGOV PTER PINR PBTS MOPS KDEM KISL PK IN, ASEC SUBJECT: INDIA AND U.S. HOLD COUNTER-TERRORISM JOINT WORKING GROUP MEETING NEW DELHI 00001050 001.2 OF 007 Classified By: Acting PolCouns Atul Keshap for Reasons 1.4 (B, D) ¶1. (C) SUMMARY: MEA Additional Secretary (International Organizations) K.C. Singh and Acting Coordinator for Counterterrorism Frank Urbancic chaired the 8th U.S.-India Counter-Terrorism Joint Working Group (CTJWG) on February 28th in New Delhi. Calling the timing "late, but better late than never," Singh proposed that the CTJWG meet twice yearly, and Urbancic agreed for the next meeting to be held in Washington in Fall 2007. The delegates discussed new ways to cooperate against bio-terrorist attacks, WMD terrorism, and terrorism financing. The Indian side welcomed enhanced Anti-Terrorism Assistance and promised to provide the RSO with a point of contact to discuss threats to U.S. citizens in India and information about terrorist arrests. The Indian side was more forthcoming about its anti-hijacking policy than it has been in the past. Discussion of the ideological underpinnings of terrorism was put off until a private meeting between K.S. Singh and Urbancic on March 1st (septel). The vibes were good at this CTJWG, with both sides looking for ways to nudge our bureaucracies toward greater coordination in the war on terror. End Summary. -------------- Kicking Off the 8th U.S.-India CTJWG -------------- ¶2. (C) Ministry of External Affairs Additional Secretary (International Organizations) K.C. Singh and Acting Coordinator for Counterterrorism Frank Urbancic opened the 8th U.S.-India Counter-Terrorism Joint Working Group (CTJWG) meeting on February 28 in New Delhi by citing the pressing need for increased cooperation to build a strong foundation for further cooperation. Calling the timing "late, but better late than never," Singh said this working group should meet at least yearly if not twice-yearly. He called attention to India and the U.S.'s shared status as victims of terrorism, noting that India earned this sad moniker first, well before the U.S. 9/11 tragedy. Singh and Urbancic sounded similar themes regarding the reasons for global terrorist violence, with Singh saying a "composite culture of tolerance frightens terrorists" and Urbancic noting that "tyranny fears democracy." After the initial statements, DCM commented the group had a mandate to think ambitiously and to build on the productive February 22 meeting between Foreign Secretary Menon and Deputy Secretary Negroponte in which SIPDIS counter-terrorism was specifically identified as an issue meriting further cooperation. DCM suggested this meeting focus on concrete issues and how the two sides could better collaborate at a working level. -------------- Bioterrorism -------------- ¶3. (C) State Bioterrorism Policy Advisor Joseph Kowalski reminded the GOI of the existing offer to hold a collaborative tabletop exercise on food supply-chain protection activities. Kowalski also proposed two new activities: 1) a joint U.S.-India conference on how scientific and security agencies should interface to prevent and respond to bioterrorist incidents; and 2) a workshop on forensic epidemiology. Singh described GOI problems with identifying and coordinating the agencies involved in NEW DELHI 00001050 002.2 OF 007 bioterrorism. He said no agency fully embraces these issues currently, so the GOI would need to review how Indian agencies could better coordinate on bioterrorism. Lalit Kant, Senior Deputy Director General of the Indian Council of Medical Research, asked for assistance with strengthening surveillance and building diagnostic capacities in India,s laboratories. -------------- WMD Terrorism -------------- ¶4. (C) WMD Office Director Tom Lehrman gave a presentation on the Global Initiative to Combat Nuclear Terrorism. He urged the GOI to endorse the Statement of Principles, which would allow it to participate in experts-level activities and the June meeting in Kazakhstan. K.C. Singh said he had no problem, in principle, with the Initiative, and reported that the Indian government had collaborated on similar activities with the IAEA. He asked about the relationship between combating proliferation and terrorism financing, to which Amit Sharma of Treasury responded that the same tools and frameworks used to prevent terrorism financing can also prevent financing of WMD networks. The GOI also questioned whether the Initiative targeted a specific country (answer: no) and if non-state actors were involved (answer: non-state actors are the primary target of the Initiative). -------------- Anti-Terrorism Assistance Program (ATA) and Law Enforcement Cooperation -------------- ¶5. (C) RSO George Lambert briefed the group on the current status of the ATA program in India and outlined areas for improvement. In 2006, the USG's training program for India resulted in ten training courses attended by 150 participants. The GOI has since replicated the ATA training, tailoring the courses to their specific needs. The GOI expressed its gratitude for the training provided and requested that additional modules be added. In addition, the GOI requested the USG notify its counterparts of the training schedule as far in advance as possible to enable better preparation and to ensure appropriate candidates are identified. According to RSO, ATA training modules scheduled for 2007 include an anti-terrorism executive seminar, training in anti-money laundering, airport security, and WMD training. RSO noted funding shortfalls and changes in policy could drastically alter the project training schedule. Urbancic added that S/CT was working to realize the driving principles of the ATA to support the Department's regional approach to CT support. ¶6. (C) Assistant U.S. Attorney Nancy Langston, assigned to the U.S. mission in Dhaka, introduced herself by saying she investigates money laundering, terrorist financing, and corruption as part of the U.S. Department of Justice's (DOJ) efforts in the region. She noted the similarities in analyzing terrorist financing and traditional money laundering, and said studies of these activities are being employed in the program's multi-agency and multi-lateral investigative courses. The primary objective of the DOJ program is to train officials from the region to function as one unit. New Delhi Legal Attache Kathy Stearman emphasized NEW DELHI 00001050 003.2 OF 007 that terrorism is the FBI's primary focus and reaffirmed previous FBI offers to assist the GOI in counterterrorism methods and investigations. Stearman encouraged the GOI's law enforcement establishment to increase its information sharing and noted that the FBI continues to have a working relationship with India,s Intelligence Bureau and Central Bureau of Investigation. As an example, Legatt said fifteen Indian officers had graduated from the FBI's National Academy. GOI representatives expressed their pleasure with the relationship and encouraged increased interaction with the FBI. -------------- Biometrics and Border Security -------------- ¶7. (C) GOI and USG officials discussed exchanging information from their respective watchlists and biometric databases. Both sides agreed having only partial data to share was a significant challenge. One GOI official said the USG,s close relationship with Pakistan and the potential that the U.S. could disclose Indian information to Islamabad was a significant concern. Department of Homeland Security Director of Counterterrorism Planning Mark Randol urged the GOI to sign a declaration of principles on the Container Security Initiative (CSI). Singh responded that the CSI was in the jurisdiction of the GOI,s customs people and that he would "run it past them." However, GOI Narcotics Control Bureau official Prakash indicated the GOI was installing container scanning equipment at some ports. Randol urged the GOI to participate in Export Control and Related Border Security Assistance (EXBS). Regarding travel documentation, an MEA official stated that India would need two years to comply with International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO) standards. -------------- Information Sharing -------------- ¶8. (C) The U.S. side opened with a renewed request from the last CTJWG to receive a single point of contact within the Indian government who could serve as a CT "information-broker." This POC could serve several useful functions. First, the USG would like a single interlocutor to help clarify or debunk any stories in the press about arrests of suspected terrorists or about potential terrorist threats within India. Based on the official read-outs from the GOI, for example, the US Embassy could then take companion steps to watchlist suspected terrorists or to feed the credible information to USG entities tracking terrorism. As a second potential benefit, the Embassy's Regional Security Officers would be able to speak with greater authority to the U.S. diplomatic, expatriate, and business community about the state of potential threats in the country. Singh recalled India's agreement in principle to this idea from last year and said the GOI's newly-created CT coordinating mechanism would most likely become such a point of contact. ¶9. (C) The U.S. side also renewed an offer for appropriate Indian officials to join, on an ad hoc basis, seminars, discussions, and meetings that are hosted by the Overseas Security Advisory Council (OSAC). RSO briefly outlined the NEW DELHI 00001050 004.2 OF 007 potential benefits to both countries of enhanced contacts between Indian security officials and the U.S. business community. An open invitation was extended to the GOI to participate in OSAC. The Indian delegation readily agreed to this cooperation and pledged to attend an upcoming OSAC sponsored seminar in New Delhi and Bangalore on soft targets. -------------- Airline/Airport Security and Anti-Hijacking Policy -------------- ¶10. (C) M. Malaviya, a representative of the Indian Civil Aviation Authority detailed India,s policy for hijacked aircraft, which was enacted in response to a 1999 hijacking incident (IC-814) that started in Nepal and ended in Afghanistan. The new policy for India-flagged aircraft (to the extent to which he could share with a non-Indian delegation) included the following: 1) India views hijacking as a terrorist act; 2) India will not engage in negotiations; 3) India will consider the act aggressive; 4) the aircraft itself may be treated as a threat; and 5) hijacking is a capital offense. Foreign-flagged aircraft will either be escorted out of Indian territory, if possible, or otherwise permitted to land on Indian soil per ICAO regulations. In the latter case, the Ministry of External Affairs will be involved in consultations with the respective foreign government. This policy is important since four American airlines operate non-stop or direct flights to India. -------------- Terrorist Finance and Anti-Money Laundering Legislation -------------- ¶11. (C) Ministry of Home Affairs Joint Director Shri Ashok Prasad opened the discussion by outlining concerns about terrorism financing in India. He cited specific case studies where the GOI has successfully intercepted transfer of funds for terrorism and criminal activity. Treasury Department Senior Advisor for Terrorist Financing Amit Sharma complimented the GOI,s efforts and acknowledged such examples highlight the need for a unified legal, civic, and prosecutorial response to combat terrorism financing. He also emphasized how governments must be proactive in going beyond the conventional legal framework to strengthen mechanisms to curb illicit finance in the informal sectors from channels like hawalas, charities, and couriers. Vivek Wadekar, Additional Director of the Financial Intelligence Unit (FIU-India),highlighted the difficulties of monitoring international couriers and card operators (many of whom have offices in the U.S. like Western Union) and requested a memorandum of understanding or MOU (pending India,s membership into the Egmont group which allows for systematic terrorist finance information sharing between foreign FIUs or their equivalent) to exchange anti-money laundering and terrorist financing information between FIU-India and Treasury FinCEN. The GOI emphasized growing concerns about new avenues to transfer and collect funds and remittances, particularly through ATMs and credit cards. Sharma acknowledged the larger focus by USG and FATF on stored value cards, debit and credit cards, and in some international jurisdictions like India, transfer of remittances through cell phones. GOI agreed to focus on monitoring these new technologies for sending funds. NEW DELHI 00001050 005.2 OF 007 -------------- Next Steps Identified for Follow-Up Action -------------- Bio-Terrorism: ¶12. (C) The GOI will respond to the proposals contained in the information presented by the USG including whether to hold a joint workshop and other events. The USG will provide its response to the proposals for cooperation made by the GOI at the prior meeting of the CTJWG in Washington. The GOI will do the same. WMD-Terrorism: ¶13. (C) The USG will provide information on the Washington WMD/Terrorism workshop in June 2007 and information on financing of nuclear terrorism. ATA/Law Enforcement: ¶14. (C) The USG will provide a tentative calendar of training courses to be organized in 2007. Both sides will make this an active calendar. The USG will consider the areas identified by the GOI for training including forensics, electronic surveillance, drug trafficking, pre-blast counter-measures, CB responses, border security measures, etc. Training directed at combating trafficking of women and children and illegal drugs is managed by INL. Post will facilitate this coordination. The GOI was encouraged to provide information on "success stories" of ATA training programmes and will respond in a timely manner on all the proposals for training through close liaison. The GOI will provide information on cooperation within the BIMSTEC on counter-terrorism and related issues. Financing of Terrorism: ¶15. (C) The USG will consider the FIU-IND's proposal for entering into an MOU with its U.S. counterpart, Treasury FINCEN, to exchange information on terrorist financing and thereby broaden and deepen existing cooperation. The USG will provide information to the GOI regarding debit cards/credit cards and cell-phone transactions related to terrorism financing. (Comment: This last item was a last-minute submission from the GOI and is a misunderstanding, which we will clarify with our Indian counterparts. We will work to increase dialogue on the topic in general, but will not share specific account-related information. End comment.) Border Security: ¶16. (C) The USG will submit a proposal for establishing protocols required for sharing biometric and other data on persons whose entry is regulated or restricted. Civil Aviation Security: ¶17. (C) The USG will consider the request of the Indian Bureau of Civil Aviation Security (BCAS) to open a regional NEW DELHI 00001050 006.2 OF 007 TSA office in India. (Note: Outside the CTJWG, DHS/TSA SIPDIS headquarters has shared its intention to create such a position with senior BCAS and Embassy officials. End Note.) Information sharing: ¶18. (C) The GOI will identify and communicate a point of contact for seeking information on threats to U.S. diplomats, diplomatic/consular premises and corporate entities, and on terrorist incidents directed at American incidents in general. They will also attempt to confirm/deny media reports relating to terrorism. -------------- Building Blocks to Cooperation -------------- ¶19. (C) Comment: Overall this session was a positive step toward increasing our counter-terrorism cooperation at the working level. Given India's intelligence mishaps of the past year and more recently the political setbacks for the Congress Party, just holding this meeting was a positive step. While still cautious, our Indian hosts appeared more receptive to our requests for information than they have been in the past. The establishment of the MEA's new Counterterrorism cell should greatly assist our efforts to gain information regarding terrorist arrests from the GOI. K.C. Singh and new Director Mani Pandey are important contacts and may prove to be integral in building the new counterterrorism relationship. End comment. ¶20. (U) This cable was cleared by Acting Coordinator for Counterterrorism Urbancic. ¶21. (U) List of participants follows: Indian Delegation: ¶1. K.C. Singh, Additional Secretary (International Organizations) ¶2. Om Prakash, Deputy Director General, Narcotics Control Bureau ¶3. Sharad Kumar, Joint Secretary, Cabinet Secretariat ¶4. Pankay Kumar Singh, Deputy Inspector General, Central Bureau of Investigation ¶5. Dr. Lalit Kant, Senior Deputy Director General, Indian Council of Medical Research ¶6. Ashok Prasad, Joint Director, Ministry of Home Affairs ¶7. D.S. Chauhan, Additional Commissioner, Bureau of Civil Aviation Security ¶8. Arun Goyal, Director, Financial Intelligence Unit ¶9. Brigadier A.S. Nandal, Director (Military Affairs), Ministry of External Affairs ¶10. Indra Manj Panday, Director (Counter Terrorism),Ministry of External Affairs ¶11. Prashant Agrawal, Under Secretary (Americas),Ministry of External Affairs ¶12. Colonel Sibu Sarkar, Ministry of Defense U.S. Delegation: ¶1. Acting S/CT Coordinator Frank Urbancic ¶2. S/CT Regional Advisor Scott Allan ¶3. WMD Office Director Tom Lehrman NEW DELHI 00001050 007.2 OF 007 ¶4. OES Bioterrorism Policy Advisor Dr. Joseph Kowalski ¶5. Department of Defense CAPT. George Coleman ¶6. Assistant Country Director OSD, Christopher Clary ¶7. Director CT Planning, DHS, Mark Randol ¶8. Treasury Dept Senior Advisor on Terrorist Financing Amit Sharma ¶9. Legal Advisor for Bangladesh, DOJ, Nancy Langston MULFORD