UPDATE ON MINURCAT IN CHAD

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 02 NDJAMENA 000942 SIPDIS SIPDIS, SENSITIVE STATE FOR AF/C, PM, AND PRM, PARIS AND LONDON FOR AFRICA WATCHERS E.O. 12958: N/A TAGS: PREF UNSC CD CT SUBJECT: UPDATE ON MINURCAT IN CHAD REF: N'DJAMENA 890 NDJAMENA 00000942 001.2 OF 002 ¶1. (SBU) Summary: MINURCAT is moving forward in preparing training activities for Chadian police, but the security and political situation could significantly delay or prevent the planned deployment to eastern Chad. Privately, MINURCAT members expressed concern about their narrow mandate, which precludes any involvement in the political situation in Chad though they felt this was at the core of the current conflict in the East. End Summary. ¶2. (SBU) On 5 December CDA Lucy Tamlyn and PRM Program Officer Geoffrey Parker met with MINURCAT Political Affairs Officers David Foncho and George Bakala. Geoffrey Parker and PRM DAS Bill Fitzgerald spoke with MINURCAT head Ousseni Campaore in a separate meeting on 4 December. MINURCAT gave an update on the status of their mission and described some of the challenges they are experiencing in carrying it out. ¶3. (SBU) MINURCAT plans to begin the first part of its mission - training of police trainers - by 10 December, provided there are resources available in the multi-donor trust fund. Currently MINURCAT has only received pledges, which kept them from initiating training on the original date of 4 December. MINURCAT plans to have about 50 police trainers from the Department of Peacekeeping Operations' (DPKO) New York-based Standing Police Capacity (SPC). They will train the Chadian national trainers, many of whom the GOC has already nominated. ¶4. (SBU) MINURCAT has also begun to receive members of the roughly 300-strong Civ-Pol element, which will deploy to the East with 850 Chadian policemen. France, Togo, Senegal, Cote d'Ivoire, Mali, Niger, and Cameroon have already sent individuals. Some countries were supposedly too generous: Cote d'Ivoire was asked to bring its original offer of 95 policemen down to under 10. ¶5. (SBU) Until it can get internal assets on the ground, MINURCAT will be somewhat dependent on French military and UN logistical capabilities. The French in Abeche have been giving communications support, while the UN Humanitarian Air Service has been providing air transport. The visitors pointed out that in past, more robust DPKO missions (such as Sierra Leone and the DRC) had their own logistical assets. But until that was the case in Chad, MINURCAT's presence would represent an added strain on the current communications structures (UNHCR has also been approached for communications support) and logistical assets in the country. WFP has also expressed concern about the potential for regional transport congestion given MINURCAT's co-use of the port of Douala to ship in vehicles, pre-fabricated living containers, and other supplies. ¶6. (SBU) MINURCAT does not expect to reach full operational capacity until the end of May. Deployment to the East will start in mid January with the establishment of the Abeche police HQ. Deployment will then continue over the next few months with 5 police stations and 12 police posts. The police will be equipped with over 200 vehicles, 900 side arms (pistols),and 500 radios. The obvious focus on the refugee camps has many humanitarians concerned that the IDPs will be neglected. MINURCAT admitted that the current deployment plan will not allow for police coverage of IDP sites over 10 kilometers from one of the refugee camps or main towns. ¶7. (SBU) The primary challenge cited by MINURCAT was the unstable situation in eastern Chad, where President Deby is personally leading his Armee Nationale Tchadienne (ANT) against three separate rebel groups. The ongoing conflict could lead to a delay in the deployment of the military contingent of MINURCAT - EUFOR - which must happen before there can be a deployment of any civilian or police elements. Even if the situation should calm down in the East, MINURCAT (the civilian portion) and EUFOR have not yet agreed on the exact extent of the security cooperation between them. This is primarily due to the fact that the police will be spread across 12 refugee camps and 6 towns, while EUFOR will be concentrated in only three locations - most likely Goz Beida, Abeche, and potentially Iriba. Currently MINURCAT is not satisfied with EUFOR's best security offer for the more distant police posts: a 2-hour quick reaction force. ¶8. (SBU) Dealing with the Chadian authorities poses another set of challenges for MINURCAT. The civilian portion of the mission is made up of police (Civ-Pol and Chadian) as well as a "multidimensional" element, the latter of which is experiencing some resistance from the GOC. Though they are very small in number, political affairs, human rights, and justice officers have been viewed very suspiciously by Chadian authorities who fear such personnel could meddle too deeply into internal matters and report on issues from which the GOC would rather draw attention away. Human rights, political developments, and "good governance" were particularly sensitive issues. MINURCAT feels that tensions NDJAMENA 00000942 002.2 OF 002 surrounding the multidimensional aspect of their mission could increase once an improved security situation allowed them to deploy these personnel to the East. Meanwhile, concerns regarding Chadian reluctance to cooperate will be dealt with at the UN in New York. ¶9. (SBU) Another challenge in dealing with the GOC has been that of human resources. MINURCAT has asked Chadian authorities to nominate candidates for the police training but is not able to openly vet them for police qualifications and previous criminal behavior/human rights violations. The UN tries to vet them discreetly. Salaries are also a source of disagreement: MINURCAT wants to pay the police directly while the GOC would rather receive the money and pay the police itself. PRM urged MINURCAT to pay salaries directly, given UNHCR's bad experience paying gendarmes in the refugee camps through the gendarmerie in N'Djamena (salaries had been reduced and arrived months late). Comment ¶10. (SBU) MINURCAT is making some progress in getting its first training activities started, but ultimately the ability to fulfill their mandate will be contingent upon EUFOR's ability to deploy to the East. MINURCAT interlocutors were quite concerned with the evolution of the political and security situation in Chad: MINURCAT Political officers drew comparisons to other DPKO missions where the UN mandate included a political track. Chad is also experiencing political turmoil, they said, though MINURCAT's mandate does not allow them to address this. According to them, without dealing with the political issues at hand, the UN could find itself dealing with Chad's security problems for quite some time. ¶11. (U) Tripoli minimize considered. Tamlyn