CENTRAL AFRICAN REFUGEES IN SOUTHERN CHAD

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 02 NDJAMENA 000934

SIPDIS

SIPDIS, SENSITIVE

AF/C FOR DAS SWAN, PRM/AFR:MLANGE

E.O. 12958: N/A
TAGS: PREF CD CT
SUBJECT: CENTRAL AFRICAN REFUGEES IN SOUTHERN CHAD



1. (U) Summary. The United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees
(UNHCR) is pursuing a strategy of self-sufficiency for Central
African refugees in southern Chad but is finding it challenging to
do so due to lack of resources and the difficulty of timing a
reduction in assistance with the refugees' ability to maintain
decent livelihoods. Meanwhile, authorities from the Central African
Republic (CAR) have encouraged the refugees to consider returning
home - despite ongoing insecurity in that country. End Summary.

Background


2. (U) From 8 - 11 November, PRM Program Officer Geoffrey Parker
visited implementing partners UNHCR, UNICEF, WFP, Africare, Mentor
Initiative, and CARE in the southern town of Gore, where roughly
two-thirds of the 48,000 Central African Republic (CAR) refugees in
Chad are residing in three nearby camps. A fourth camp and the
remaining refugees are located along the border to the East, near
the town of Danamadji. The number of refugees has gone up slightly
in 2007 as approximately 3,000 new arrivals have been registered so
far this year. These most recent arrivals have largely been Peulh
nomads who are targeted by bandits for their cattle.


3. (U) Since the first refugees arrived in late 2002, their
situation in Chad has suffered from a lack of international
visibility. The displacement within and out of the Central African
Republic made Western newspapers only recently, mainly due to French
military support to CAR President Bozize's regime against rebel
assaults in northeastern CAR in November/December 2006 and March

2007. The CAR refugees have also been overshadowed by the much
larger refugee situation along Chad's eastern border with Darfur,
Sudan.


4. (U) The situation in northwestern CAR, where most the refugees
are from, remains volatile. During the first half of 2007,
villagers in the North suffered greatly at the hands of the Central
African Armed Forces (FACA) and the Presidential Guard (GP),who
conducted massive reprisals on civilians (extrajudicial executions,
burning of villages, etc.) for alleged complicity with the rebel
group Popular Army for the Restoration of Democracy (APRD). Human
rights reporting coming out of CAR eventually led to increased
international scrutiny, and the latter half of 2007 has seen far
fewer atrocities committed by either side. However, lawlessness and
impunity still abound across the entire northern CAR. Bandit
activity has not abated and skirmishes between the APRD and FACA are
not uncommon. Many civilians are forced to stay constantly mobile
to prevent attracting unwanted attention.

Towards Self-Sufficiency


5. (U) The strategy pursued by UNHCR for the CAR refugees in Chad is
one of self-sufficiency and - compared to the eastern Chad refugee
situation - there is strong potential for it to succeed. Many of
the refugees have access to primary and secondary education, health
care, markets, and land. PRM funding is contributing to the ability
of refugees not only to reduce their dependency on outside
assistance, but to mitigate the negative impacts of their presence
on the local population and environment.


6. (U) In pursuing this strategy of self-sufficiency, the challenge
will be to balance the draw down of services for refugees with their
ability to maintain consistent and productive livelihoods. This
will be reflected most elementally in the refugees' ability to feed
themselves, be it through their own production of food or by earning
enough money to buy it. Beyond this, refugees should eventually be
able to pay - at least to some percentage - medical and school fees
that Chadians pay as part of the national health and education
systems. Naturally, this is a slow process that will require a
seamless transition from humanitarian to development assistance.
Currently, the European Commission delegation in N'Djamena is
planning 4 million euros in projects to that end for southern Chad.
PRM will continue to support UNHCR and other humanitarian partners,
but there is currently no USG development presence in Chad that
could assist the transition.


7. (U) However, for all its potential to succeed, the southern Chad
refugee situation suffers from a severe lack of international
attention and, consequently, financial resources. Coordinating the
progression from dependency to self-sufficiency has proven extremely
challenging. The most notable example is in the agriculture sector,
where programs have been successful but simply not large enough to
balance a decision by the World Food Program to lower food rations
in the camps in 2007. Seeds, tools, and land were not available in
sufficient quantity to make any significant impact on food security.
Neither was support for income generating activities that could
allow refugees to earn money for buying food. The result has been
that the refugees' lives in 2007 centered mainly on the quest for
food, preventing their participation in educational, professional,
and recreational activities.


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8. (U) UNHCR, WFP, and the NGO community in Gore are cognizant of
the situation and aim to rectify it. A joint donor/UNHCR/WFP
assessment mission in October decided to slightly raise rations in
Amboko Camp, which had been most severely affected by the cut. The
mission also recommended finding support for school feeding programs
as the main reason for the abysmal school attendance rate among
refugees was consistently cited as "hunger." The humanitarian
community has the right programs in mind, but will require far
greater resources in the short- to medium-term (1-3 years) to ensure
the refugee community is able to sustain itself with minimal
international assistance in the long-term.

CAR Visit on Repatriation - PRM Visit on Resettlement


9. (U) On 13 and 17 November, the CAR Ministers of Social Affairs
and Interior visited the CAR refugees in the camps near Gore and
Danamadji, respectively. At each site thousands of refugees turned
out to greet the delegation with dances, songs, and gifts. The
message from the ministers was clear: President Bozize wants to see
CAR's sons and daughters to return home. The Minister of Social
Affairs in particular painted a rather rosy picture of the prospects
for returns in the very near future. Specific reasons she cited
were the peace accords with the UFDR rebels in NE CAR, President
Bozize's June visit to Markounda (NE CAR) to "extend a hand" to the
APRD rebels, the demobilization of child soldiers in Birao, the
prospective arrival of EUFOR to maintain the peace in northern CAR,
and a $300 million agreement with the World Bank to build roads.



10. (U) Coinciding with the CAR ministerial visit in Gore was that
of PRM Refugee Coordinator for Admissions Emily Mestetky to examine
the possibilities and requirements for a resettlement of CAR
refugees to the United States in 2008. There she explained U.S.
standards for refugee referrals, discussed specific types of
vulnerabilities that might qualify a refugee for resettlement, and
conducted preliminary site surveys for potential Overseas Processing
Entity processing sites. UNHCR's goal for resettlement of CAR
refugees in 2008 is roughly 350, and the office in Gore feels
confident it will achieve that number.

Comment


11. (SBU) UNHCR in both Chad and CAR were surprised by the CAR
government's sudden desire to push for the recent ministerial visit.
Several humanitarian and political observers Parker met while in
Bangui (16 - 24 November) felt the CAR government was feeling
pressure to show a greater interest in the welfare and security of
northern CAR - particularly after a scathing September 2007 Human
Rights Watch (HRW) report on FACA and GP abuses on civilians. The
government even invited HRW to attend a recent international donor
conference in Brussels. UNHCR on both sides of the border,
however, are far from optimistic about the prospects for returns
anytime soon given the ongoing insecurity, especially in the
Northwest. They will stall any attempt to pressure them into
facilitating what they consider a premature repatriation process.
Tamlyn