CENTRAL AFRICAN REFUGEES IN SOUTHERN CHAD

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 02 NDJAMENA 000934 SIPDIS SIPDIS, SENSITIVE AF/C FOR DAS SWAN, PRM/AFR:MLANGE E.O. 12958: N/A TAGS: PREF CD CT SUBJECT: CENTRAL AFRICAN REFUGEES IN SOUTHERN CHAD ¶1. (U) Summary. The United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) is pursuing a strategy of self-sufficiency for Central African refugees in southern Chad but is finding it challenging to do so due to lack of resources and the difficulty of timing a reduction in assistance with the refugees' ability to maintain decent livelihoods. Meanwhile, authorities from the Central African Republic (CAR) have encouraged the refugees to consider returning home - despite ongoing insecurity in that country. End Summary. Background ¶2. (U) From 8 - 11 November, PRM Program Officer Geoffrey Parker visited implementing partners UNHCR, UNICEF, WFP, Africare, Mentor Initiative, and CARE in the southern town of Gore, where roughly two-thirds of the 48,000 Central African Republic (CAR) refugees in Chad are residing in three nearby camps. A fourth camp and the remaining refugees are located along the border to the East, near the town of Danamadji. The number of refugees has gone up slightly in 2007 as approximately 3,000 new arrivals have been registered so far this year. These most recent arrivals have largely been Peulh nomads who are targeted by bandits for their cattle. ¶3. (U) Since the first refugees arrived in late 2002, their situation in Chad has suffered from a lack of international visibility. The displacement within and out of the Central African Republic made Western newspapers only recently, mainly due to French military support to CAR President Bozize's regime against rebel assaults in northeastern CAR in November/December 2006 and March ¶2007. The CAR refugees have also been overshadowed by the much larger refugee situation along Chad's eastern border with Darfur, Sudan. ¶4. (U) The situation in northwestern CAR, where most the refugees are from, remains volatile. During the first half of 2007, villagers in the North suffered greatly at the hands of the Central African Armed Forces (FACA) and the Presidential Guard (GP),who conducted massive reprisals on civilians (extrajudicial executions, burning of villages, etc.) for alleged complicity with the rebel group Popular Army for the Restoration of Democracy (APRD). Human rights reporting coming out of CAR eventually led to increased international scrutiny, and the latter half of 2007 has seen far fewer atrocities committed by either side. However, lawlessness and impunity still abound across the entire northern CAR. Bandit activity has not abated and skirmishes between the APRD and FACA are not uncommon. Many civilians are forced to stay constantly mobile to prevent attracting unwanted attention. Towards Self-Sufficiency ¶5. (U) The strategy pursued by UNHCR for the CAR refugees in Chad is one of self-sufficiency and - compared to the eastern Chad refugee situation - there is strong potential for it to succeed. Many of the refugees have access to primary and secondary education, health care, markets, and land. PRM funding is contributing to the ability of refugees not only to reduce their dependency on outside assistance, but to mitigate the negative impacts of their presence on the local population and environment. ¶6. (U) In pursuing this strategy of self-sufficiency, the challenge will be to balance the draw down of services for refugees with their ability to maintain consistent and productive livelihoods. This will be reflected most elementally in the refugees' ability to feed themselves, be it through their own production of food or by earning enough money to buy it. Beyond this, refugees should eventually be able to pay - at least to some percentage - medical and school fees that Chadians pay as part of the national health and education systems. Naturally, this is a slow process that will require a seamless transition from humanitarian to development assistance. Currently, the European Commission delegation in N'Djamena is planning 4 million euros in projects to that end for southern Chad. PRM will continue to support UNHCR and other humanitarian partners, but there is currently no USG development presence in Chad that could assist the transition. ¶7. (U) However, for all its potential to succeed, the southern Chad refugee situation suffers from a severe lack of international attention and, consequently, financial resources. Coordinating the progression from dependency to self-sufficiency has proven extremely challenging. The most notable example is in the agriculture sector, where programs have been successful but simply not large enough to balance a decision by the World Food Program to lower food rations in the camps in 2007. Seeds, tools, and land were not available in sufficient quantity to make any significant impact on food security. Neither was support for income generating activities that could allow refugees to earn money for buying food. The result has been that the refugees' lives in 2007 centered mainly on the quest for food, preventing their participation in educational, professional, and recreational activities. NDJAMENA 00000934 002 OF 002 ¶8. (U) UNHCR, WFP, and the NGO community in Gore are cognizant of the situation and aim to rectify it. A joint donor/UNHCR/WFP assessment mission in October decided to slightly raise rations in Amboko Camp, which had been most severely affected by the cut. The mission also recommended finding support for school feeding programs as the main reason for the abysmal school attendance rate among refugees was consistently cited as "hunger." The humanitarian community has the right programs in mind, but will require far greater resources in the short- to medium-term (1-3 years) to ensure the refugee community is able to sustain itself with minimal international assistance in the long-term. CAR Visit on Repatriation - PRM Visit on Resettlement ¶9. (U) On 13 and 17 November, the CAR Ministers of Social Affairs and Interior visited the CAR refugees in the camps near Gore and Danamadji, respectively. At each site thousands of refugees turned out to greet the delegation with dances, songs, and gifts. The message from the ministers was clear: President Bozize wants to see CAR's sons and daughters to return home. The Minister of Social Affairs in particular painted a rather rosy picture of the prospects for returns in the very near future. Specific reasons she cited were the peace accords with the UFDR rebels in NE CAR, President Bozize's June visit to Markounda (NE CAR) to "extend a hand" to the APRD rebels, the demobilization of child soldiers in Birao, the prospective arrival of EUFOR to maintain the peace in northern CAR, and a $300 million agreement with the World Bank to build roads. ¶10. (U) Coinciding with the CAR ministerial visit in Gore was that of PRM Refugee Coordinator for Admissions Emily Mestetky to examine the possibilities and requirements for a resettlement of CAR refugees to the United States in 2008. There she explained U.S. standards for refugee referrals, discussed specific types of vulnerabilities that might qualify a refugee for resettlement, and conducted preliminary site surveys for potential Overseas Processing Entity processing sites. UNHCR's goal for resettlement of CAR refugees in 2008 is roughly 350, and the office in Gore feels confident it will achieve that number. Comment ¶11. (SBU) UNHCR in both Chad and CAR were surprised by the CAR government's sudden desire to push for the recent ministerial visit. Several humanitarian and political observers Parker met while in Bangui (16 - 24 November) felt the CAR government was feeling pressure to show a greater interest in the welfare and security of northern CAR - particularly after a scathing September 2007 Human Rights Watch (HRW) report on FACA and GP abuses on civilians. The government even invited HRW to attend a recent international donor conference in Brussels. UNHCR on both sides of the border, however, are far from optimistic about the prospects for returns anytime soon given the ongoing insecurity, especially in the Northwest. They will stall any attempt to pressure them into facilitating what they consider a premature repatriation process. Tamlyn