SUDAN REBELS IN CHAD REPORT JEM SPLIT

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 02 NDJAMENA 000784 SIPDIS SENSITIVE SIPDIS DEPARTMENT FOR AF/SPG AND AF S/E NATSIOS PARIS AND LONDON FOR AFRICA WATCHERS E.O. 12958: N/A TAGS: PGOV PREL PREF CD SU SUBJECT: SUDAN REBELS IN CHAD REPORT JEM SPLIT ¶1. (SBU) Summary: JEM representatives informed Emboffs that a split has taken place within the movement, pitting Chairman Khalil Ibrahim on one side against his former Vice-Chair Bahar and field Commander Banda on the other. JEM "Chief Negotiator" Ahmed Tugod Lissan accused JEM/Bahar of perpetrating the massacre of AMIS forces in Haskanita in complicity with the GOS and Mini Minawi. End Summary. BANDA/BAHAR FACTION SPLITS OFF 2 (SBU) In a meeting with the Charge and PolOff on October 4, JEM representative in N'Djamena Tajaddin Niam said that a serious of actions by JEM leader Khalil Ibrahim had resulted in the creation of a new JEM wing. According to Niam, Ibrahim had sacked JEM leaders and commanders who did not agree with him. He had tried to extend the Darfur conflict into Kordofan. By calling for a separate Darfur region (September 18 BBC interview),he refused to abide by the principles of the JEM manifesto. His actions showed that he was not serious about the Tripoli talks but intended rather to doom the talks before they started. This had produced a split between JEM units loyal to Khalil Ibrahim and units loyal to former Vice-Chair Bahar Idriss Abugarda (among which Niam counted himself). ¶3. (U) Tajaddin stated that JEM was ready to issue a communiqu to international actors formally announcing the split and naminQhe new JEM "collective leadership." (Note: Post received a note on October 5 documenting the grievances against Khalil Ibrahim and announcing that the JEM would be under the leadership of Bahar Idriss Abugarda with a 15 person committee. General Abdalla Banda Abaker will lead as commander in chief of JEM forces. End Note.) Tajaddin said Bahar Idriss Abugarda supported the talks in Tripoli and planned to attend as the leader of the JEM. He said that there is a role for Khalil Ibrahim in the JEM organization provided that "he express a willingness to compromise"; Tajaddin added that he would not be surprised if the Tripoli talks failed if Khalil decided to attend as leader of the JEM. ¶4. (SBU) Tajaddin also expressed concern over the "capture" of three JEM commanders by Khalil, including the intelligence chief of the JEM, in Darfur. (Note: The three commanders are Mohammed Saleh Mongo, Abdel-Aziz Suliman Ori and Omer Bakeit Abaker. End Note) Tajaddin stated that they are working with the international community, including ICRC and UN offices, to have them returned. KHALIL LOYALIST ACCUSES JEM SPLINTER OF SELLING OUT TO SUDAN ¶5. (SBU) JEM Chief negotiator Ahmed Tugod Lissan met with Charge on October 8 to present his version of the JEM split. He claimed that Bahar -- former Vice-President in charge of the Darfur region -- had been in the field too long. There had been complaints from other commanders who asked for the dismissal of Bahar and Field Commander Banda. A committee had been formed to examine the charges, which included misallocation of finance and unexplained losses of vehicles and weapons. The investigation concluded that Banda and Bahar had made serious mistakes. The entire JEM Executive Body (save Tajadine Niam) agreed that Banda should be sacked. Bahar - who had been with Lissan in Tripoli and Arusha -- subsequently informed the movement that he was cutting all ties with Khalil Ibrahim. It became apparent that Bahar had been recruiting in the field with a view to forming a new JEM wing. Accordingly Bahar was also sacked. ¶6. (SBU) Lissan claimed that Bahar and SLA/Unity were responsible for the attack on Haskanita. (CDA asked if Bahar had photographic evidence. Lissan said that he did not, but that he had informants.) Lissan stated that Bahar was desperate for recognition, and the attack was intended to let the international community and the mediation team know that he had the numbers on the ground and needed to be included in the peace talks. (In fact, according to Lissan, Bahar has only five cars.) Lissan added that the subsequent razing of the town was carried out by Sudanese armed forces. ¶7. (SBU) Queried as to Bahar's motivation for carrying out the attack, Lissan claimed Bahar had essentially sold out to the Sudanese. He had promised them that he would sign the DPA, unseat Khalil and take his vehicles. He had linked up with Mini Minawi for support. Mini had provided transport at the Chad border for a meeting with the GOS Intelligence Chief Saleh Gosh, the Minister of Defense Abdel Rahim Mohammed and Darfur Negotiator Nafi Ali Nafi. ¶8. (SBU) Lissan characterizedQad's current relationship with the JEM as "very good." He said that President Deby had NDJAMENA 00000784 002 OF 002 met with JEM a few weeks ago, and had specifically cautioned Bahar against any split, saying that he would not support any effort to undermine the peace process. ¶9. (SBU) Lissan reiterated that the path to peace lay with working with the core Abuja negotiators. He was concerned that Special Envoy Natsios wanted to see all of the movements in Tripoli. To invite all of them (some thirty by his calculation) would doom the talks. Factions that had been fighting in the field would refuse to sit down with groups that had no credibility. The core group of Abd al-Wahid, JEM (Khalil),SLA Abd al-Shafi, Khamis Abdulla and SLA/Unity were the key players. Lissan said he had also warned the Libyans that the negotiation would be a failure if the key groups did not have a chance to sit down and come up with one vision and one negotiating team. TAMLYN