CHAD - UN OCHA WEAKNESSES

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 03 NDJAMENA 000633 SIPDIS SENSITIVE SIPDIS AIDAC USAID/DCHA FOR MHESS, GGOTTLIEB, SBRADLEY DCHA/OFDA FOR KLUU, AFERRARA, ACONVERY, DLILLIE, AMALLEY DCHA/FFP FOR WHAMMINK, JDWORKEN NAIROBI/ECARO FOR JMYER; FFP FOR NESTES STATE FOR AF/C, AFR/WA, AF/EPS, EB, CRS, AND PRM USUN FOR TMALY BRUSSELS FOR PLERNER GENEVA FOR NKYLOH ROME FOR RNEWBERG, HSPANOS E.O. 12958: N/A TAGS: EAID PGOV PHUM SOCI PREF PREL CD SUBJECT: CHAD - UN OCHA WEAKNESSES Refs: A) Ndjamena 06 01396 B) Ndjamena 0619 C) Ndjamena 0625 NDJAMENA 00000633 001.2 OF 003 SUMMARY -------------- ¶1. (SBU) The UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA) effort to coordinate humanitarian activities in eastern Chad is falling short of expectations and promises made to donors earlier in 2007. To improve its performance, OCHA HQ needs to take eastern Chad's requirements more seriously, immediately deploy to the field at least two experienced humanitarian officers, improve support to field offices, and lead on an urgent basis a process to plan for the post-rains period. End summary. PROMISES BUT NOT ENOUGH ACTION -------------- ¶2. (SBU) During a visit by USAID/OFDA to eastern Chad in November 2006 (ref A),it became clear that OCHA needed to beef up its presence in eastern Chad and take on its coordination role, especially in light of increasing numbers of internally displaced people (IDPs). At that time it had a newly opened sub-office in Abeche temporarily staffed by a national officer from Ndjamena and not much else. Subsequent OFDA visits in January and May 2007 found OCHA had not made much progress, either in establishing and staffing the offices or in leading the humanitarian community's effort to assist the IDPs. ¶3. (SBU) As of July 2007 and OFDA's latest visit to eastern Chad (refs B and C),OCHA still has not fully taken on its responsibilities in Chad. Earlier excuses of difficulties in recruitment and funding are no longer valid, especially as OFDA recently provided a second tranche of funding, bringing the total to $1 million for FY 07. ¶4. (SBU) Upon prodding by OFDA early in 2007, and the provision of funding, OCHA appeared to recognize the problem and agreed to send some experienced staff to the region, fully staff Abeche, open two additional offices in the east, and take its coordination role seriously. OCHA did send an experienced field officer to eastern Chad, but his limited four-month term ran out in July and he left the country with no replacement. STAFFING -------------- ¶5. (SBU) While the Ndjamena office is near permanent strength (eight of ten),the field offices are woefully understaffed according to OCHA's own staffing chart. Currently, the Abeche office is staffed with a permanent head of office, two secondees from the UK Department for International Development (DfID),one UN Volunteer (UNV),a driver and a cleaner (six of 14 planned). The Goz Beida office has one DfID secondee and a cleaner (two of five),and the Farchana office does not yet exist. The three staff provided by DfID are on short-term one-time contracts. ¶6. (SBU) OCHA says it is very difficult to find francophones willing to come to Chad, as well as qualified Chadians. That may be the case, but other organizations that complained of the same problem, have managed to deploy full teams. OCHA itself has deployed numerous francophones in other countries in the region, including Kenya and Somalia. The problem is more likely linked to poor recruiting in Geneva and unwillingness of permanent OCHA staff to work in Chad. SUPPORT -------------- ¶7. (SBU) Support for OCHA's Chad field operations, from OCHA Geneva and from OCHA Ndjamena, is lacking. Almost a year after opening the Abeche office it has no photocopier, one printer (shared by the four staff),one vehicle, an improperly installed generator and little else. A construction project for a staff guesthouse next door has stalled due to lack of support from Ndjamena. ¶8. (SBU) The reason, the head of the Abeche office said, is because NDJAMENA 00000633 002.2 OF 003 unlike operational agencies such as UNICEF, OCHA depends on the UN Development Program (UNDP) for its administrative support in country. Since eastern Chad is on UN security phase four, UNDP can not travel to Abeche, so providing support to OCHA in Abeche (where there is no UNDP office) is not a priority for UNDP. In addition, UNDP's procedures are more suitable for a development organization with a longer term approach. ¶9. (SBU) Support is also lacking from OCHA headquarters in Geneva, including the area of staffing as noted. This may be because of OCHA's structure, where it relies on other agencies for administrative services, and partly because it has simply not prioritized action in Chad. It may also be due to the fact that OCHA has limited central budgetary support and relies on direct program and project funding. ACTIVITIES -------------- ¶10. (SBU) OCHA spends too much time on activities such as producing detailed minutes of meetings and ensuring that annual appeals are produced, but little on the nitty-gritty of field level humanitarian coordination. Illustrative of this point, there is not even a set of NGO pigeon-hole mailboxes in the Abeche office, and during a recent work day (when OFDA rep was using their office) not a single non-OCHA staff member entered the office. Even accounting for increased use of email, given OCHA's information sharing role it would be expected that NGOs representatives would visit. ¶11. (SBU) OFDA reps in the field that have attended the regular OCHA coordination meetings in Abeche say that these are poorly attended and consist of little more than NGOs going around the room saying what they're doing. There is no real discussion of issues, no seeking common positions and no decisions are made. ¶12. (SBU) OCHA does get good marks for the maps and up-to-date contact lists it produces on a regular basis, thanks to one of the DfID secondees in Abeche and an OCHA map officer in Ndjamena. LEADERSHIP -------------- ¶13. (SBU) Leadership in the OCHA office is lacking. The Ndjamena-based country director is well-meaning, but appears to spend most of her time preparing appeals, sharing minutes with the diplomatic community in the capital and supporting the UNDP resident coordinator, who might not appreciate the importance of the field component of OCHA's work. There does not appear to be much effort put into facilitating real communication within the field and providing leadership to determine the overall strategic direction of the response. ¶14. (SBU) It also does not seem that OCHA has much of a field orientation. The Abeche head of office made his first trip to Goz Beida in four months during OFDA rep's visit in July. The country director rarely travels to the east, and when she does, it is usually to accompany high level visitors. When OFDA reps traveled to Farchana for three days in July they invited the new DfID secondee, slated to work there, to join the trip, but the Abeche head of office wanted her to stay and help him finish typing up meeting minutes. She thus lost an opportunity to see the Farchana area, learn about its issues and get acquainted with some of OCHA's donors. SOLUTION -------------- ¶15. (SBU) OCHA should immediately deploy permanent, experienced, action-oriented IDP advisors in both Abeche and Ndjamena. One to advise the UN country team on IDPs, one to do the same in Abeche where the action is. It should also redouble its efforts to fully staff its offices, finalize the construction of the Goz Beida office, establish effective support systems and start construction of the Farchana office. ¶16. (SBU) Simultaneously, it needs to take on the task of leading NDJAMENA 00000633 003.2 OF 003 the humanitarian community in planning for the post-rains period scenarios (for IDP return, status quo or more displacement). OCHA can do this by hosting a forum in Abeche to solidify the consensus on IDP assistance strategy, get the GOC on board and come up with a simple unified plan to share with donors and other actors. CONCLUSION -------------- ¶17. (SBU) What OCHA Chad needs is another dose of shock therapy, similar to one provided by OFDA earlier in the year. In OFDA rep's opinion, OCHA is providing secretariat support to the humanitarian coordinator in the capital at the expense of coordination and leadership in the east where its needed. ¶18. (SBU) This is a golden opportunity for OCHA since (exceptionally) the other humanitarian organizations, including UN agencies and even the ICRC are clamoring for OCHA leadership. OCHA would have no need for its usual challenge of carving out its niche; in eastern Chad it exists, is empty, and is waiting for OCHA to fill it. TAMLYN