VISIT OF SPECIAL ENVOY NATSIOS TO CHAD: MEETINGS

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 02 NDJAMENA 000062 SIPDIS SENSITIVE SIPDIS PARIS AND LONDON FOR AFRICA WATCHERS E.O. 12958: N/A TAGS: PGOV PREL PREF PHUM CD SU SUBJECT: VISIT OF SPECIAL ENVOY NATSIOS TO CHAD: MEETINGS WITH PRESIDENT AND FOREIGN MINISTER ¶1. (SBU) Summary: In meetings with Chadian President Idriss Deby Itno and Foreign Minister Allam-mi on January 18 in N'djamena, Chad, Special Envoy for Sudan Andrew Natsios expressed thanks to Chad for receiving Darfur refugees and for its support for a UN force on the border. He stressed that unless conflicts between Sudan and Chad were dealt with, there would be no end to the Darfur conflict. President Deby thanked the United States for its efforts to bring peace to the region, expressed concern for the mounting IDP numbers in eastern Chad and argued that the Sudanese Government was attempting a population "exchange" whereby Darfurians of African origin would be expelled to Chad, and those Chadians of Arab origin would move to Darfur. Both the Foreign Minister and the President acknowledged that Chad turned a blind eye to Sudanese rebel movements across the border, but denied that arms were flowing from the Chadian government to the Sudanese rebels. End summary. FOREIGN MINISTER ALLAM-MI: CHAD A VICTIM OF KHARTOUM'S FAILED DARFUR POLICY -------------- -------------- ¶2. (SBU) Special Envoy Andrew Natsios met with Chadian President Deby and Foreign Minister Allam-mi on January 18. At the meeting with Allam-mi, the Foreign Minister said that the Bashir government was actively supporting Chadian rebels with the objective of removing President Deby. In response to Mr. Natsios' points that intelligence sources indicated Chadian support for Sudanese rebels, Allam-mi emphatically denied active Government of Chad (GOC) support to Sudanese rebels, but acknowledged that the GOC "closes its eyes to the activities of Sudanese rebels" in Chad and that Sudanese support for Chadian rebels had led to a dynamic of popular support for Sudanese rebels in eastern Chad. Allam-mi alleged that Sudan used subterfuge and the scapegoating of Chad to mask its refusal to engage in meaningful negotiation with Sudanese rebels. As the situation in Darfur becomes more and more unacceptable to the international community, Allam-mi warned, Sudan will seek to contrive other ways to frustrate the peace process and to divert attention from its responsibility for failure of that process. By way of example, he suggested that ongoing rebel activity in Ade near the border with Sudan [note: the village of Ade was reportedly briefly held by Chad rebels on January 18. End note] was staged to frustrate the Special Envoy's plans to travel to the east to meet with Sudanese rebel leaders. Allam-mi said that it is important for the international community -- and the United States -- to push Sudan to bring peace and stability to Darfur and he welcomed the Special Envoy's initiative to hold talks with Darfur rebel leaders who have yet to sign the Darfur Peace Agreement (DPA). PRESIDENT DEBY: SCORCHED EARTH POLICY AND NEW IDPS -------------- -------------- ¶3. (SBU) In a meeting the same day. Special Envoy Natsios explained to President Idriss Deby Itno that he was in Chad to talk about the issues between Chad and Sudan and to meet with Darfur rebel groups -- the latter at the request of Sudanese President Bashir. He intended to ask the rebel groups to develop a unified position, and to work for a political - not a military - solution. SE Natsios underscored that Jan Eliasson of the United Nations (UN) and Salim Salim of the African Union (AU) were the lead negotiators. The U.S. job was to support the UN and the AU. The DPA should be the basis for negotiations over possible amendments. By way of example, the Special Envoy noted that the Sudanese government had said privately that it was willing to increase the compensation fund from $30 million to $200 million, if that would enable the non-signatories to come to agreement. In this context, Special Envoy Natsios stressed the importance of allowing the rebels -- political leaders and field commanders -- to meet to develop a unified position. Recently President Bashir had agreed to allow rebels to meet in Darfur. This meeting had the potential to be significant, but there was always concern that the GOC would bomb the meetings (as it had the last two meetings organized by Sudanese rebels). ¶4. (SBU) Special Envoy Natsios explained that he wanted to explore with President Deby any steps the United States could take to mitigate conflicts in Chad, Sudan and the Central African Republic (CAR) through peaceful negotiations. He stressed that unless conflicts between countries such as Sudan and Chad were dealt with, there would be no end to the Darfur conflict. Special Envoy Natsios concluded by warmly thanking President Deby for the support Chad has extended to Darfur refugees and its cooperation with the United Nations on the question of having a blue-hatted force along the border. ¶5. (SBU) President Deby welcomed the visit of the Special Envoy and his efforts to bring peace. He stated that the Special Envoy NDJAMENA 00000062 002 OF 002 could count on the support of Chad for any effort which would stop or contain the Darfur conflict. He stressed that Chad -- more than any other country -- desired to see an end to the conflict. Not only was Chad suffering from the impact of the refugees, but the GOS -- under the pretext that Chad was supporting Sudanese rebels -- had organized a group of mercenaries which have been working to destabilize Chad since December 18, 2005. President Deby explained that while Chad allowed Sudanese rebels to go back and forth across the border to visit their families who lived in Chad, they did not have arms to give them and were not doing so. President Deby noted that Chad had demonstrated its will to the GOS to resolve conflicts peacefully. The first Darfur cease-fire was negotiated in Ndjamena; despite change of venue, the GOC has continued to play a positive role. Furthermore, the February 2006 accord signed in Tripoli between Chad and Sudan had been violated many times (by Sudan). President Deby emphasized that Chad supported any initiatives aimed at resolving the conflict, and would help the U.S. delegation meet with Chadian rebels. That being said, he commented that "neither the Sudanese rebels nor the Sudanese government are interested in resolving the conflict." ¶6. (SBU) Looking to the roots of the Darfur conflict, President Deby stated that Sudan had a policy of "exchange of populations" whereby all Darfurians of African origin would be pushed into Chad, and those Chadians of Arab origin would move to Darfur. Calling it a global strategy, he explained that Darfur villages were being burned to allow for more pasturage. The President explained that he had just returned from a 12-day visit to the border where he had seen first-hand the scorched earth policy that Sudan was implementing as far as Chad, including signs proclaiming "the new Sudan" in burned-out Chadian towns. Some 100,000 Chadian Internally Displaced Persons (IDPs) were living near the border without any means of support and he had asked the Chadian Council of Ministers to approve approximately USD 8 million for IDPs. President Deby mentioned how much he appreciated the work of the humanitarian community in Goz Beida and Guereda. He made a plea to the international community to avoid putting the IDPs in camps, but to allow them to return to their villages and to rebuild the wells, schools and medical centers that they needed to resettle in their localities. He mentioned that during his stay some 11,000 Chadians had been assisted in returning to their own villages, but many tens of thousands remained homeless. Special Envoy Natsios informed President Deby that a USAID team was in the region and was looking at ways to assist Chadian IDPs. ¶7. (SBU) President Deby warned the Special Envoy that Sudan had armed a large force which was marching on Chad. The targets could be Abeche, Goz Beida or Adre He mentioned that he was speaking on behalf of CAR President Bozize as well, who also feared an imminent attack from Sudan. Asked by Special Envoy Natsios whether these forces endangered the refugee camps, President Deby said that he thought not -- these were more in danger of attacks from janjaweed. ¶8. (U) This cable was not cleared by Special Envoy Natsios. ¶9. (U) Tripoli minimize considered. WALL