CHAD: TWO UNEASY TRACKS OF DIALOGUE

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 03 NDJAMENA 000594 SIPDIS SENSITIVE SIPDIS E.O. 12958: N/A TAGS: PREL PGOV CD LY SU SUBJECT: CHAD: TWO UNEASY TRACKS OF DIALOGUE REF: NDJAMENA 544 ¶1. (SBU) SUMMARY: Strains within the opposition coalition have not yet led to an open rupture, but the internal political dialogue is blocked over the issue of a government of consensus. Meanwhile, there is apparent progress in the parallel dialogue in Tripoli between the government and rebels. END SUMMARY. ¶2. (SBU) The opposition coalition CPDC (Coordination des Parties politiques pour la Defense de la Constitution) has so far weathered a fundamental disagreement that seemed (reftel) on the verge of breaking the coalition apart. Opposition heavyweights Jean Bawoyeu Alingue, Wadal Abdelkader Kamougue, and Saleh Kebzabo are ranged on one side, leaning toward signing an agreement on improved electoral modalities, and Lol Mahamat Choua and Ibni Oumar Mahamat Saleh are on the other side, insisting on not signing without broader guarantees, including formation of a government of consensus empowered to enforce a new road map on electoral reform. However, General Kamougue convened the CPDC leaders last week and they emerged with an uneasy understanding to maintain opposition unity for the time being. ¶3. (SBU) Meanwhile, the talks between the government and armed opposition continue in Tripoli, concluding their third week. We do not have a direct read-out but it is clear, from opposition press accounts and ministerial comings and goings from Ndjamena to Tripoli, that the talks are active. The European Union here informs us that the negotiations in Tripoli are "advanced." The rebels -- apparently even including Deby's relatives the Erdimi twins -- appear to willing to sign a ceasefire and, according to the EU, are negotiating their participation in the government. The EU surmises that the rebel groups' poor fighting record since Mahamat Nour (now Minister of Defense) defected at the end of 2006, compounded by some withdrawal of Sudanese support in the wake of the Riyadh/Tripoli entente with Chad, have made the rebels amenable to a deal. ¶4. (SBU) Charge d'affaires called on Alingue July 12 and Ibni Oumar Mahamat Saleh July 13 to get an updated view on the incipient split in the CPDC and on linkage between the external (Tripoli) and internal dialogues. Both were very careful to avoid casting aspersions on each other or admitting any linkage to Tripoli, while both expressed hope that Tripoli could produce a ceasefire. (Comment: We understand that at least some of the opposition leaders are in continual telephonic contact with some of the rebels, and we know that privately some have given vent to bitter mutual criticisms. End Comment.) Alingue's View -------------- ¶5. (SBU) Alingue, who chairs the internal dialogue, acknowledged that the dialogue, since it commenced in December 2006, had made considerable progress in elaborating electoral reforms -- a significant achievement considering the complete lack of trust that had prevailed in Chad ever since Deby had announced that he would change the constitution and run for a third term. By April both sides, with significant technical advice from the European Union, had largely come to agreement on these electoral reforms. They began then to turn to the even more difficult issue of creating a general environment in which fair elections would be feasible. Alingue emphasized that the most important obstacle to fair elections and, indeed, economic development and good governance, was Chad's state of insecurity, and thus the CPDC had insisted on negotiations that included the armed rebels. If the negotiations now underway in Tripoli brought a lessening of insecurity, then the government would have gone some way toward meeting this requirement. There was no direct link between the internal dialogue and Tripoli, Alingue said, but an agreement between the government and rebels would be essential to organizing elections. However, if Tripoli dragged on, it might nonetheless be possible to sign the internal agreement. ¶6. (SBU) The other dimension to the discussion on the "general environment," according to Alingue, was the NDJAMENA 00000594 002 OF 003 necessity for modalities to ensure that the electoral reforms agreed upon would be fulfilled in practice. Much debate had focused on the formation of a watch-dog committee with international membership, which the government (as represented by the ruling party MPS in this dialogue) had at first opposed but now accepted. For the past two weeks, the dialogue had foundered on the last remaining major issue: participation of the opposition in the government, a "government of consensus." The government/MPS said it was willing to consider the opposition's representation in the government, but it insisted that Deby reserve the right to say who was to be named to what ministerial portfolio. Alingue admitted that there were some CPDC leaders who objected to the idea of participating in the government at all, even one in which the CPDC had a determinitive role, since they would lose the clarity of their status as opposition leaders. (Comment: We believe Saleh Kebzabo is one of these, preferring to put reliance on the watch-dog committee as the guarantor of the agreement. End Comment.) Alingue acknowledged that this fundamental disagreement might lead to the break-up of the CPDC. Ibni Oumar's View -------------- ¶7. (SBU) Ibni Oumar did not appear to attach much importance to the talks in Tripoli, saying that, while it was important that they succeed, the CPDC's requirements for guarantees to ensure the effective conduct of elections would remain the same. The electoral reforms that had been agreed would be worth little without those guarantees. The CPDC had set forth a "road map" in May that included a thorough reform of territorial administration (to include removal of military interference in elections),a watch-dog committee with international observers, and a "consensual team" that would have complete power to oversee and enforce the road map. The MPS appeared to agree to this road map on May 8, and it was an MPS member who had suggested a "government of consensus" rather than "consensual team." The MPS had appeared to agree that the President would delegate some of his power under the present constitution. However, the MPS had walked back its apparent agreement and now, according to Ibni Oumar, wanted to use the CPDC's insistence on guarantees as a way to break up the CPDC. However, Ibni Oumar said, in its recent meetings the CPDC agreed to remain unified and to continue to insist on these guarantees. The watch-dog committee was one important guarantee but not adequate without a government of consensus. To the Charge's question about the role of the European Union, Ibni Oumar said the EU had from the beginning of the dialogue seen its role as restricted to offering technical advice on electoral issues. He said that the EU did not appear to be interested in the larger issue of guarantees for electoral reforms. European Union View -------------- ¶8. (SBU) Poloff called on EU Counsellor Martin Klaucke (German) July 11 for his read-out on the dialogue. Klaucke said that the government had made significant concessions on the reform of the electoral system. It was a big step forward for Chad. The reforms would hopefully allow Chad to have legislative elections that were much less manipulated than past elections had been. Legislative elections were admittedly not so important as presidential elections, due to the weakness of Chad's National Assembly, but successful legislative elections could bode well for the presidential election in 2011. ¶9. (SBU) Klaucke said that at the June 21 plenary the government/MPS had agreed on all the electoral reforms and two out of three of the wider demands of the CPDC: watch-dog committee with EU and AU, and who would be allowed to sign (CPDC insisted only MPS and CPDC, and a compromise had been worked out by which other political parties -- mostly small and allied to the government -- would "initial but not sign"). It was the third issue, the CPDC's insistence on a government of consensus, that had blocked agreement. In fact, Klaucke said, some of the CPDC did not want to be in the government at all, and Klaucke suspected that the CPDC was now using its demand for a government of consensus as an NDJAMENA 00000594 003 OF 003 excuse to delay agreement pending developments in Tripoli. Klaucke speculated that the CPDC feared that the armed opposition would extract a better deal from the government than the moderate opposition, one from which the latter might benefit if they were patient. ¶10. (U) Tripoli minimize considered. TAMLYN