CHAD/SUDAN: JEM PERSPECTIVE

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 02 NDJAMENA 000517 SIPDIS SENSITIVE SIPDIS E.O. 12958: N/A TAGS: PREL PHUM CD SU SUBJECT: CHAD/SUDAN: JEM PERSPECTIVE REF: NDJAMENA 462 ¶1. (SBU) SUMMARY: Taljadine Niam, JEM representative in Chad, met the Ambassador June 20 at his request, seeking to maintain contact despite sanctions on JEM leader Khalil Ibrahim. Khalil, he claimed, had departed Chad for Darfur with "all" the JEM forces. He said JEM (contrary to its blocking role at Abuja in 2006) was urgent to see an end to SLM disunity and to move toward political resolution of the Darfur crisis. JEM did not view Eritrea or SPLM as the right intermediaries. Rapid demographic changes in Darfur were a key factor in JEM's sense of urgency. END SUMMARY. ¶2. (SBU) Taljadine Niam, representative of the Justice and Equality Movement (JEM) in Chad, accompanied by Issa Hassan, called on the Ambassador, with poloff, June 20. He said that the JEM sought to continue contact despite the sanctions imposed on JEM leader Khalil Ibrahim. Taljadine regretted that Khalil had been penalized for his role in opposing the agreement signed in Abuja in May 2006, since, he claimed, "even your government now does not see the agreement as being a good agreement." The Ambassador disputed this assertion, noting that the United States accepted that the agreement could be modified but believed that further negotiations should be based on it. Taljadine said that the JEM did not want to start the negotiations from zero again. In fact, "there were many good elements in the Abuja agreement -- the ceasefire, human rights, many things." "Easy" to negotiate modified accord -------------- ¶3. (SBU) Taljadine said that the American negotiators had been too impatient in Abuja. If only they had accepted a higher compensation component and agreed to reconstituting Darfur as a unitary region, the JEM would have signed the agreement, even without obtaining a vice-presidential position. The Americans had thought that SLM leader Minni Minawi was the "big boss," and subsequent events, with Minni isolated in Khartoum, had proved that he had not been and that JEM's position had been correct. If only the parties could now get back to the table, the negotiating process would be "quick and easy." For its part, all the JEM would ask for was a unitary Darfur region and "proper compensation," as had been its legitimate objectives in Abuja. If only the SLA could get its act together -------------- ¶4. (SBU) Taljadine regretted that the National Redemption Front (NRF) announced June 30, 2006, had never gotten off the ground. The NRF had pulled together JEM and SLM's Khamis Abdallah Abakar, along with Ahmad Ibrahim Diraij and Sharif Harir, but without SLM's Abd al-Wahid Nur. JEM had wanted to give life to the NRF and rope in the bulk of Darfur rebels. JEM had been willing to disband itself as an organization and had proposed the respected and noncontroversial Diraij (a Fur) as first rotating president. But even the rump SLM with whom JEM attempted to negotiate had feared that JEM, being united and having the single strongest force on the ground, would dominate the organization, so they sought instead to unify SLM ranks first. However, the SLM had been too disunified to find a way to unify itself. JEM was more urgent than ever, Taljadine said, to get on with political negotiations. Therefore, SLM unification was also in JEM's urgent interest, because it was SLM disunity that blocked any progress. (Note: See reftel for the Ambassador's May 31 conversation with SLM's Adam Shogar, who presented a diametrically opposed view: Shogar claimed that it was the SLM that had proposed disbanding the SLM and JEM in favor of a single organization and that Khalil had insisted on being president. End Note.) Sense of urgency -------------- ¶5. (SBU) To the question why JEM was now so urgent to get on with political negotiations to resolve the Darfur crisis, Taljadine said that there were several reasons. The people of Darfur were stewing in their IDP and refugee camps, leading unnatural lives and suffering. Sudan was establishing facts on the ground, giving land to the janjaweed. Arabization was proceeding at an increasing pace, with the consequent withering of local languages and culture. The longer the people stayed in camps, the less they would want or be able to go back to their homes. Refugees in Chad were intermarrying and putting down roots in Chad. Post-crisis leaders in Darfur (read: JEM) would need as much time as possible before national elections in two years to organize themselves so that Darfur would have its optimal role in the unfolding national political process. Improvement in Chadian-Sudanese relations was having a NDJAMENA 00000517 002 OF 002 negative effect on the rebel groups and, although it was more likely that that relationship would turn sour again, if those relations continued to stay on an even keel there would be long-term effects adverse to the rebels. Finally, JEM had to take international views into consideration, as the international pressures to find a political solution were immense, Taljadine admitted. Not happy with Eritreans, SPLM, Qafhafi -------------- ¶6. (SBU) Taljadine reviewed with dissatisfaction recent regional efforts to unify the Darfur rebels. Eritrea was not the right facilitator, in JEM's view. It had brought an airplane to Ndjamena to collect rebels, and Khamis Abakar, Sharif Harir, and Khalil Abdallah had ridden to Asmara, with delegations, and were apparently still there. The JEM did not go, although it had not refused absolutely, merely asked for more clarification on what Eritrea had in mind (not yet received). According to Taljadine, Eritrea had placed its bet on Sharif Harir as the leader of a new SLM, but Sharif was a university professor not capable of uniting forces on the ground. ¶7. (SBU) Meanwhile, Taljadine noted, the SPLM had sought to host a set of reconciliation conferences in Juba, but this effort had failed ("postponed" meant "failed," Taljadine insisted). The SPLM had asked JEM to participate in Juba. JEM, which viewed the SPLM as having played a negative role in Abuja, had not refused, but as with Eritrea, JEM had asked for clarification on the SPLM's objectives (not received). Meanwhile, Qadhafi had summoned Chadian and Darfurian rebels to Tripoli. JEM's Bahar Idriss Abu Garda and Adam Lisan Tugoud were now there. There was no way of knowing what Qadhafi had in mind, though the one sure thing was that Qadhafi was allergic to the presence of international forces in his back yard. ¶8. (SBU) The Ambassador asked the JEM's view of the effort of the Center for Humanitarian Dialogue (CHD) to bring SLM factions together in Nairobi. Taljadine said that CHD had called him. JEM viewed CHD's efforts positively and would be willing to be present in Nairobi. He advised working through the AU to get Chad to agree to CHD's flying SLM leaders through Chad to Nairobi. The Chad angle -------------- ¶9. (SBU) Taljadine said that Khalil Ibrahim, following the Riyadh accord between Chad and Sudan, had removed himself with "all" the JEM forces to Darfur. Only Taljadine and Issa Hassan remained in Chad, he claimed with a straight face. JEM's relations with Chad remained good, and JEM preferred Chad to all other regional intermediaries. Chadian rebels were still present in Sudan and carrying out attacks ("committing crimes") around Abeche and al-Geneina. Taljadine said he could not understand why the Chadian government was serious about its Riyadh obligations when the Sudanese government was not. Meanwhile, he said, after the defection of Mahamat Nour, Chadian rebels were a weak and ineffective lot. Their problem was not lack equipment or assistance from Khartoum, but lack of fighting spirit and, especially, lack of good intelligence from within Chad. Mahamat Nour had been extremely well informed by spies inside the Chadian military and intelligence. WALL