CHAD: DIFFERENT PERSPECTIVES ON DIALOGUE, REBELS

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 02 NDJAMENA 000516 SIPDIS SENSITIVE SIPDIS E.O. 12958: N/A TAGS: PREL PGOV PHUM CD SUBJECT: CHAD: DIFFERENT PERSPECTIVES ON DIALOGUE, REBELS REF: NDJAMENA 499 ¶1. (SBU) SUMMARY: Abderaman Moussa, the National Mediator, and Jean Alingue, prominent oppositionist, gave the Ambassador June 19 their very different views on the ongoing political dialogue and, in particular, participation of the rebels. Alingue said that the dialogue had reached agreement on elections modalities but might nonetheless fail because Deby was unwilling to expand it to include the rebels. Moussa confirmed that Deby would not participate in a face-to-face negotiation with rebels, but he underlined that a Chadian delegation would go to Tripoli to meet Chadian rebel leaders. (In fact, it is a high-level delegation, and a close Deby advisor says it is "conceivable" that Deby himself could go to Tripoli.) END SUMMARY. ¶2. (SBU) The slow-moving political dialogue in Chad is coming to a decision point, as discussed reftel, although a conclusive meeting keeps being deferred -- putting off the day when the dialogue is either pronounced dead or, in the less likely scenario, heralds the opening of a new era. The Ambassador met two of the key leaders involved in the dialogue June 19, to get informed government and opposition points of view on the status of the discussions in their last lap. ¶3. (SBU) First was the National Mediator Abderaman Moussa, a seasoned security official who was moved to his present position a few months ago, after serving as President Deby's security advisor. Political parties have conducted the dialogue without direct government involvement (the "majority," including the ruling party MPS and its weak allies, talking to the "minority," comprising now only the moderate opposition coalition CPDC, with the exit of the more radical party of Yoronger); however, the government, especially Moussa, has kept a keen eye on the process. Second was Jean Bawoyeu Alingue, Deby's first prime minister in the early 1990's but a leader in the opposition ever since. Alingue is chairman of the dialogue and one of the rumored choices for new prime minister, if the dialogue succeeds and a government of national unity is named. Moussa: Rebels Excluded from Dialogue -------------- ¶3. (SBU) Moussa said that he did not take seriously the CPDC's insistence that the dialogue "somehow" include the disparate Chadian armed rebel groups. The CPDC knew perfectly well, he said, that the rebel groups' objective was to come to power by force of arms and that the rebels had no use for the moderate (unarmed) opposition. When former rebel leader Mahamat Nour (now Minister of Defense) had negotiated his return to Chad in late 2006, Moussa noted, Nour had not dealt with nor even mentioned the CPDC. Moussa said that when he had led the Chadian delegation to Tripoli in February to conduct talks with Chadian rebel groups (at the level of deputy leaders),these rebels, similarly, had not asked that the CPDC come to Tripoli. "Those who want to take power by force will not want to give any gift to the CPDC. At base, they totally disagree." ¶4. (SBU) Now, Moussa said, the rebel leaders themselves had traveled to Tripoli. Moussa said that Deby would name a delegation to meet the rebels in Tripoli. Moussa said that this activity did not involve the moderate opposition in Chad. The rebels insisted that Deby move aside, while the CPDC accepted that "the guy" finish his mandate. In any case, he added, if any of these rebels were lured back into Chad, there would be others, perhaps including from the moderate opposition, who would be dissatisfied and would flee Chad as rebels. Discontent was the mindset in Chad. Moussa dismissed as a foreordained failure former Prime Minister Goukouni Weddeye's efforts toward reconciliation with the rebels. ¶5. (SBU) Moussa pointed to two other issues that could prevent a successful conclusion of the dialogue. Some in the CPDC, he said, were insisting upon a full census of the population before holding legislative elections. The government, he said, opposed further delay of the elections, which were constitutionally mandated to occur before the end of 2007. Similarly, Moussa was dismissive of the opposition's demand for a government of consensus or national unity. "Everyone (in the opposition) would want to be in the government," he said. More pointedly, he said, such a government would take too much power away from the president ("unconstitutionally"). Alingue: Rebels Essential in the Dialogue -------------- ¶6. (SBU) Alingue's principal focus was the "environment of NDJAMENA 00000516 002 OF 002 insecurity" in the country and the necessity, therefore, of expanding the dialogue to include the rebels. He said the CPDC did not see that it would be possible to hold effective elections while the country was under constant armed threat. The Ambassador observed that the government had made overtures to the rebels, defused the rebel group led by Mahamat Nour, participated in meetings with rebels hosted by Libya, and given Goukouni the green light to try his hand at reconciliation. Alingue said none of these actions qualified. Deby needed to meet all the rebels face-to-face. The "family conflict" that had bled the country for several years could only be brought to an end in this way. When the Ambassador pressed for details on how Deby would organize such a dialogue with these rebellious members of the "family conflict," Alingue was vague -- but he was adamant. ¶7. (SBU) Alingue acknowledged that the dialogue had made great progress on issues of electoral reform, such as revisions to the electoral code and revamping the electoral commission. The dialoguers had, from early on in the discussions, agreed on the need for an electoral census (voter registration) and a "demographic census," which would not be a true census but rather a demarcation of Chad's administrative units. (Note: Alingue said that the CPDC had not insisted on a census of the general population prior to the legislative elections, but other CPDC members have told us otherwise. End note.) It would take one to two years to effect these basic electoral reforms, Alingue said, requiring the delay of the legislative elections -- a "lesser evil." The Ambassador said that he had heard that there was reluctance on the part of the government to accept a delay in the legislative election. Alingue responded that the dialogue had taken place strictly between the opposition parties and the MPS and its allies, and not the government. The government (i.e., Deby),he said, would "have to give in." ¶8. (SBU) Comment: We may not find out where this dialogue is leading until the two sides meet in plenary, which has been often (perhaps mercifully) put off. Deby will almost certainly not accede to a big round table negotiation that would include both the moderate and armed opposition. It is not evident yet that he will even agree to commitments which the MPS has ostensibly made on matters more directly germane to the electoral process, as much as we think it would behoove him to do so. ¶9. (SBU) But there is at least a chance that Deby might deal with the rebels face to face. On June 20 Deby did dispatch a delegation to Libya, led by one of his closest advisors, Minister of State Adoum Younousmi. In a conversation with the Ambassador June 21, another close advisor (and second of only three ministers of state) Mahamat Ali Abdallah Nassour said that "if things go well in Tripoli, it is conceivable Deby himself may go to Tripoli to talk directly to Nouri and the twins" (Mahamat Nouri and Tom and Timane Erdimi). WALL