CHAD: KOUCHNER PLAN ACCEPTED

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 03 NDJAMENA 000504 SIPDIS SENSITIVE SIPDIS E.O. 12958: N/A TAGS: PREL KPKO CD PHUM PREF SUBJECT: CHAD: KOUCHNER PLAN ACCEPTED REF: USUN NEW YORK 433 ¶1. (SBU) SUMMARY: President Deby hasaccepted a two-track humanitarian protection pla for eastern Chadthat Kouchner proposed to him une 10. The plan is modest but achievable. It culd have a relatively quick impact in protecting efugees and internally displaced persons, as well s somewhat reducing insecurity in the region. The plan has two components: police within the camps and military outside the camps. The UN is to take charge of the police component, with as many as 300 UN police (could be francophone African) in charge of as many as 1200 Chadian police, who will receive UN training. France is to lead the military component (1,500 French, 1,000 Chadian, 300-500 EU). It is not clear to what extent the 1,500 French military are in addition to the existing 1,200 already in Chad. We believe this proposal offers a creative way forward in addressing an urgent problem. While it falls short of more ambitious plans to deter cross-border activity, it will contribute to security in the border region. We urge Washington to give it favorable consideration. END SUMMARY. ¶2. (SBU) The Ambassador, accompanied by DCM and poloff, on June 15 met Francois Dureau, UN Department of Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO) Situation Center Chief, and, separately, Serge Malle, UN High Commission on Refugees (UNHCR) resident representative. Dureau said he had been in Chad since May 21, conducting discussions with Foreign Minister Allam-Mi and the interministerial committee established to deal with the East. Those discussions had reached a dead-end, with the Chadians refusing to agree to foreign forces on Chadian soil (beyond, of course, the long existing 1200-man French force, "Epervier"). Dureau had made it clear to the Chadians that the UN would not be a party to providing Chadian gendarmes with military equipment. Kouchner Brings Change of Direction -------------- ¶3. (SBU) Dureau said that Allam-Mi called him in again on June 11, the day after Kouchner met Deby in Ndjamena, and told him that there had been a change. Allam-Mi said that he had not been present at Kouchner's meeting with Deby but that Deby had convened his close advisors afterward and issued new instructions. There would now be a two-track approach involving foreign forces in eastern Chad: (1) Police in the refugee camps -- Chadian police commanded and trained by the UN. (2) Military protection force, involving French, Chadian, EU, and possibly non-EU troops. Allam-Mi asked if this arrangement would come in the form of a UN mandate. Dureau said he had responded that, even though the military force would not be made up of UN peacekeepers, a UN resolution might be forthcoming to endorse the French/EU military force, so long as its purpose was clearly set forth in the framework agreement as being protection of refugees and humanitarian workers. Police Component -------------- ¶4. (SBU) Dureau said he had met with Allam-Mi and the interministerial committee again June 15 to iron out details. The UN had proposed a Chadian police force of 800 to be placed under the command of 229 UN international police. The Chadians asked for 1200. Dureau said that he had countered that the UN would accept this increase only on the understanding that the covering international force would be concomitantly expanded, to 250-300, and that the Chadian police would only be deployed in phases. The UN had stiplulated, further, that police deployment could not precede military deployment in any locality. Dureau doubted, he said, that Chad would be able to find even 800 police to send into training, certainly not in the first phase. ¶5. (SBU) Dureau said that he had emphasized that the most urgent need was Dar Sila, the southeastern section of the Chad/Darfur border area, where there are two large refugee camps and large near-by gatherings of internally displaced persons (IDPs). Dureau said that the understanding he had worked out with the Chadians would permit the police component also to "take care of" the IDPs. He said that 150 police in a given area, such as these Dar Sila camps, could not provide security that would also guarantee the IDPs protection in their home villages, but it might go some way to boost their confidence. Allam-Mi had pressed for use of the military force to secure the IDPs' home villages. Dureau said that the UN preferred to reserve the military force for camp protection but the UN would give consideration to some patroling in IDPs' vacated home villages to reassure populations that they could return. Military Component NDJAMENA 00000504 002 OF 003 -------------- ¶6. (SBU) Dureau said that Allam-Mi and the committee had agreed on a ilitary force consisting of 1500 French, 1000 Chdians, and 300-500 EU. The Epervier command, Dureu noted, was not eager to see an expansion of Frnch forces and responsibilites in Chad -- but it ould do as Paris instructed. A remaining open pint, according to Dureau, waswhether the 1500 French troops for camp protection would be in addition to the 1200 Epervier, or if not, what portion of Epervier would become part of the camp-protection effort. Dureau said that it seemed likely that the new arrangement, whatever the exact numbers, would involve a significant French expansion in Chad. Dureau did not yet have a read-out on the meetings, earlier in the day in Paris, which had covered technical details. The EU was to meet on June 18 in Brussels to work out the possible EU contribution. A joint French/EU delegation would come to Ndjamena June 20-21 to finalize details on the military presence, precedent to the contact group meeting June 25 in Paris. Thence, DPKO would give a full report to the UNSC for a final endorsement. ¶7. (SBU) Dureau said that there was one further unresolved issue: the follow-on force. He said that France did not want to commit these forces (above and beyond Epervier) "forever." The French plan contemplated a four-six month deployment of French forces, which would then transition to the UN. Dureau noted that the deployment of UN police might prove to be a good precedent to demonstrate to Deby and others that a UN force was not a threat. ¶8. (SBU) Dureau said that, in his discussions with the Chadians, he had kept away from the issue of "the border" (i.e., any use of the military force for border security, surveillance, or control). The UN, he said, understood that the French would provide the international force with information from air surveillance, medevac, and other assistance. Abeche airfield was inadequate to handle even a relatively modestly ramped-up operation. With the rainy season already starting, deployment would prove to be extremely difficult. ¶9. (SBU) Dureau said that, in his discussions with the Chadians, he had also put to one side the issue of relocation of some of the refugee camps. Relocation would be a large undertaking, and no suitable relocation sites had been found. The northern camps did not present issues of humanitarian protection so acutely as the southern camps; the problem in the northern camps lay more in rebel infiltration and militarization. The police presence would be important in getting to grips with that issue, Dureau observed. UNHCR Endorses Plan -------------- ¶10. (SBU) In the separate follow-on meeting with the Ambassador, UNHCR resident representative Serge Malle said that the plan that Kouchner had brought was what UNHCR had advocated for some time. It was what was needed: a small force targeted on humanitarian protection, something that Deby could accept, something that could be realistically implemented in a relatively short period of time. The devil would be in the details, and all medicines had side effects. UNHCR was nervous that "some groups" (meaning Chadian rebel groups) would take a negative view of even this small force. UNHCR had thus far avoided being a target of various armed elements in eastern Chad (its assets had of course been targeted, but that was a different issue). However, Malle concluded, it was essential to take the risk. ¶11. (SBU) Malle surmised that only the French could have pulled off this arrangement, since it was the preexistence of Epervier that had made swallowing the pill acceptable to Deby. It could hardly be an open-ended burden France would embrace light-heartedly ("a billion-dollar per year force to protect 250-million dollars in humanitarian aid!" he commented, presumably referring to cost of the UN's robust force),but the present plan was one that would make a palpable difference in the lives of the refugees and IDPs, bring a little more law and order to the region, and possibly give the IDPs a little more confidence to return to their home areas. Malle said that it was particularly important that the police be properly trained before being deployed. Malle anticipated that the UN police component would be francophone African. ¶12. (SBU) Malle said that the rainy season would probably start in earnest in another two to three weeks in Dar Sila, where IDPs had tripled within eight months from 50,000 to 150,000. Prepositioned supplies in Dar Sila were adequate for the refugees, less so for the IDPs, but Malle did not expect a catastrophe. Shelter for the IDPs was the biggest NDJAMENA 00000504 003 OF 003 problem. ¶13. (SBU) COMMENT: We believe this proposal offers a creative way forward in addressing an urgent problem. It is acceptable to the parties concerned. It can be implemented rapidly. It will help protect the humanitarian operation. While it falls short of more ambitious plans to deter cross-border activity, it will contribute to security in the border region. We urge Washington to give it favorable consideration. END COMMENT. WALL