CHAD: IMPORTANT JUNCTURE IN INTERNAL POLITICAL

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 03 NDJAMENA 000499 SIPDIS SENSITIVE SIPDIS E.O. 12958: N/A TAGS: KDEM PGOV PHUM PREL CD SUBJECT: CHAD: IMPORTANT JUNCTURE IN INTERNAL POLITICAL DYNAMIC REF: A. NDJAMENA 446 ¶B. NDJAMENA 457 ¶1. (SBU) SUMMARY: The ongoing political dialogue in Chad has come to a crunch point. According to a senior official who serves as go-between in the dialogue, several key areas of disagreement remain, but each one is surmountable. A prominent oppositionist has removed himself from the dialogue, but he is an inveterate spoiler. After years of false promises, the public is cynical. People know that the real test would be an iron-clad promise from Deby that he would step down in 2011 -- which is not going to happen. However, the more moderate opposition coalition appears still to be united and committed to the dialogue. The timing is propitious, as Deby is only beginning the second year of his term and the rebels are quiet for the moment. The big question mark is Deby himself. END SUMMARY. ¶2. (SBU) The Ambassador has had a series of meetings over the past two weeks with opposition and government officials to get to grips with progress, or lack of progress, in the political dialogue discussed in ref A. A blow-by-blow account -- if too hopeful -- was provided June 13 by Abderaman Djasnabaille, Secretary of State at the Ministry of Interior. Djasnabaille spent years in Paris in the Chadian oppositionist community, but Deby lured him back. His current official responsibilities (he has moved through three cabinet portfolios over the past year) cover territorial administration and decentralization, and Deby has tapped him as a point man in the dialogue. Djasnabaille said that he felt huge pressure from both sides, his sympathies lying with the moderate opposition, who mistrust him. Agreed -------------- ¶3. (SBU) Djasnabaille said that he was in the process of putting together a draft agreement to be submitted to the ruling party (MPS),opposition coaltion (CPDC),and European Union (as mediator/facilitator) next week. Several issues that had been a focus of sharp disagreement have now, according to Djasnabaille, been brought to resolution, thanks in no small part to technical advice and energetic intervention by the EU. The parties have now agreed that the electoral commission will have equal representation from the government-allied and opposition parties. Procedures for voting by Chadians living outside of Chad will be tightened up (Chadians abroad will have to give proof of citizenship and be registered at an embassy or consulate). Prodedures for voting by nomads will be tightened up (nomads will now only have one day in which to vote, and will only be able to vote in five districts). Voting procedures at voting booths will be streamlined and made more transparent (single, uniform, secret ballot). Agreed, in Principle -------------- ¶4. (SBU) More controversially, Djasnabaille claimed that all sides agreed on the need for both a general census (total population, including the external Chadian population) and electoral census (registration of voters). The last census was in 1993, and today no one knows the total population or how much it has changed from region to region or district to district. The mandate of the present legislature, last elected in 2001, has been extended twice and was due to expire at the end of this year. It would have to be extended again. Djasnabaille said that extending the mandate of a discredited National Assembly was regrettable but necessary. The dialoguers remained divided over the time required for conducting a census -- a technical issue and solvable. Djasnabaille thought that a census would most likely require two and one-half years. (Comment: President Deby told the Ambassador June 4, ref B, that he would not accept extension NDJAMENA 00000499 002 OF 003 of the current legislature. Other interlocutors have suggested that, if Deby is adamant on this point, there would still be room for compromise: a near-term voter registration which would be redone properly once the census was complete. End Comment.) ¶5. (SBU) Djasnabaille advocated two and a half years for another reason: It would permit the installation of professional personnel at the district level. Professionalization of territorial administration was a long process, he acknowledged, but even a marginally more professional administration would be helpful in promoting electoral transparency. All dialoguers agreed on the terrible state of local administration, rife with old soldiers who could barely read or write. ¶6. (SBU) Djasnabaille said that the single most contentious element in the dialogue was the formation of a government of consensus or national unity. He said that all sides had accepted the idea in principle, but the hard part was getting down to naming the prime minister and his cabinet -- who would be on, who would be off, and who would have the right to name the cabinet: Deby or the dialoguers? These points were not yet decided, he said. Not Agreed, but Solvable -------------- ¶7. (SBU) A key requirement of the CPDC is the formal establishment of an international follow-up committee, to investigate on a continuing basis compliance with promises made by the government. Djasnabaille said that President Deby appeared to be negative on this point, while everyone else, including the government representatives in the dialogue understood that it was a legitimate requirement. The EU representative in Ndjamena, who had been so active in the dialogue, should have a formalized role, and perhaps others, although none had yet participated actively. ¶8. (SBU) Another CPDC requirement is that the final accord be signed only by the parties participating in the dialogue. The government has insisted that all legally-consituted parties sign. Most of those parties are one-man bands, many of them beholden to the government, so the CPDC objects. Djasnabaille said this point remained unresolved. However, the EU representative told the Ambassador June 12 that the government was likely to accept a compromise, under which only the dialoguers would sign, but all parties would be present at the ceremony. ¶9. (SBU) The final unresolved demand by the CPDC is that there be a formal overture to the Chadian rebels to be a part of the dialogue and its follow-on process. Djasnabaille said that the process would indeed need to become more inclusive, not only the rebels but also civil-society leaders. But, he said, the government would not accept delaying formalizing an accord in an effort to rope in armed rebels. Former President Goukouni's Initiative -------------- ¶10. (SBU) The Ambassador asked Djasnabaille where the reconciliation effort led by former President Goukouni Weddeye stood. Djasnabaille said he had been present at Deby's meeting with Weddeye in Libreville some weeks ago. Deby had encouraged Weddeye to get on with reconciliation with rebels as rapidly as possible and to return to Chad. Goukouni said he would need time to contact all the rebels and would wait on returning to Chad. Djasnabaille then visited Goukouni in Algeria. Some of the rebels were now willing to reconcile (Djasnabaille did not specify). Djasnabaille outlined a hopeful timetable: Finish the dialogue by the end of June, sign the accord, Goukouni would oversee reconciliation with some of the rebels in July, NDJAMENA 00000499 003 OF 003 perhaps again in Libreville, and Goukouni would return at last to Chad. ¶11. (SBU) Other sources are much less sanguine about Goukouni's initiative. President Deby is said not to be expecting these efforts to get anywhere. Goukouni's family members tell us the former president has no intention of returning to Chad for fear of being used by Deby to provide a false show of support for his regime. Yorongar Opts Out -------------- ¶12. (SBU) Meanwhile, on June 12, maverick oppositionist Ngarlejy Yorongar announced that he was pulling out of the dialogue. He addressed his bitterest barbs not to Deby or the representatives of the ruling party in the dialogue but to Jean Alingue, leader of a party within the CPDC, who has served as dialogue chairman. He also bitterly criticized the EU representative for pushing too hard for a compromise, particularly on the issue of expanding the dialogue to include the rebels. (Comment: Yorongar's defection is not a deal-killer. He has a long history as grandstander and spoiler, which plays well to his constituency of angry and frustrated Chadians. He no doubt calculates that the dialogue is bound to fail and he will reap the benefit of having remained pure. End Comment.) Much Room for Gloom -------------- ¶13. (SBU) Chadians are extremely cynical about this dialogue, across the board and rightly so. There have been many false promises about democracy to Chad. Deby's reneging on his 2001 promise to leave office in 2006 was the greatest blow. The only way that Deby could cut to the quick of the cynicism would be to announce now that he will never run again. Even that promise would be scarcely believed -- and he is not going to make that promise. Still, this dialogue is the most serious effort toward democracy that Chad has seen for several years. The time for it is propitious, partly for the very reason that Deby is not being pressured on the issue of what happens in 2011. It is also propitious because the East is quiet for the moment. It is a deceptive quiet, as Chad's security remains very fragile, but it is enough of a quiet to provide some political breathing room. Chad, and Deby, need to get started somewhere, and if it is not now, it is not likely to be anytime soon. ¶14. Minimize Considered. WALL