KOME OILFIELD SECURITY

C O N F I D E N T I A L NDJAMENA 000468

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

DS/IP/AF, DS/IP/ITA

E.O. 12958: DECL: 06/05/2017
TAGS: ASEC CD EPET PGOV PREL
SUBJECT: KOME OILFIELD SECURITY


Classified By: RSO Brad Markwald, reason 1.5c and 1.5e

SUMMARY

1. (SBU) After receiving tearline information that suspected
extremists had allegedly conducted surveillance on the Doba
Oil facility in Chad, on May 24, 2007 the Regional Security
Officer was invited to review the oilfield security operation
in the Kome region of Chad near the city of Doba by the head
of security in Chad for Exxon/Esso. A review of the
facilities and the force protection assets deployed by the
Chadian government was conducted and recommendations were
given to the security official. While adequately set up for
loss prevention and anti-theft deterrence, RSO observed the
facility was completely unprepared for even a minor terrorist
attack. END SUMMARY

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BACKGROUND AND THE OILFIELD PROJECT
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2. (SBU) On May 21, 2007 the Regional Security Officer was
instructed to pass tearline language to the appropriate
EXXON-MOBILE officials responsible for security.
Specifically, as of mid-May 2007, the Doba Oil facility in
Chad had allegedly been surveilled by suspected extremists.
The specific intent of this surveillance was unknown. In
response, RSO met with the regional coordinator for security
at Exxon-Mobile that evening. Afterwards, the RSO was
invited down to the region to inspect the current force
protection measures and make recommendations as appropriate.
The Kome oil fields stretch from Moundou to Doba and finally
to Sarh. It encompasses a 12,272 (21,000 km) square mile area
of operation. There are actually 9 camps in all with the
strategic operations center located at the Kome 5 camp. The
entire process operates under EEPCI, the Esso Exploration and
Petroleum Chad Inc. under the local authority of the Chadian
National Petroleum Project (CNPP).


3. (U) Thursday, May 24, RSO and Exxon security flew to Kome
5 via the regularly scheduled charter flight operated.
Security at their airport locations in N,djamena and at the
airstrip in Kome 5 was organized and effective. Because the
company does not allow alcohol at any of their facilities in
Chad, the unintended result is that all passengers and
baggage are completely searched. No firearms are allowed and
any edged weapons must be in checked baggage for the flight.
The runway at Kome 5 is improved laterite and should hold up
to extensive use, even during a rainy season. The facilities
in the Kome 5 area are typical of the entire operation. In
total, there are 450 oil production sites, 50 construction
sites and 2000 personnel of which many are American
expatriate workers.

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LOSING HEARTS AND MINDS
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4. (C) Initial discussions with the security staff revealed
considerable tensions between the operation and its
surroundings. Last year alone theft from oilfield property
was over half a million USD. Public relations efforts have
fallen short of the local,s expectations and a growing
resentment is building towards the oil project and its
workers. More layoffs are scheduled for next year as old
construction projects finish. Attacks on local security and
production personnel are rising. Historically, local leaders
and politicians were opposed to the project. The local
population complains that the Chadian government is not doing
more for them with the oil profits. They want more
individual compensation payments, and are upset the
government hasn,t made more progress on setting up the fund
from community compensation projects. Aided by stagnant
wages that have not increased significantly in the last few
years and another round of layoffs, labor unions have
exploited the situation; provoking several strikes and
protests that have shut down or restricted production. Fuel
shortages are a common occurrence and at the time of this
visit, the entire facility had only 5 days of fuel oil for
the generation of power. If the operation looses power, the
pipeline looses pressure. It takes up to three weeks to get
the pressure up to operating levels.

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THE FACILITIES AND ASSESMENT
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5. (SBU) The Kome 5 and surrounding major facilities are
enclosed with a 9-foot chain link fence with a barbed wire
anti-climb barrier. Several large washout holes where rain
has run off and cleared away the base of the fence were
observed. Many were large enough for an intruder to exploit.
Although it was daytime, there appeared to be adequate
lighting set up throughout the compound. Guard posts were
spaced about every 200 meters along some sections of the
fence. Other sections were patrolled by guards on foot. Very
few CCTV cameras were observed. An unpaved road used by the
local guard mobile patrol ringed the compound. It was in poor
condition and should degrade significantly during the coming
rainy season. The road prevents trees and other objects from
assisting intruders who might try scaling the fence. Several
gates are located around the perimeter secured with a chain
and padlock, guarded by at least one unarmed local security
officer. The main entrance does not have an anti-vehicle
barrier. A second gate has a drop arm access control device
that has little to no anti-ram capability. Some of the guards
at the main entrance or in the interior are armed with a
police baton. There were no Chadian security forces at the
entrance. Access control is effective and all vehicles were
visually searched before entering and exiting. However, no
IED search is performed, only a visual scan of the interior.


6. (C) At Kome 5, two inner compounds have been separated.
No anti-ram or vehicle barriers are present at these
compounds. The first area is the general housing compound.
Access to this compound is further restricted to only
authorized personnel (occupants and assigned workers) by
unarmed contract guards but perimeter fencing remains
identical with numerous washout points. The other inner
compound encloses the Central Treatment Facility (CTF) and
other oil processing equipment. The fencing here is the same
but with a motion detector system. It has less washouts and
more standoff distance between the fence and the facilities
in the perimeter. RSO was informed the motion detection
system has problems and does not always work properly. It is
set up to activate in zones when triggered to assist in guard
response. A CCTV system is planned for eventual installation
that will be tied to the motion sensors. Once activated, the
camera in the area of the sensor will provide visual
surveillance of the triggered area. There is a very large
drainage culvert that runs along most of the inner perimeter.
It could easily stop any vehicle approaching it from the
outside. However, at several points the culvert is bridged
to allow direct access from the back of the compound. A
vehicle could drive through the fence, over the bridge and
gain unrestricted access to the CTF,s critical structures
with minimal preparation. The CTF is the heart of the oil
operation and even a minor attack on this complex would shut
the facility down for months if not years. The ecological
disaster that would immediately follow would be immense. The
main pipelines feeding the complex to include the MA1 line to
Cameroon are all buried and not exposed.


7. (C) The main operations center is not separated from the
general compound. Many of the adjacent structures are of a
pre-fabricated design and offer no protection in case of
attack. On the contrary, their simple construction would
shatter and produce a lot of shrapnel if subjected to an
explosive device. The main facility has good access control
procedures with Radio Frequency ID card readers limiting
unauthorized access. The main entrance and all windows are
not hardened for forced entry or ballistic protection. A
prepared and determined attacker could breach the facility
easily.


8. (C) A tour of the outlying operations revealed even less
protective measures in place. Wellpads and drill rigs were
almost entirely defenseless. Vandalism and theft to
protective fencing around expensive monitoring equipment has
left just about every facility at risk. After trying to keep
pace with the theft of security fence doors (which are stolen
by locals to make beds),security gave up and has a plan to
use surplus shipping containers to cover the equipment. With
over 450 well points and pumping stations, it is impossible
to guard all the facilities and many of the more remote
locations may go a long time without seeing a security
patrol. RSO noted active wells were totally open and exposed;
$7,000 high pressure cables lay unprotected and are routinely
stolen. Multi-million dollar drill rigs had unarmed guards in
the area but nothing to prevent a concerted attack. RSO was
informed that five drill rigs are in constant rotation and
operation.


9. (C) The Driller,s Camp is located about 15 km,s from the
main camp at Kome 5. This facility is the residential and
operational base for the bulk of the field workers in the
area. Its security posture is identical to the Kome 5
facility in regards to guard posting, access control and
perimeter defenses. Of serious concern is the location of
the explosives storage bunker and the radioactive material
storage container. The explosives bunker is located
approximately 10 meters from the chainlink fence line. An
unarmed guard protects the vehicle entrance to the bunker.
Again, access control is tight to prevent theft but not to
deter attackers. The radioactive materials container is
above ground and clearly marked with the international
radioactive hazard sign. It was also 10 meters from the fence
as well and unguarded. Both sites were not protected by any
substantial vehicle barriers.

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SECURITY FORCES ) OR LACK THEREOF
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10. (SBU) Exxon contracts the bulk of its local guard force
from three providers. There are roughly 1000 guards per shift
spread out over the region. They are unarmed except for
impact batons. Augmenting this force are 112 locally hired
EEPCI security guards, similarly lightly armed.


11. (C) In support of this massive operation, the government
of Chad has provided approximately 165 Gendarmes -
approximately 1 armed police officer per 77 square miles
(128km). That,s also assuming all Gendarmes are in service
which, according to Exxon security is a rare occurrence.
They are armed with an assortment of light weapons to include
various automatic pistols and AK-47 type assault rifles.
They do not have access to medium or heavier weapons such as
crew-served machine guns, armored vehicles or RPG,s. They
are paid a daily per diem for meals and incidentals by EEPCI.
Because the Gendarmes do not have many vehicles and even
less fuel, they are also provided 64 four-wheel drive trucks
with drivers and 4 buses. RSO visited the main Quick Reaction
Force (QRF) camp just outside a back gate at Kome 5. Both
the Chadian Gendarmes and their EEPCI drivers are collocated
in a facility designed to provide instant reaction to any
threat. A contract or other EEPCI security guard would alert
the base by radio of the threat and its location. The QRF
would respond immediately. RSO observed the facility to be
clean but organized for comfort rather than for the mission
they are providing. All the occupants were either in their
T-shirts and flip-flops playing cards and eating or sleeping
in their tents. Weapons were stored in a haphazard manner
with no one posted for guard duty on the camp. Attackers
with only a limited amount of training could easily overcome
this, the only real armed response without much effort,
leaving the entire facility exposed for an extended period.
Even if they were to respond, it is doubtful with the weapons
on hand they could repel an organized attack.


12. (C) RSO visited two other sub-camps and observed the same
activity with the exception - some were doing laundry. As
mentioned earlier, if the roads deteriorate with the coming
rains, organized response time for the QRF and Gendarmes
would be slow at best and could be as long as 30 minutes to
the main Kome 5 site. Much more if they needed to respond to
a more remote location. Chadian government support for the
oilfields is completely lacking. All local police and
Gendarmes security forces receive little to no training from
their host organizations. RSO was informed by an EEPCI
security manager that the Gendarmes often sell their
ammunition for extra money. It is probable that most don,t
have much more than one magazine of ammunition with a few
having none at all.

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CONCLUSIONS ) NO GOOD NEWS
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13. (C) The Exxon/Mobile oilfield projects in southern Chad
are totally unprepared for any level of terrorist attack. In
confidence, oil security and executives have said if any
threat is ever determined to be specific, they would quickly
shut down the operation and cease production. GoC provided
resources are entirely dependant on EEPCI for mobility and as
the Gendarmes often go months without pay, they are a source
of income. What is provided lacks numbers, motivation,
discipline and training. Their morale is poor and their
equipment is not adequate for their mission. When the
project was first planned, an internal company threat
assessment did not identify the area as susceptible to a
terrorist attack; this despite the almost complete
lawlessness and open borders between Sudan, the Central
African Republic and Cameroon. As a result, the entire
facility was constructed around loss prevention. It would
take months if not years to harden the facility to attack and
RSO was told again in confidence that was not going to
happen. Since last year the investment in the project has
been recovered. If threatened, they would shut down their
operation and sell what remains to the Chinese. A project of
this size, being led by a high profile American oil company
and staffed by a significant portion of Americans is an ideal
target anywhere ) let alone in an area with such political
and economic instability, high crime and bordered by a
fundamentalist Islamic state.


14. (C) The fact that the facility is almost entirely
undefended and surrounded by disgruntled locals makes the
site extremely vulnerable to any sort of attack ) terrorist
or otherwise. For various reasons, the Chadian security
services assigned to the oil project have not received the
necessary resources, training and leadership to complete
their mission. EEPCI needs to do a lot more liaison with
local officials with emphasis on strengthening the local
economy to provide jobs outside the oil industry in
anticipation of more layoffs. The USG should consider
providing to the local police and Gendarmes with basic to
advanced firearms training as well as instruction in police
and patrol tactics to counter any terrorist threat. If
extremists have indeed surveyed the facility for attack,
they,ve undoubtedly come up with the same conclusions as to
its vulnerabilities.
WALL