CHAD'S ROLE IN PEACE IN DARFUR: IS THIS THE RIGHT

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 NDJAMENA 000046 SIPDIS SENSITIVE SIPDIS E.O. 12958: DECL: 01/11/2017 TAGS: PGOV PHUM PREF ASEC CD SU SUBJECT: CHAD'S ROLE IN PEACE IN DARFUR: IS THIS THE RIGHT PATH? Classified By: ECONOMIC/CONSULAR OFFICER JITU SARDAR FOR REASONS 1.4 (B ) AND (D) ¶1. (C) AMBASSADOR'S INTRODUCTION: This is an important piece on our engagement with Chad and its role in peace efforts in Darfur. It was prepared by Jitu Sardar, who is completing an impressive tour here after having contributed significantly to our reporting on eastern Chad and our Darfur rebel contacts over the last two eventful years. While it may in part give too little weight to what we have been doing and too much to our ability to achieve the results we seek, it nonetheless presents an assessment well worth Washington's careful attention. Those working on Chad and Darfur will benefit from reading it. We are sending it through open channels to allow it to have the readership it deserves. END AMBASSADOR'S INTRODUCTION ¶2. (C) SUMMARY: Discussions of an international force along the Chad-Sudan border, the "Plan B" option that uses Chad as a launching pad for relief operations, and proposals for a C-130 sale to Chad, point to Chad's importance in any policy equation in bringing peace to Darfur. However, bringing peace to Darfur should not come at the expense of bringing peace to Chad. While we view our policy in Chad through the lens of Darfur for good reason, we cannot ignore the root causes of instability in Chad. Moving forward on engagement with Chad in Darfur must entail a robust effort to work with France and other key international partners to pressure the Deby regime to reform the political and economic fabric of the country. If we push forward with our approach of working with the Deby regime, and not make some significant demands on him to engage in substantive reforms in his country, we not only risk exacerbating the conflict in Chad, but also shatter any hopes of helping the victims of Darfur. END SUMMARY. - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - THE ROOTS OF CHAD'S INSTABILITY - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - ¶3. (C) The attacks on N'Djamena by Chadian rebels on April 13, 2006 demonstrated the vulnerability of President Idriss Deby Itno's regime. As long as rebel groups operate against the regime, insecurity threatens humanitarian activities and the Sudanese refugee populations. While we have publicly opposed the taking of power by force, and expressed concern of reports of Sudanese support for Chadian rebel groups, we have done little to publicly highlight the fundamental problem generating the instability in Chad: the lack of good governance by the Deby regime. ¶4. (C) Following the announcement of President Deby's victory on May 14, we did little to highlight the glaring irregularities in the electoral process, and our muted response was viewed by many in the Chadian public as an acceptance of the Deby regime. This was a theme that began in May 2005, when we said little after a highly suspect national referendum guaranteeing President Deby the constitutional right to run for a third term as president (the only apparent message, which came from the Ambassador during a fourth of July celebration speech calling for transparent national elections, resulted in a sharp rebuke from President Deby and his advisors). ¶5. (C) The Chadian rebellion has been actively supported by the Sudanese, but it is a Chadian rebellion. It consists of individuals who are dissatisfied with this regime, for a host of reasons, some of which are personal, but many of which are principled. Embassy contacts, who include former advisors and confidants to Deby, have pointed out a fundamental fact on the ground: after sixteen years in power, President Deby has failed to improve the lives of Chadians. There are practically no working social services, even as the Government garners millions in oil royalty payments and is expected to receive hundreds of millions of dollars in tax revenues this year. Corruption is rampant, and is mostly perpetuated by the President and his family. Deby's reneging on his promise to not run for a third term, and his unwillingness to have a genuine political dialogue and engage in a substantive political transition, reveal that he has no plans to give up his power. Indeed, one can argue that the problems described require long-term solutions that are greater than Deby himself. But, as a World Bank official told us earlier in the year, reform requires commitments from the top, and thus far, Deby has committed to nothing. - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - REFORM IN CHAD IS CRUCIAL FOR DARFUR - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - NDJAMENA 00000046 002 OF 003 ¶6. (C) As long as President Deby fails to initiate political and economic reform, the Chadian rebellion will continue, and feed off the dissatisfaction of the Chadian people. While the Chadian president has signed an agreement with one of the rebel movement's leaders, the main personalities of the rebel movement, Mahamat Nouri, Deby's former ambassador to Saudi Arabia, and Timan Erdimi, Deby's former chief of staff and Zaghawa elder, are still bent on removing Deby from power, and have the means and support to actively engage with the Chadian national army in the coming months. ¶7. (C) A resurgence in civil war in Chad is disastrous for our policy initiatives, both in the short-run and long-run. In the near future, combat between the Chadian national army and rebel movements threatens the safety of humanitarian workers, refugees, and Chadians in the East, and disrupts humanitarian operations. It puts members of any proposed international force along the Chad-Sudan border in harm's way. And it feeds the violence in Darfur, as Deby and loyalists in his government will make the strategic decision to continue support to Sudanese rebels to retaliate against Chadian rebels and their supporters in Khartoum. ¶8. (C) As long as the regime in Khartoum remains recalcitrant, we will probably need Chadian support for our security and humanitarian relief efforts. If we do decide to continue to cooperate closely with this regime on Darfur, we must be aware of the long-term risks to our image in Chad. The Chadian government may claim that C-130s will be used for humanitarian efforts in eastern Chad and Darfur. But the most likely scenario is that C-130s will be used to transport troops, military equipment, and weapons to the eastern border for combat operations, combat operations that will undoubtedly result in casualties. A strong engagement with this regime, without any strong push for change, will give Deby the impression that he can continue on his current track without opposition from us, and will be perceived by Chadians as U.S. support for an undemocratic regime that has alienated many of its constituents, and is conducting a war in eastern Chad that is killing and disrupting the lives of Chadians. - - - - - - - - - WHAT SHOULD WE DO? - - - - - - - - - ¶9. (C) We must establish the position that we can only be an active ally with President Deby if he will commit to political and economic reforms. This can be accomplished through a series of steps. First, we must convince the French to pressure Deby to begin a transition process, have a real dialogue with the opposition, and begin a reform process. While we have heard rumblings of French intentions to push the Chadian president to begin reforms, the French perspective in recent months still appears to be that Chad is not ready for a transition, and Deby's position must be supported. This patronizing approach is short-sighted, and will ultimately fail to bring progress and stability in Chad. If we work aggressively to convince the French that a multilateral approach, which would include the European Union, the United Nations, the Chinese, Arab states, and the African Union, is necessary to pressure Deby to change the system, we will take a crucial step for progress. ¶10. (C) Our diplomatic efforts must be coupled with public statements at the highest levels of the U.S. and foreign governments to call on Deby to make substantive reforms, for the sake of Chad's and the region's stability. If we are forced to roll out the "Plan B" option and enhance our cooperation with the Chadians, Deby should be aware that we expect him to demonstrate intentions to implement reforms at home. We should also be clear that while reform efforts will be rewarded, a failure to do so will be seen negatively by our leadership. As observers close to the President have told us, Deby is not a statesman, nor a diplomat; he is a nomadic warrior at heart who focuses on his immediate survival, and only pays attention to tough talk from the highest levels of power. ¶11. (C) Chad is, and should be, a strategic ally to the United States. While peace in Darfur is the most pressing objective, Chad and the United States share other important policy goals, such as combating trans-national terrorism, and allowing American-led oil interests to continue operations in southern Chad. In order to preserve these goals, we must review our current policy approach in Chad, and actively seek to push Deby to move forward with crucial reforms. If we couple our future engagement with the regime with strong calls for reform, we can reach a durable, lasting solution to bring peace not only to Darfur, but to the region. ¶12. (U) Tripoli Minimize Considered. NDJAMENA 00000046 003 OF 003 WALL