LET'S TAKE THIS YES FOR AN ANSWER: NEXT STEPS ON A

UNCLAS NDJAMENA 000205 SIPDIS SENSITIVE SIPDIS E.O. 12958: N/A TAGS: KPKO PGOV PHUM PREF PREL UNSC CD SUBJECT: LET'S TAKE THIS YES FOR AN ANSWER: NEXT STEPS ON A UN BORDER FORCE IN EASTERN CHAD REF: NDJAMENA 189 AND PREVIOUS ¶1. (SBU) SUMMARY AND RECOMMENDATION: President Deby's rejection of the UN border force proposed by the UN's Department of Peacekeeping Operations (UNDPKO) leaves an opening for bringing in a smaller force tasked with protecting humanitarian operations in eastern Chad. We believe we should pursue this option. We urge consideration of immediately dispatching a UNDPKO team to consult with the Chadians on the mandate and deployment of such a force. END SUMMARY AND RECOMMENDATION ¶2. (SBU) After sending mixed signals for months, Chad has now said no to the UNDPKO's proposals for a force of as many as 11,000 personnel on its eastern border with Sudan. Having agreed in principle to a border force, President Deby has now sent word that he never intended to accept military personnel nor to authorize it to do more than protect refugees, displaced persons, and humanitarian workers. ¶3. (SBU) His stance stems from his determination to keep defense of his border in his own hands. He may be wary of a move that appears provocatively like a potential cross-border force into neighboring Sudan. He is likely reluctant to go against Qadhafi by accepting international troops in Qadhafi's backyard. Nor is he eager to expose what he or his people are doing to arm tribal militias loyal to him. He may be looking to use his position on accepting a UN border force as leverage to get the UN Security Council to back him more resolutely against Sudan or to gain other favors (e.g., state visits, military purchases). For whatever reason, he has now staked out a position that will not be easy for him to back out of. ¶4. (SBU) This rejection of the UNDPKO's proposals nonetheless leave the door open to a force with a more limited mandate and a lighter footprint. In the statement clarifying Chad's position, the acting foreign minister spoke in favor of a force composed of gendarmes and police officers tasked with protecting civilian populations and humanitarian workers. He raised the possibility of accepting logistics support that would include monitoring and surveillance. In his meeting with the Ambassador, he agreed that aerial support could be part of the mission. ¶5. (SBU) We believe we should take Chad up on this offer. Such an operation would be able to take action to address the urgent and necessary challenge of protecting civilian populations. While it would not have an explicit mandate of deterring cross-border attacks, its presence would help dissuade those activities. A smaller force with a mandate focused on humanitarian protection would reduce the risk of getting caught in the crossfire of Chad's complex internal conflicts. Recruiting police and gendarmes was never going to be easy, but at least the hurdles to staffing and financing this more limited operation should be lower. ¶6. (SBU) During his recent visits to Chad UNDPKO Assistant Secretary Annabi raised concerns that any peacekeeping SIPDIS operation would require significant military elements. It would be important to ensure that any gendarmes units were sufficiently armed for the protection of civilians at risk. In the end it may not be possible to reach agreement with Chadian authorities on an effective force. But at least we have an opening, and we should make the most of it. We recommend dispatching a UNDPKO team to test Chad's expressed willingness to accept a humanitarian protection force in eastern Chad and explore with them the terms for its rapid deployment. WALL