SUDANESE REBELS PASS THROUGH N'DJAMENA

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 NDJAMENA 000020 SIPDIS SENSITIVE SIPDIS DEPARTMENT FOR SE NATSIOS, AF/SPG, AF/C, PRM, LONDON AND PARIS FOR AFRICA WATCHERS, NSC FOR PITTMAN AND SHORTLEY E.O. 12958: DECL: 01/09/2017 TAGS: PGOV PHUM PREF ASEC CD SU SUBJECT: SUDANESE REBELS PASS THROUGH N'DJAMENA Classified By: ECONOMIC/CONSULAR OFFICER JITU SARDAR FOR REASONS 1.4 (B ) AND (D) ¶1. (C) SUMMARY: Sudanese rebel groups plan to make every effort to meet Special Envoy Natsios during his visit to Chad. Sudanese Liberation Movement's Ahmed Abdul Shafi and representatives from the National Redemption Front claimed that there was extensive military coordination on the ground, but alluded to the need for enhanced political coordination among the various rebel groups. The factions appear to be in agreement on the need for a revision of the Darfur Peace Agreement in order for a comprehensive peace to be reached. NRF representatives continue to deny that they are receiving support from Chadian authorities, and speculate that Sudanese patience with Chadian rebel groups is waning. END SUMMARY. - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - REBELS PLAN TO MEET WITH NATSIOS - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - ¶2. (C) On January 6 and January 8, the Ambassador met separately with Sudan Liberation Movement's Ahmed Abdul Shafi and National Redemption Front's N'Djamena representative Tadjedine Niam (who also acts as the NRF representative to the African Union). The Ambassador noted to both representatives that Special Envoy Natsios was planning to travel to Chad in the coming weeks, and asked whether the representatives would be available to meet with the Special Envoy. ¶3. (C) Niam stated that he had been in contact with Justice and Equality Movement's president Khalil Ibrahim, as well as Group of 19 representatives Adam Shogar and Sudanese Liberation Movement's Khamis Abdallah, who were all currently in Darfur. All individuals, according to Niam, would be available to meet Natsios in Abeche during the Special Envoy's trip to the region. Abdul Shafi told the Ambassador that while he was traveling to Darfur later in the week to meet with SLM field commanders, he would return to Abeche to meet with Natsios as well. Niam asked that the Embassy communicate with the Chadian authorities beforehand to ensure that the rebel leaders would be permitted to enter Chad from Darfur. The Ambassador said that he would contact the appropriate authorities to facilitate their entry into the country. - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - REBELS SEEK WAY FORWARD ON PEACE IN DARFUR - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - ¶4. (C) Both Abdul Shafi and Niam were appreciative of Natsios' interest in meeting with the DPA non-signatory groups, and regretted that the U.S. and other donors had not had contact with the non-signatories in the post-DPA period. According to Abdul Shafi, the non-signatories were in control of several areas of the region, and Presidential Special Advisor Minni Minnawi was not only marginalized in Darfur, but within the government in Khartoum as well. In order to stabilize the security situation, the international community would have to engage more actively with the non-signatories. Niam noted that regional actors such as Libya and Egypt, who previously had more actively sided with Khartoum, were actively seeking engagement with the rebel movements. ¶5. (C) Both Abdul Shafi and Niam stated that while they have enhanced their military coordination, the non-signatories were still trying to achieve a common position on the way forward toward a lasting peace in Darfur, not only in anticipation of the meeting with Natsios, but also for future consultations. According to Abdul Shafi, non-signatories were coordinating on the military level, but still needed to demonstrate a degree of political coordination. And while there were specific differences among the non-signatories, they did agree that a lasting peace would require a review of the tenets of the DPA. Niam argued that the review should focus on individual compensation, reconstruction and development, and political representation. In all three areas, the needs of the Darfurians were inadequately met. On the reconstruction and development side, for example, the Government of Sudan's commitment of 700 million USD would not satisfy the costs associated with developing the region's infrastructure following the four year conflict. Politically, the Darfurian people represented more than twenty percent of the population, and needed to be adequately represented in the government. ¶6. (C) Abdul Shafi went a step further, and said that the revision was only one step in a long-term process to "dismantle the current structure." According to him, the NDJAMENA 00000020 002 OF 002 current views of President Omar al-Bachir and the regime in Khartoum focused on a level of pan-arabization and islamization which would divide the country, impede national unity, and prolong the suffering of the Darfurians. In order to alter this trend, the Darfurian people needed to be empowered. A review of the DPA with this objective would pave the way for national reconciliation. ¶7. (C) Speaking to United Nations Security Council Resolution 1706, Niam said that while the NRF welcomed the resolution's focus on protection for displaced persons and refugees, as well as humanitarian access, it could not accept the resolution's condemnation of the DPA non-signatories. Niam and Abdul Shafi both stated that the SLM and NRF would welcome an international force to enhance security in Darfur, and would be willing to coordinate their activities with the force if they were consulted in advance. - - - - - - - - - - - CHAD'S ROLE IN DARFUR - - - - - - - - - - - ¶8. (C) Niam told the Ambassador that while the Government of Chad was allowing for rebel representatives to pass unofficially through N'Djamena, the GOC appeared to be distancing itself from engagement with Sudanese rebel groups. GOC officials, for examples, had informally asked certain NRF officials to "keep a low profile" while in N'Djamena. Niam claimed that the GOC was not providing any military support to the NRF in Darfur, and that no NRF forces were in Chad. ¶9. (C) He also said that Sudan's patience with the Chadian rebel movement was also waning. Sources in Khartoum close to the NRF had reported that the regime was currently deciding whether to continue to support the rebel movement, as support for Chadian rebel groups have thus far been unsuccessful in toppling the Deby regime. Niam added that the Chadian military was continuing to reinforce its position along the Chad-Sudan border, and President Deby, according to NRF sources, was taking a more active role in commanding the Chadian National Army's operations in eastern Chad. ¶10. (U) Tripoli Minimize Considered. WALL