CHAD INTERETHNIC CONFLICT: "A POLITICAL CRISIS

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 02 NDJAMENA 000163 SIPDIS SENSITIVE SIPDIS E.O. 12958: N/A TAGS: PREL PREF CD SU SUBJECT: CHAD INTERETHNIC CONFLICT: "A POLITICAL CRISIS - FOR NOW" ¶1. (SBU) Summary: Leading "Chad watcher" Roland Marchal emphasized that resolving the Darfur crisis required pressure on President Deby - pressure on Khartoum was not enough. President Deby's calculated pitting of ethnic group against ethnic group in eastern Chad (for the sake of regime survival) risked seriously damaging Chad's social fabric. Marchal cautioned that what is now "just a political crisis" in Chad could well become something much more serious. End summary. ¶2. (SBU) The Ambassador and DCM met with Roland Marchal, Senior Research Fellow at the Paris-based Center for International Studies and Research on February 18 to discuss political developments in Chad. Marchal sees President Deby destroying the gains of the last 15 years of peace by fostering corruption, appointing family members to high-ranking positions and degrading the professional army through undeserved promotions and use of militias. Most pernicious, according to Marchal, is the destruction of the social and civil fabric by a policy of setting ethnic group against ethnic group - all for the sake of regime survival. HOW TO CREATE A FAILED STATE: SET GROUP AGAINST GROUP. -------------- -------------- ¶3. (SBU) Marchal pointed to the conflict between Zaghawa and Tama in the vicinity of Guereda in Dar Tama (the traditional home of the Tama ethnic group). Conflict had already broken out between these two groups (with the Tama at the receiving end) well before the signing of a peace agreement between Tama leader Mahamat Nour and the Government of Chad (GOC). The situation has further deteriorated: a full-blown feud between Mahamat Nour and Zaghawas of the Kobe sub-group appears to be in the works with Zaghawa pitted against demobilized FUC rebels (the latter now empowered by the recent peace accord). Although the government has recently taken steps to move the FUC troops elsewhere in Chad, the President was not stepping in to support the Zaghawa, according to Marchal, because he suspects them of supporting the Erdimi brothers against him. ¶4. (SBU) Another example offered by Marchal was that of the arming of the Dadjo tribes in Dar Sila to take on Chadian Arabs suspected of being aligned with Chadian rebels. Marchal recalled that in 2004 the Government of Chad had armed the Arabs because the Dadjo themselves were seen as "a problem." Now the situation was reversed ("the mirror image of Darfur") and Deby was fighting his wars by assembling militias and arming citizens to fight each other. (Comment: An International Red Cross Delegate based in Goz Beida informed DCM as well that the government had been arming Dadjo militias. End comment). .AND STAND BACK -------------- ¶5. (SBU) Marchal underscored that by these acts, the Chadian state could no longer be seen as able to impartially maintain security or administer justice. In setting tribe against tribe, Deby was "undoing the social bonds" which held Chad together. Furthermore, according to Marchal, by their unwavering support of President Deby, the French were complicit in helping Deby destroy the Chadian state DARFUR: "NATIONALIZE" THE CRISIS AND THEN RESOLVE -------------- --- ¶6. (SBU) Recognizing that the Chadian roots of the Darfur crisis run deep, Marchal argued that solving that crisis required a two step solution. First, the crisis must be "nationalized" - i.e. understood and dealt with according to the different circumstances in Chad and Sudan. While this approach might appear more time-consuming, two crises were in fact easier to deal with than one regional one according to Marchal. ¶7. (SBU) In Chad, Marchal singled out the importance of targeting those groups which are responsible for "transnationalizing" the conflict. He explained that JEM was the most dangerous Darfur rebel group - not for military reasons -- but for political reasons. JEM embodies the political and nationalist aspirations of the Kobe sub-group of the Zaghawa (note: President Deby is from the Bideyat sub-group). According to Marchal, the Kobe needed to be pressured - and at the same time reassured that they will not be eradicated by Khartoum. If Chadian support for JEM could be reduced, JEM's ability to operate in Darfur would be curtailed - its NDJAMENA 00000163 002.3 OF 002 credibility with the Darfur people called into question, and there would be greater pressure to return to the negotiating table. In sum: Darfurians need to be more realistic - and the only way to do this is to limit their resources and power. WAY FORWARD FOR CHAD? -------------- ¶8. (SBU) In the meantime, a creditable political process was needed in Chad which would bring in the Chadian armed opposition, and reduce President Deby's need to support his regime through Darfur rebel groups. By allowing greater political space, this process would also give Zaghawa Kobe "aspirants to the throne" a legitimate political process in which to engage. To clear the way, the international community should make it clear that it would not accept a Khartoum-staged regime change in Chad. ¶9. (SBU) In Marchal's view, a credible political process would include: -- an agreed division of power between the President and the Government; -- a process of national reconciliation - reaching to the communal level and including demobilization of militias; -- steps to ensure equitable allocation of oil resources; -- steps to improve delivery of government services; -- decentralization and empowerment of ministries; -- electoral reform (Marchal suggested that most political parties would be satisfied with an agreement on political party and campaign financing); and -- a clear understanding of the fate of the Head of State once he left office. ¶10. (SBU) And finally, the GOC needed to talk to the armed opposition - many of whose "preconditions" (such as Deby stepping down) were negotiating strategies which would be discarded under pressure. Comment -------------- ¶11. (SBU) Marchal has looked closely at the Chadian roots of the Darfur conflict, and is one of the best- informed "Chad watchers" on this subject. Post concurs that the situation in Chad cannot simply be understood as spillover from Darfur - rather, Chad's own political crisis feeds the Darfur crisis. A Chad-focused approach can assist in giving momentum to the Darfur peace process. ¶12. (U) Tripoli minimize considered. Wall