PRESIDENT DEBY BACKTRACKING ON UN FORCE IN EASTERN

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 NDJAMENA 000122 SIPDIS SIPDIS PARIS AND LONDON FOR AFRICA WATCHERS E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/06/2017 TAGS: PREF PREL KPKO CD SU SCRS SUBJECT: PRESIDENT DEBY BACKTRACKING ON UN FORCE IN EASTERN CHAD Classified By: S/CRS Charles Wintermeyer for reasons 1.4 (B) and (D) SUMMARY -------------- ¶1. (C) UN Assistant Secretary General for Peacekeeping Operations Hedi Annabi told the Ambassador in meetings February 5 and 6 that President Deby seems to have backtracked on deployment of a UN military peacekeeping force to eastern Chad. Instead, Deby's preference remains a civilian police (civpol) contingent, though he expresses a willingness to consider other modalities. Annabi said that Deby's position is a retreat from his December 9 letter to the Secretary General soliciting UN peacekeepers. Annabi stated that a civilian police presence absent a military component is not operationally viable. Asked whether Deby might be more receptive were the peacekeeping mandate limited to refugee camp protection, Annabi responded that Deby's current position is opposed to any UN blue helmets. In discussions with Annabi and other representatives of the diplomatic community in N'Djamena, suggestions floated for persuading Deby included a high-level intervention with him at the upcoming Franco-African Summit in Paris, a visit by the UN Secretary General or African Union President Kufor, or a combined SIPDIS demarche in N,Djamena by ambassadors of Security Council member states or a combined demarche by "friends of Chad" ambassadors to include the EU and Arab states. END SUMMARY ¶2. (U) ASG Annabi briefed the diplomatic community in N'Djamena February 5 on the outcome of the Technical Assessment Mission(TAM) in Chad. Accompanied by his special assistant Peter N. Due, he met with the Ambassador the following day before his departure for New York to seek the Ambassador's thoughts on how to proceed. The TAM team had visited Abeche, Adre, Farshana and Goz Beida. Annabi met with President Deby in Amtiman earlier in the day on February 5. In November, due to security concerns, the TAM team had not been able to travel to eastern Chad. Goals and Possible Force Composition -------------- ¶3. (C) Annabi articulated two goals for a UN force in eastern Chad. The first would be to protect civilian populations (including refugees, IDPs and local civilians). The second would be to dissuade and report on cross-border activities. He anticipated either a brigade size (5,000 soldiers) or a division size (10,000 soldiers) force composition. The force would also contain 1,000 civilian police (civpol), consisting of 200 UN police trainers and 800 Chadian police and gendarmes. Due to the difficulty in recruiting Francophone civpols for UN missions, he recommended that 500 Chadian police and 300 gendarmes be trained for a month. President Deby Now Backtracking -------------- ¶4. (C) Annabi expressed concern about his February 5 meeting with President Deby. In contrast to the unanimous support for a strong UN force expressed in meetings with officials during their travels through eastern Chad, Annabi observed, Deby was even more hesitant than he was in their meeting last November. According to Annabi, Deby now claimed it was the international community had asked for a UN force in Chad not the Government of Chad. Deby said the force he had in mind would only include civpols, not a military force. He feigned ignorance of the 9 December 2006 letter from the GoC to the UN requesting a multi-dimensional UN force for Chad. He reiterated that he had only agreed in principle to a UN force, but he nevertheless remains willing to continue discussions on the matter. Why The Backtracking? -------------- ¶5. (C) Annabi was not able to explain Deby,s retreat on the positioning of a UN force in eastern Chad, other than to note Deby,s pique over what he perceives as unequal treatment by the international community. Annabi described Deby as miffed over the attention the conflict in Darfur has received in comparison with Chad's own plight. He seemed to feel that the UN Security Council has not taken seriously Chad's complaints about attacks coming from Sudan. ¶6. (C) In discussions with Annabi and other diplomatic representatives, several other reasons were posited for Deby's reluctance on the UN force. For one, he perceives himself to hold the upper hand now. His forces in the East are now equipped with armed helicopters and night vision capability, plus he has a solid stream of oil revenues. Deby is also prickly about protecting Chad's sovereignty, fears provoking Sudan or Libya, and NDJAMENA 00000122 002 OF 002 lacks an understanding of peacekeeping operations (PKO). Although the GoS has agreed to a UN force in Chad, Qaddafi's opinion is still relevant for Deby. Also part of Deby,s strategy could be an attempt to get the UN Security Council to side with him in condemning Sudan and thus gaining its backing for his case that his problems originate entirely from his hostile neighbor. Could The Diplomatic Community Help Change Deby's Mind? -------------- -------------- ¶7. (C) Both during the general meeting with the diplomatic community (including representatives from France, China, the EU, and South Africa),and the follow-up meeting with the Ambassador, several ideas for making a UN force more acceptable to Deby were discussed. One was to deploy just a civpol force here without a military component. Annabi felt that was not realistic. The civpol had to have some kind of military protection. The only cases of which he was aware where civpols did not deploy with a UN military force were where there was some other military force deployed (such as NATO troops in Kosovo). Another proposal was to focus the PKO,s mandate on protecting refugees and IDP's, rather than on dealing with cross-border movements. Annabi did not believe that this would get much traction with Deby, since Deby seemed unreceptive to the whole ideal of a PKO that included military elements. ¶8. (C) Also discussed were steps that the international community could take to persuade Deby. One was a joint demarche, either from UNSC member-states represented in Chad, or from a larger group of friends of Chad to include the EU and Arab states represented here. Another was a visit to Chad by the UN Secretary General (which Annabi felt was unlikely) or by AU President Kufor. Perhaps the best starting point would be for the French and fellow African leaders to try to convince Deby at the Franco-African Summit next week. The French CDA agreed to raise this option with Paris. Contacts with Chadian Rebel Groups -------------- ¶9. (C) During the TAM's visit, the team met with the political opposition, but had no personal contact with rebel groups. However, in a telephone conversation, one rebel leader told a TAM member that they did not want a UN force, and would consider it as bolstering Deby,s position. However, the rebel leader made no threats. The TAM team expressed interest in pursuing contacts with Chadian rebel representatives, though it considered the matter less of a concern in view of the improvement in the security situation since its visit in November. Comment -------------- ¶10. (C) ASG Annabi's report is due to the Security Council by 15 February. In our view, the quickest way to get to Deby on this issue would be at the Franco-African Summit. The other measures discussed in para 8 have merit and should be explored as well. WALL