PRESIDENT DEBY BACKTRACKING ON UN FORCE IN EASTERN

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 NDJAMENA 000121 SIPDIS SIPDIS PARIS AND LONDON FOR AFRICA WATCHERS E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/06/2017 TAGS: CD KPKO PREF PREL SU SCRSERD SUBJECT: PRESIDENT DEBY BACKTRACKING ON UN FORCE IN EASTERN CHAD NDJAMENA 00000121 001.2 OF 003 -------------- -------------- CANCELATION - ZFR/ZFR THIS CABLE AS A NEW CABLE IS BEING SENT. -------------- -------------- NDJAMENA 00000121 002 OF 003 to Annabi, Deby now claimed it was the international community had asked for a UN force in Chad * not the Government of Chad. Deby said the force he had in mind would only include civpols, not a military force. He feigned ignorance of the 9 December 2006 letter from the GoC to the UN requesting a multi-dimensional UN force for Chad. He reiterated that he had only agreed in principle to a UN force, but he nevertheless remains willing to continue discussions on the matter. Why The Backtracking? -------------- ¶5. (C) Annabi was not able to explain Deby,s retreat on the positioning of a UN force in eastern Chad, other than to note Deby,s pique over what he perceives as &unequal treatment8 by the international community. Annabi described Deby as miffed over the attention the conflict in Darfur has received in comparison with Chad,s own plight. He seemed to feel that the UN Security Council has not taken seriously Chad,s complaints about attacks coming from Sudan. ¶6. (C) In discussions with Annabi and other diplomatic representatives, several other reasons were posited for Deby,s reluctance on the UN force. For one, he perceives himself to hold the upper hand now. His forces in the East are now equipped with armed helicopters and night vision capability, plus he has a solid stream of oil revenues. Deby is also prickly about protecting Chad,s sovereignty, fears provoking Sudan or Libya, and lacks an understanding of peacekeeping operations (PKO). Although the GoS has agreed to a UN force in Chad, Qaddafi,s opinion is still relevant for Deby. Also part of Deby,s strategy could be an attempt to get the UN Security Council to side with him in condemning Sudan and thus gaining its backing for his case that his problems originate entirely from his hostile neighbor. Could The Diplomatic Community Help Change Deby,s Mind? -------------- -------------- ¶7. (C) Both during the general meeting with the diplomatic community (including representatives from France, China, the EU, and South Africa),and the follow-up meeting with the Ambassador, several ideas for making a UN force more acceptable to Deby were discussed. One was to deploy just a civpol force here without a military component. Annabi felt that was not realistic. The civpol had to have some kind of military protection. The only cases of which he was aware where civpols did not deploy with a UN military force were where there was some other military force deployed (such as NATO troops in Kosovo). Another proposal was to focus the PKO,s mandate on protecting refugees and IDP,s, rather than on dealing with cross-border movements. Annabi did not believe that this would get much traction with Deby, since Deby seemed unreceptive to the whole ideal of a PKO that included military elements. ¶8. (C) Also discussed were steps that the international community could take to persuade Deby. One was a joint demarche, either from UNSC member-states represented in Chad, or from a larger group of &friends of Chad8 to include the EU and Arab states represented here. Another was a visit to Chad by the UN NDJAMENA 00000121 003 OF 003 Secretary SIPDIS General (which Annabi felt was unlikely) or by AU President Kufor. Perhaps the best starting point would be for the French and fellow African leaders to try to convince Deby at the Franco-African Summit next week. The French CDA agreed to raise this option with Paris. Contacts with Chadian Rebel Groups -------------- ¶9. (C) During the TAM,s visit, the team met with the political opposition, but had no personal contact with rebel groups. However, in a telephone conversation, one rebel leader told a TAM member that they did not want a UN force, and would consider it as bolstering Deby,s position. However, the rebel leader made no threats. The TAM team expressed interest in pursuing contacts with Chadian rebel representatives, though it considered the matter less of a concern in view of the improvement in the security situation since its visit in November. Comment -------------- ¶10. (C) ASG Annabi,s report is due to the Security Council by 15 February. In our view, the quickest way to get to Deby on this issue would be at the Franco-African Summit. The other measures discussed in para 8 have merit and should be explored as well. WALL