BAHAMAS MASS MIGRATION CONTINGENCY ASSESSMENT

C O N F I D E N T I A L NASSAU 000094 SIPDIS SIPDIS STATE FOR WHA/CAR RCBUDDEN E.O. 12958: DECL: 01/11/2017 TAGS: SMIG PREF PREL HA CU BF SUBJECT: BAHAMAS MASS MIGRATION CONTINGENCY ASSESSMENT REF: STATE 03439 Classified By: Charge d'Affaires, a.i. Brent Hardt for reasons 1.4(b) a nd (d) ¶1. (C) The following information is provided in response to reftel request, tracked to reftel questions: a. (C) Would your host government be willing to establish a camp to house at least 1,000 migrants interdicted by the U.S. during a mass migration? Would they be willing if the U.S. paid to build and run the camp? The Bahamian Government would not be willing to establih a camp unless the U.S. agreed to bear the cost to build and operate the camp. The USCG has prviously approached the Bahamian government as pat of planning for Operation Vigilant Sentry -- the USCG mass migration plan. During these discussions, the Director of Immigration expressed a willingness to provide temporary housing in The Bahamas as part of a response to mass migration. The Director expressed concern, however, regarding lack of Bahamian resources, budgeting, or planning for mass migration, and indicated that he would welcome U.S. involvement. During previous discussions with Poloff regarding mass migration planning, immigration officials openly acknowledged the lack of Bahamian planning and capacity to handle a mass migration, stating directly that the Bahamian government would rely almost entirely on significant assistance from the U.S. and the UN. At the political level, constructing a camp that housed people for long periods of time could be problematic. Moving migrants back to their home countries expeditiously would be a key ingredient for a successful cooperative effort. b. (C) Would the country be willing to establish such a camp if the U.S. is not taking any migrants, or only a few thousand, at GTMO? Would they be willing to have their camp act as a substitute to GTMO? Or would they only be willing to consider overflow at GTMO? It is unlikely that the Bahamas would want to be seen as a detention point of first resort. They would be much more willing to be able to cooperate with us in establishing a camp if it was clear to the Bahamian public that we were doing all we could to accommodate refugees and had maximized the capacity of our potential holding points. Bahamians recognize that their location between Haiti, Cuba and the U.S. could involve them willingly or unwillingly in any mass �00A;migration scenario in the Caribbean. The Bahamian government's likely need to turn to the US for assistance in the event of such a scenario could give the U.S. some leverage in securing cooperation on mass migration planning. The Bahamian government would likely face a some public backlash for accepting migrants captured in international or U.S. waters by the U.S. To overcome such potential local political sensitivities, advance planning and negotiation with the Bahamian government would be critical. c. (C) Would they be willing to take any migrants or only those from certain countries? The Bahamas would be more likely to accept migrants from Cuba, which they would view as more likely to pass through and not have any intention to remain. Haitian migrants would be less welcome, as Haitian migration is a politically charged issue in this country of only 315,000 persons with approximately 50,000 legal and illegal Haitians. Cuban migrants are currently governed by a bilateral agreement between The Bahamas and Cuba requiring repatriation within a short time frame. d. (C) Would their willingness to accept Cuban migrants interdicted by the U.S. be greater in a post-Fidel environment? Probably. The Bahamas is vulnerable to Cuban diplomatic pressure on migration issues out of fear of Cuba's future refusal to accept repatriated migrants and the threat of Cuba-directed migration to The Bahamas. If that threat was lower in a post-Castro Cuba, The Bahamas would be more likely to fully cooperate with the U.S. on Cuban migration issues. e. (C) Are there any political or bilateral issues that would be negatively impacted if we approach the country? No. U.S.-Bahamas cooperation on migration issues has been outstanding. The USCG has already approached the Director of Immigration on mass-migration issues, as have the UNHCR and Poloff. Approaching the Minister of Immigration and/or Foreign Ministry would be necessary to ensure adequate Cabinet support for potential cooperation. However, any such approach should be mindful of upcoming elections in The Bahamas, constitutionally due to be called by May, and the importance of illegal Haitian migration as a major issue in those elections. It is unlikely that the government would agree to host Haitian migrants not caught in Bahamian waters during a political campaign. f. (C) What size camp, in terms of numbers of migrants, do you think your host government would be willing to establish? If the U.S. is paying? If the government is paying? The Bahamas' immigration detention facility in Nassau can hold 500 persons in permanent housing and an additional 500 migrants in temporary tents. Permanent housing is at or near capacity simply in managing regular migration flows. Conditions in temporary tent facilities are substandard. Post estimates The Bahamas would be willing to house the additional 500 in tents in substandard conditions in Nassau for 2-3 weeks without U.S. support, provided those migrants were caught in Bahamian waters. According to the Director of Immigration, The Bahamas would also be willing to host an additional camp of approximately 1000 migrants, most likely on remote Great Inagua island, but would be able to do so only for a very short time without significant support. Conditions in Inagua would likely be substandard absent significant investment. Post believes The Bahamas could host a maximum of 2,000 on Great Inagua with considerable U.S. support. Securing Bahamian concurrence to house migrants not caught in Bahamian waters presents political problems, but these might be surmountable if the U.S. were willing to invest in long-sought upgrades to the harbor in Great Inagua. The Bahamian government has been eager to expand its maritime presence on its southern border near Haiti, and has repeatedly approached Post and U.S. military representatives for support in expanding the Royal Bahamas Defense Force base on Great Inagua, particularly including improvements to Matthew Town Harbor. If the US agreed to expand the harbor, and if the U.S. appropriately leveraged much needed assistance for mass migration through Bahamian waters, Bahamian support for holding of migrants not captured in Bahamian waters would be more likely. g. (C) Would the country want to run the camp or have the U.S. run it? If they run it, can we be confident that they will run it in accordance with international standards regarding treatment of migrants? Would they be willing to let the US run the camp. The Bahamas lacks the manpower or funding to run a camp independently to required standards. While The Bahamas would make every effort to run the camp in accordance with international standards, Post's observation of temporary housing at the Carmichael Road Immigrant Detention Center indicates that it would be unable to do so. The Bahamas would expect and welcome U.S. assistance, but would likely want to ensure Bahamian control and oversight of any operation on Bahamian soil. The solution is likely to be a cooperative operation, an option made possible by excellent U.S.-Bahamas law enforcement and defense relationships. h. (C) If the U.S. builds and runs the camp, would the host country expect/insist that we take in any migrants that land on their territory directly, in addition to those we interdict and transship to their land? Probably not. The Bahamian government would continue to operate its own detention center and interdiction activities. As noted, the U.S. and The Bahamas have a well-established and long-practiced agreement allowing U.S. migrant interdiction operations in Bahamian waters. Under that agreement, the Bahamian government is responsible for migrants caught in its waters and the USG is responsible for those caught outside Bahamian waters. ¶2. (C) COMMENT: Post understands that the USCG has completed one mass migration practice exercise involving The Bahamas, with a second planned for February. It also appears that UNHCR is independently developing a mass migration plan involving The Bahamas that may not have been coordinated with USCG or other US plans. END COMMENT. HARDT