Somalia Security: A Stagnant Insurgency

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 NAIROBI 000906 SIPDIS SIPDIS DEPT FOR AF/E AND A/S FRAZER E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/26/2017 TAGS: PGOV PREL PTER ASEC MOPS SO ET SUBJECT: Somalia Security: A Stagnant Insurgency REF: A) Nairobi 660 B) Nairobi 762 Classified by PolOff John O'Leary. Reasons 1.4 (b) and (d) -------------- Summary -------------- ¶1. (C) The Somali insurgency in Mogadishu remains deadly but does not appear to be spreading significantly throughout the country. Perpetrators include Islamic Courts remnants, marginalized Hawiye clan members, disaffected warlords, and common criminals; and they continue to terrorize the city's population. More neighborhoods are establishing armed watch groups to keep insurgents from launching attacks that invite Ethiopian retaliation, which lately tends to be indiscriminate artillery fire. Mogadishu residents are rearming to protect themselves from the insurgency and rising crime. Prime Minister Gedi attributes the relative calm of the last three nights to more aggressive patrolling by the TFG and the Ethiopians. End summary. -------------- Status of Insurgency -------------- ¶2. (U) Between January 28 and February 23, there were approximately 53 security incidents in Mogadishu aimed at destabilizing the Transitional Federal Government (TFG). These incidents included mortar fire, rocket propelled grenade (RPG) attacks, and use of personal weapons (AK-47, pistol, grenade) on TFG government and security installations, the port, Ethiopian encampments, and various individuals related to the pacification process. Press reporting indicates approximately 67 Somalis killed and something in excess of 220 wounded; mostly innocent civilian men, women, and children. Ethiopian and TFG counterattacks are said to account for at least 21 of the dead and more than 47 of the wounded. These figures do not include criminal activity or inter-clan clashes which are not evidently aimed at the demise of the TFG. ¶3. (U) Despite persistent government claims that remnants of the Islamic Courts are behind the continual stream of attacks and despite the claim by a Courts-affiliated group that it is indeed responsible for the violence (Reftels),the perpetrators remain unknown. Observers posit four categories of groups involved in the anti-TFG resistance: --Islamic Courts remnants; --Hawiye Clan members who feel marginalized under the TFG; --Warlords who feel marginalized by the TFG and see in the current strife an opportunity to enhance their positions; and --Thugs. How these groups might be organized or whether they cooperate is unknown. They all stand to benefit, however, from a weakened or disrupted TFG. ¶4. (U) Despite calls from al-Qaida's al-Zawahiri for the insurgents to wage a jihad against the TFG and the Ethiopians, there have been no suicide attacks since the attempt to kill TFG President Yusuf last September. (Comment: The Popular Resistance Movement in the Land of the Two Migrations (Reftel B) has stated on the Courts-affiliated website "Qaadisiya" that it will use suicide attacks against Ugandan and other AU peacekeepers. End Comment.) ¶5. (C) The attackers tend to target military and TFG facilities, including the port. They often miss, however. The patterns of attack indicate that the attacking groups are few in number and that the weapons types are not used in concert. As the primary attack weapon, mortars tend to be used against Ethiopian/TFG encampments, Villa Somalia, and the port. RPGs are used against moving vehicles, police stations, and hotels. Small arms are used against individuals and groups. -------------- Attack and Response -------------- ¶6. (C) The attackers are insensitive to Ethiopian retaliation against the neighborhoods from which they launch. There is a report, for instance, that on the night of February 19-20 a clan elder saw an attack group enter his area and asked them to leave. The group refused until after they had launched their mortars, and 10 innocent civilians died and 36 to 100 were wounded in the Ethiopian retaliation. Some observers believe that the insurgents choose to attack from certain areas in order to punish the inhabitants for not NAIROBI 00000906 002 OF 002 supporting their cause. ¶7. (U) In response, neighborhoods are forming their own armed "neighborhood watch" groups (Reftel B) to keep potential attackers out of their areas. In a conversation with Poloffs on February 23, Prime Minister Gedi stated that the TFG is actively encouraging neighborhood elders to form these groups. Watch members reportedly have set up roadblocks and searched vehicles at night in the Waaberi, Wardhiigleey, Gubta, Hodan, Siinaay, and al-Baraka neighborhoods; and other neighborhoods are following suit. An armed watch reportedly prevented insurgents from launching mortar rounds from a Mogadishu market in Hodan district on February 22. Although there appears to have been at least one success, it is too early to assess the effectiveness of these neighborhood watch groups. Gedi attributes the relative calm in Mogadishu the past three nights to more aggressive patrolling by the TFG and the Ethiopians. -------------- Noteworthy Events -------------- ¶8. (U) The fighting on the night of February 19-20 (para 6) was the most brutal since the insurgency began after the expulsion of the Islamic Courts from Mogadishu. Nonetheless, the insurgent attacks that began the killing were loud and frightening but caused little damage. Observers agree that the casualties resulted almost exclusively from Ethiopian artillery retaliation. ¶9. (U) Unknown attacker(s) tossed a hand grenade at the residence of the TFG's Trade minister in Mogadishu on February 13 - to no effect. Unknown gunmen then attacked the hotel where he was staying in Kismaayo on February 17. The second attack may be a coincidence since a trade minister is not normally a prime target. ¶10. (U) Unknown attacker(s) lobbed a hand grenade into the residence compound of Ayr sub-clan politician Dr. Mohamud Uluso in Mogadishu on February 17. (Uluso had led an Ayr delegation to Addis Ababa in early February and had participated in a civil society roundtable with A/S Frazer in Nairobi in January.) There were no injuries and no significant damage. ¶11. (U) A car carrying four passengers exploded on a street in Mogadishu on February 18, and the occupants were burned beyond recognition. The consensus is that the car was transporting explosives. No other details are available. ¶12. (U) Unknown gunmen murdered radio journalist Ali Omar in Baidoa on February 16. According to press reporting, three assailants ordered him to stop, then killed him when he attempted to flee. The circumstances suggest robbery as a motive rather than politics. ¶13. (U) Unknown gunmen in Mogadishu killed a district commissioner and a deputy district commissioner in separate incidents on February ¶21. Prime Minister Gedi told Poloffs on February 23 that these were assignations. -------------- Comment -------------- ¶14. (C) On the whole, these insurgent attacks have succeeded in spooking the population of Mogadishu, provoking the Ethiopians into indiscriminate counterattacks, and instilling doubts about the TFG's ability to establish control over the city. Crime, independent of insurgent attacks, is on the rise. There are reports that the city's inhabitants are rearming to protect themselves. The neighborhood watches may provide needed relief from the nightly fighting, but there is a risk that they could develop into new militias answerable to new warlords. RANNEBERGER