SOMALIA - KENYAN INTERDICTION OF TERRORISTS AND

S E C R E T NAIROBI 005404 SIPDIS NOFORN SIPDIS DEPT FOR AF/E, AF/RSA, AND A/S FRAZER E.O. 12958: DECL: 01/02/2017 TAGS: PGOV PREL PTER ASEC MOPS SO ET KE SUBJECT: SOMALIA - KENYAN INTERDICTION OF TERRORISTS AND ISLAMIC COURTS RADICALS Classified By: Ambassador Ranneberger for reasons 1.4 (b,d) ¶1. (C) As the leadership of the Islamic Courts and the high value targets of interest to us fled towards Kismayo, we urged the Kenyan government to reinforce security along the land and sea borders to interdict/deter/apprehend any of these individuals seeking to cross into Kenya. ¶2. (C) The Kenyans informed us that additional military, police, and naval assets were deployed. Recent information indicates that Kenya is vigorously patrolling the border. Within the past two days. One group (individuals not identified) that attempted to cross into Kenya was pushed back and, according to press reports, another group of 10 were arrested (individuals not identified). Throughout the current situation we have continued to share information with the Kenyan National Security Intelligence Service (NSIS) and with military intelligence, as well as other elements of the government. ¶3. (C) USG information on January 1 indicated that a group of 15-20 technicals was identified near the Liboi border crossing point, and the Kenyans were informed. ¶4. (S) The TFG and Ethiopians are also in close touch with the Kenyans on the border security issue. We suggested that the Ethiopians be in contact with the Kenyan National Security and Intelligence Director regarding their interest in possibly using an airstrip in northern Kenya to facilitate Ethiopian deployments in southern Somalia. ¶5. (S) On January 1, the TFG,s local representative informed us that Kenya,s Special Envoy on Somalia, Ambassador Affey, had traveled to Garissa in northern Kenya perhaps with the objective of facilitating the movement into Kenya of elements of the Islamic Courts. (Affey is an ethnic Somali of the Darood/Ogaden sub-clan who has contacts with some members of the Courts and is also rumored to be corrupt.) After learning of Affey,s presence in Garissa, the Ambassador spoke with Foreign Minister Tuju. Tuju said that the TFG has for a long time had problems with Affey so their information should be assessed accordingly. Nevertheless, Tuju said, he called Affey in Garissa. Affey, who is from Garissa, said he is there because his mother is sick, but admitted that he has been in contact with members of the Islamic Courts who are 40 kms from the Kenyan border. Tuju said that he would call the provincial commissioner to ensure that he keeps an eye on Affey. ¶6. (S) Tuju raised an issue relevant to interdiction efforts. He pointed out that Kenya has a legal responsibility to allow into Kenya legitimate refugees fleeing from Somalia. Refugees are only allowed in if they are crossing at an official border-crossing point. It would be possible, Tuju speculated, for members of the Islamic Courts and/or wanted terrorists to enter with others under the guise of being refugees. (The Kenyan government has a refugee screening facility at Liboi and takes fingerprints there, but we have no expectation that such screening would detect targets of interest. We are urging the Kenyan intelligence service to station personnel at the Liboi facility. Refugees remain at Liboi for 2-7 days, and are then taken to designated refugee camps. We also lack specific identifying data on most members of the Islamic Courts and on other radicals/jihadists/terrorists who might seek to enter Kenya, with the exception of some high value targets.) ¶7. (C) Having raised this issue, Tuju assured the Ambassador that Kenya completely shares U.S. objectives in wanting to stop Islamic Courts radicals and jihadists/terrorists from entering Kenya. In a discussion with the Ambassador January 1, Minister of Security Michuki provided the same assurance. ¶8. (S) The Mission is sending a team on January 2 to Garissa to facilitate information-sharing with Kenyan authorities to enhance border-patrolling efforts and refugee screening, and to help us better monitor Kenyan actions. RANNEBERGER