Kenya Election: Role of Religious Institutions

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 02 NAIROBI 004652 SIPDIS SENSITIVE SIPDIS DEPT FOR AF/E LONDON, PARIS FOR AFRICA WATCHER E.O.12958: N/A TAGS: PGOV KDEM KE SUBJECT: Kenya Election: Role of Religious Institutions REF: A. NAIROBI 4423 ¶B. NAIROBI 3609 Summary -------------- ¶1. (SBU) Kenya's vibrant religious institutions play an active role in public life. They have figured prominently in the run up to the 2007 general elections. From sponsoring civic education efforts to backing certain candidates, religious leaders from the Christian and Muslim communities have used the pulpit to achieve their interests. Much of this activism -- such as denouncing violence and promoting voter education -- has been positive. When religious leaders engage in partisan politics, however, controversy ensues, which only serves to highlight Kenya's ethnic and religious divisions. End Summary. Neutral Advocates for the Democratic Process -------------- ¶2. (SBU) In the run-up to the December 27 national elections, Kenya's diverse religious institutions have advocated vociferously for a range of interests. Much of this advocacy centers on the integrity of the electoral process. Prominent religious institutions, such as the National Council of Churches (NCCK) and the Supreme Council of Muslims (SUPKEM),routinely declare their neutrality and encourage members to make their own decisions. ¶3. (SBU) Some institutions, such as the NCCK and the Kenya Council of Imams and Ulema (KCIU) also conduct civic education programs. NCCK's program is specifically aimed at combating voter apathy and helping voters determine how to judge candidates against their priorities. NCCK and SUPKEM also plan to participate as domestic election observers. ¶4. (SBU) Religious organizations of all stripes have also implored political parties to refrain from violence. In September, the Inter-Religious Forum (which includes Christians, Muslims, and Hindus) and UNDP brought political parties together to sign a pact against election violence. Advocating for Traditional Interests versus Taking Sides -------------- ¶5. (SBU) Religious activism has taken on ecclesiastical and community interests as well. While some positions are clearly in line with church doctrine -- such as the Catholic Bishops' Conference of Kenya calling for aspiring leaders to reject abortion, euthanasia, and the death penalty -- other leaders' declarations have been more political and have correspondingly sparked controversy. ¶6. (SBU) Cardinal John Njue made headlines in October when he spoke out against the establishment of federalism (majimbo),for which opposition candidates Raila Odinga and Kalonzo Musyoka have both advocated (ref A). Some accused Njue (a Kikuyu) of supporting President Kibaki (another Kikuyu) out of ethnic solidarity. Other Catholic bishops later denied that Njue's comments reflected the position of the Catholic Church. ¶7. (SBU) Apart from the majimbo debate, presidential aspirants' courting of the Muslim vote has caused the most controversy this year. Muslims represent only 10 percent of the population and have never voted as a bloc, but the close presidential race has created an incentive for candidates to outline how they will address the community's grievances. ¶8. (SBU) To show his sympathy with Muslim interests, President Kibaki established a Presidential Action Committee to investigate complaints that Muslims suffer unfair discrimination and declared the Islamic holy day of Eid ul Adha a national holiday. Opposition Orange Democratic Movement (ODM) candidate Raila Odinga signed a Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) with the National NAIROBI 00004652 002 OF 002 Muslim Leaders' Forum (NAMLEF) promising to attend to the community's needs in exchange for their support. Candidate Advocacy, Secrecy Lead to Fearmongering, Division -------------- ¶9. (SBU) KCIU representative Musa Mwale told PolOff that NAMLEF wanted the contents of its MOU with Odinga to remain confidential because they believed it would encourage other presidential candidates to conclude similar agreements with them. (Note: KCIU is one of NAMLEF's member organizations. End Note.) ¶10. (SBU) If this is true, NAMLEF grossly miscalculated. Shortly after the agreement was concluded, a false version of the MOU (likely created by Kibaki supporters) was widely publicized, claiming that if elected, Odinga would "recognize Islam as the only true religion," require non-Islamic religious activities in Coast Province to be approved by an Islamic council, ban alcohol, and impose strict Islamic restrictions on women's dress. ¶11. (SBU) While the fake MOU was inflammatory and hardly plausible (Odinga is Anglican),it generated negative publicity for Odinga and exposed ethnic rifts in both the Islamic and Christian communities. In late November, Christian church leaders from Western, Nyanza, and Rift Valley Provinces (Luo, Luhya, and Kalenjin dominated areas) supported Odinga and implied that Christian leaders in Kikuyu-dominated areas of Central Province were promoting (or at least tolerating) a sectarian hate campaign against Odinga. The leaders also accused groups in Kikuyu-dominated communities of holding "oathing ceremonies" to enforce Kikuyu electoral solidarity and rituals to curse political opponents - practices associated most recently with the organized crime syndicate Mungiki. (In fact, there have been no credible reports of such practices in Kikuyu communities in recent times, outside the Mungiki.) ¶12. (SBU) As for the Muslims, the MOU brought out divisions between coastal and ethnic Somali Muslims, who received perks in the MOU, and the rest of their brethren in faith. "Upcountry Muslims" and various pro-Kibaki or neutral Muslim associations complained of the presumptiousness of NAMLEF to negotiate on behalf of the entire community. ¶13. (SBU) In late November, ODM and NAMLEF belatedly released the real MOU, but it did little to unify Muslim leaders. The contents were hardly inflammatory and closely matched Odinga's public promises to the Muslim community (e.g., redress historical marginalization with targeted development, end discrimination and human rights abuses, including the alleged rendition of Kenyans to Somalia, Ethiopia, and Guantanamo Bay, etc.). SUPKEM officials rejected it, however, claiming that NAMLEF had no authority to speak on behalf of Kenya's Muslims. SUPKEM's rejection was perhaps understandable, as the group's Secretary General had already endorsed President Kibaki. Perhaps more importantly, Odinga's MOU promise to "embrace NAMLEF as his partner of choice" and accord it an advisory role in his administration could significantly diminish SUPKEM's influence if Odinga wins. Comment -------------- ¶14. (SBU) Ethnic identity has always commanded a stronger allegiance than religious affinity when Kenyans go to the ballot box. At their best, Kenya's religious institutions have played a positive role, encouraging people to vote according to their principles rather than their fears. This election season has also shown, however, that religious leaders who choose to engage in partisan politics risk entangling their institutions in highly charged and ethnically-driven campaign controversies, possibly to the detriment of their flock's unity. RANNEBERGER