LOOKING FOR MR. KABUGA: POSSIBLE SIGNS OF

C O N F I D E N T I A L NAIROBI 004630 SIPDIS SIPDIS E.O. 12958: DECL: 03/18/2027 TAGS: KCRM KE PGOV PHUM PREL SUBJECT: LOOKING FOR MR. KABUGA: POSSIBLE SIGNS OF INCREASED KENYAN GOVERNMENT COOPERATION WITH ICTR REF: A. 06 NAIROBI 5301 ¶B. 07 NAIROBI 1416 ¶C. 07 NAIROBI 3739 Classified By: Political Officer Samuel Madsen for reasons 1.4 (b,d). ¶1. (U) SUMMARY: Chief Prosecutor Jallow of the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR) met on 29 November with Kenyan Foreign Minister Tuju. FM Tuju promised Jallow that he would press for the Kenyan government to increase its cooperation with the ICTR's efforts to find and apprehend indicted Rwandan war criminal Felicien Kabuga. END SUMMARY ¶2. (U) On 29 November Poloff attended a meeting between the Friends of the ICTR and Chief Prosecutor Jallow hosted by the Canadian High Commission. Prosecutor Jallow began by thanking the members of the Friends group for their efforts to convince the Kenyan government to fully cooperate with the ICTR prosecutors. Jallow believes these efforts made possible his first ever meeting with Kenyan Foreign Minister Tuju, held earlier that morning (see COMMENT for information on the joint Friends demarche to the Kenyan Foreign Ministry). During the meeting, Tuju claimed he had been kept in the dark as to the status of the ICTR's efforts to determine if Kabuga is in Kenya. He was unaware that the ICTR had determined Kabuga had bank accounts in Kenya until recently and claimed the Foreign Ministry had not been kept up to date on the progress of the case by the police and intelligence services. ¶3. (U) Jallow told Tuju that the ICTR's mandate is to assist the Kenyan police in searching for Kabuga, not to find him themselves. He noted that early in their investigation Kenyan intelligence officials had shown ICTR investigators a large file on Kabuga, but had never allowed them to examine its contents. He also noted that the ICTR investigators had been unable to gain Kenyan government cooperation in interviewing certain Kenyan citizens, including former government officials, regarding their ties to Kabuga. Furthermore, he described the ICTR's unsuccessful efforts to petition the Kenyan government to freeze bank accounts and other assets identified as being owned or controlled by Kabuga. For his part Tuju admitted that some officials in the government may have ties to Kabuga. He also accepted that corruption within the government and law enforcement agencies could be impeding the investigation. Jallow responded by pointing out that time is short because the ICTR's mandate expires at the end of ¶2008. ¶4. (U) Tuju responded to Jallow's presentation by declaring he would immediately discuss this matter with President Kibaki and seek his support. He further promised to provide a letter to Jallow on Friday, 30 November, giving assurances the Kenyan government will cooperate more fully with the ICTR, including a timetable for specific actions to be taken. Tuju and Jallow agreed the Foreign Ministry will be the focal point between the Kenyan government and the ICTR. Tuju also pledged that he would work with other Kenyan government agencies to get their cooperation for the ICTR's efforts and specifically promised to meet with the Attorney General to discuss freezing Kabuga's Kenyan assets. ¶5. (U) Jallow noted that Tuju was not specific on the timelines his letter would propose. Jallow promised to provide a copy of the letter to the Friends as soon as he received it. The UK representative observed that these statements were not new and the ICTR and the Friends had heard similar things before. He added that he would be surprised if Tuju had actually been as ignorant of the status of the ICTR's investigation and the lack of Kenyan cooperation as he claimed. Other participants noted that Tuju's indluence within the Kenyan government is limited, particularly over the security services. ¶6. (U) Jallow agreed that, while the message from Tuju was positive, the Friends must keep up their pressure on the government. He said he would wait to see what was in Tuju's letter before making any decision as to whether or not he will have to refer the Kenyans to the UN Security Council as being uncooperative in the Kabuga investigation. ¶7. (U) The representatives of the Friends agreed that little effective action is likely during the next month as the Kenyan electoral campaign concludes. While agreeing Tuju's statements were positive no one believed any major turning point has been reached. There was also skepticism Tuju would be able to produce a letter with firm proposals in only one day. All agreed it would be a good idea to continue pressure on the Kenyan government to fully cooperate with the ICTR. ¶8. (C) COMMENT: DCM Slutz represented the USG at a November 6 meeting with MFA Permanent Secretary Thuita Mwangi at which the Canadian High Commissioner, on behalf of the Friends of the ICTR, regretted that GOK officials had been "unavailable" to meet with Jallow in September, 2007 and formally requested that the GOK/MFA reconsider its formal October 11 response to the Canadians and Jallow that "during the months of November/December 2007, Mr. Jallow will not be able to get the appointments as requested." The Canadian and other embassy representatives highlighted the need for Kenya to meet with Jallow so that he could include the Kenyan response in his end of the year report to the UNSC. They pointed out that failure to cooperate with Jallow would compel the UNSC to take action to sanction Kenya. The Canadian High Commissioner also handed Mwangi a copy of the September 24, 2007 letter from Jallow to Minister of Interior Michuki, Minister of Justice Kaura, and AG Wako which outlines that the joint Kenyan police-ICTR Task Force has found that Kabuga was issued with a Kenyan entry and work permit (no. 772865) on April 1995 and that he did enter and carry on business in Kenya; that while the Task Force cannot confirm Kabuga's current whereabouts, there have been sightings of him in Kenya between 2002 and October 30, 2006; and that he has business interests and bank accounts in Nairobi. The Canadian High Commissioner and others also pressed MFA to encourage the Kenyan National Intelligence Service (NSIS) to be more cooperative and forthcoming in sharing information it has on Kabuga with the joint Kenyan Police-ICTR Task Force set up to investigate the presence and activities of Kabuga in Kenya. The MFA Permanent Secretary stated that he was uninformed about GOK efforts to find Kabuga and he promised that he would put GOK - specifically NSIS --cooperation on the agenda for the November 7 Kenyan National Security Council meeting. We have not been informed of the outcome of the Kenyan Security Council deliberations on GOK, particularly NSIS, cooperation but Tuju's willingness to cooperate may be the result of such deliberations. ¶9. (C) It is likely that Tuju is well aware of the need for Prosecutor Jallow to report to the UNSC on Kenya's level of cooperation within the next few weeks. His promise of a new committment to cooperate with the ICTR may be sincere, but may also be an effort to dealy a negative report to the UNSC. Unless Tuju's promised letter provides compelling assurances of specific concrete action Jallow may have little choice but to report that Kenya continues to fail in it's obligation's to assist the ICTR's investigation. Even if Tuju's claims of renewed cooperation are sincere, the electoral campaign in Kenya is reaching its climax and at least a majority of the cabinet members are expected to be replaced. There is little likelihood any senior government officials will make a substantial effort to increase cooperation with the ICTR until the new administration and cabinet take office. RANNEBERGER