LOOKING FOR MR. KABUGA: POSSIBLE SIGNS OF

C O N F I D E N T I A L NAIROBI 004630

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 03/18/2027
TAGS: KCRM KE PGOV PHUM PREL
SUBJECT: LOOKING FOR MR. KABUGA: POSSIBLE SIGNS OF
INCREASED KENYAN GOVERNMENT COOPERATION WITH ICTR

REF: A. 06 NAIROBI 5301

B. 07 NAIROBI 1416

C. 07 NAIROBI 3739

Classified By: Political Officer Samuel Madsen for reasons 1.4 (b,d).


1. (U) SUMMARY: Chief Prosecutor Jallow of the
International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR) met on 29
November with Kenyan Foreign Minister Tuju. FM Tuju promised
Jallow that he would press for the Kenyan government to
increase its cooperation with the ICTR's efforts to find and
apprehend indicted Rwandan war criminal Felicien Kabuga. END
SUMMARY


2. (U) On 29 November Poloff attended a meeting between
the Friends of the ICTR and Chief Prosecutor Jallow
hosted by the Canadian High Commission. Prosecutor Jallow
began by thanking the members of the Friends group for
their efforts to convince the Kenyan government to fully
cooperate with the ICTR prosecutors. Jallow believes these
efforts made possible his first ever meeting with Kenyan
Foreign Minister Tuju, held earlier that morning (see COMMENT
for information on the joint Friends demarche to the Kenyan
Foreign Ministry). During the meeting, Tuju claimed he had
been kept in the dark as to the status of the ICTR's efforts
to determine if Kabuga is in Kenya. He was unaware that
the ICTR had determined Kabuga had bank accounts in Kenya
until recently and claimed the Foreign Ministry had not been
kept up to date on the progress of the case by the police and
intelligence services.


3. (U) Jallow told Tuju that the ICTR's mandate is to
assist the Kenyan police in searching for Kabuga, not to
find him themselves. He noted that early in their
investigation Kenyan intelligence officials had shown ICTR
investigators a large file on Kabuga, but had never allowed
them to examine its contents. He also noted that the
ICTR investigators had been unable to gain Kenyan government
cooperation in interviewing certain Kenyan citizens,
including former government officials, regarding their ties
to Kabuga. Furthermore, he described the ICTR's
unsuccessful efforts to petition the Kenyan government to
freeze bank accounts and other assets identified as being
owned or controlled by Kabuga. For his part Tuju admitted
that some officials in the government may have ties to
Kabuga. He also accepted that corruption within the
government and law enforcement agencies could be impeding the
investigation. Jallow responded by pointing out that time is
short because the ICTR's mandate expires at the end of

2008.


4. (U) Tuju responded to Jallow's presentation by
declaring he would immediately discuss this matter with
President
Kibaki and seek his support. He further promised to provide
a letter to Jallow on Friday, 30 November, giving
assurances the Kenyan government will cooperate more fully
with the ICTR, including a timetable for specific actions
to be taken. Tuju and Jallow agreed the Foreign Ministry
will be the focal point between the Kenyan government and
the ICTR. Tuju also pledged that he would work with other
Kenyan government agencies to get their cooperation for the
ICTR's efforts and specifically promised to meet with the
Attorney General to discuss freezing Kabuga's Kenyan assets.


5. (U) Jallow noted that Tuju was not specific on the
timelines his letter would propose. Jallow promised to
provide a copy of the letter to the Friends as soon as he
received it. The UK representative observed that these
statements were not new and the ICTR and the Friends had
heard similar things before. He added that he would be
surprised if Tuju had actually been as ignorant of the status
of the ICTR's investigation and the lack of Kenyan
cooperation as he claimed. Other participants noted that
Tuju's indluence within the Kenyan government is limited,
particularly over the security services.


6. (U) Jallow agreed that, while the message from Tuju
was positive, the Friends must keep up their pressure on
the government. He said he would wait to see what was in
Tuju's letter before making any decision as to whether or not
he will have to refer the Kenyans to the UN Security Council
as being uncooperative in the Kabuga investigation.


7. (U) The representatives of the Friends agreed that
little effective action is likely during the next month as
the Kenyan electoral campaign concludes. While agreeing
Tuju's statements were positive no one believed any major
turning point has been reached. There was also skepticism
Tuju would be able to produce a letter with firm proposals
in only one day. All agreed it would be a good idea to
continue pressure on the Kenyan government to fully cooperate

with the ICTR.


8. (C) COMMENT: DCM Slutz represented the USG at a
November 6 meeting with MFA Permanent Secretary Thuita Mwangi
at
which the Canadian High Commissioner, on behalf of the
Friends of the ICTR, regretted that GOK officials had been
"unavailable" to meet with Jallow in September, 2007 and
formally requested that the GOK/MFA reconsider its formal
October 11 response to the Canadians and Jallow that "during
the months of November/December 2007, Mr. Jallow will not
be able to get the appointments as requested." The Canadian
and other embassy representatives highlighted the need for
Kenya to meet with Jallow so that he could include the Kenyan
response in his end of the year report to the UNSC. They
pointed out that failure to cooperate with Jallow would
compel the UNSC to take action to sanction Kenya. The
Canadian
High Commissioner also handed Mwangi a copy of the September
24, 2007 letter from Jallow to Minister of Interior Michuki,
Minister of Justice Kaura, and AG Wako which outlines that
the joint Kenyan police-ICTR Task Force has found that Kabuga
was issued with a Kenyan entry and work permit (no. 772865)
on April 1995 and that he did enter and carry on business in
Kenya; that while the Task Force cannot confirm Kabuga's
current whereabouts, there have been sightings of him in
Kenya
between 2002 and October 30, 2006; and that he has business
interests and bank accounts in Nairobi. The Canadian High
Commissioner and others also pressed MFA to encourage the
Kenyan National Intelligence Service (NSIS) to be more
cooperative and forthcoming in sharing information it has on
Kabuga with the joint Kenyan Police-ICTR Task Force set up
to investigate the presence and activities of Kabuga in
Kenya. The MFA Permanent Secretary stated that he was
uninformed about GOK efforts to find Kabuga and he promised
that he would put GOK - specifically NSIS --cooperation on
the agenda for the November 7 Kenyan National Security
Council meeting. We have not been informed of the outcome of
the
Kenyan Security Council deliberations on GOK, particularly
NSIS, cooperation but Tuju's willingness to cooperate may be
the result of such deliberations.


9. (C) It is likely that Tuju is well aware of the need
for Prosecutor Jallow to report to the UNSC on Kenya's level
of cooperation within the next few weeks. His promise of a
new committment to cooperate with the ICTR may be sincere,
but may also be an effort to dealy a negative report to the
UNSC. Unless Tuju's promised letter provides compelling
assurances of specific concrete action Jallow may have little
choice but to report that Kenya continues to fail in it's
obligation's to assist the ICTR's investigation. Even if
Tuju's claims of renewed cooperation are sincere, the
electoral campaign in Kenya is reaching its climax and at
least a majority of the cabinet members are expected to be
replaced. There is little likelihood any senior government
officials will make a substantial effort to increase
cooperation with the ICTR until the new administration and
cabinet take office.

RANNEBERGER