RESPONSE TO REQUEST FOR INFORMATION ON HOST

UNCLAS NAIROBI 004550 SIPDIS SIPDIS DEPARTMENT FOR S/CT KEN MCKUNE, NCTC, AND DHS E.O. 12958: N/A TAGS: KVPR PTER PREL PGOV PINR CVIS ASEC KHLS KE SUBJECT: RESPONSE TO REQUEST FOR INFORMATION ON HOST GOVERNMENT PRACTICES - INFORMATION COLLECTION, SCREENING, AND SHARING REF: STATE 133921 ¶1. (SBU) U.S. Mission Kenya provides the following on host government practices in response to REFTEL. ¶A. Watchlisting: -- If host government maintains a "watchlist," how many records does the watchlist contain, and how many are terrorist-related? Answer: The GoK/Immigration has approximately four thousand (4000) persons watchlisted and twelve thousand documents. We do not know how many of these are terrorist-related. -- Which ministry or office maintains the watchlist? Answer: The Kenyan Department of Immigration. Other agency's may maintain their own "watchlist" but they have to submit a request to Immigration to have the name or document placed on the "official" watchlist. ¶B. Traveler Information Collection: -- What are the country's policies (legislation, mandates, etc.) on collecting information from travelers arriving in the country? Answer: We do not have specific information. -- Are there different policies for air, sea, and land entry and for domestic flights? Answer: Not to our Knowledge -- Who collects traveler information? Answer: The Kenyan Department of Immigration. They may pass the entry/departure cards to the Tourist board for their use. -- What are the policies of the collecting agency to share that information with foreign governments? Answer: No observed set policy -- Does the host government collect Passenger Name Record (PNR) data on incoming commercial flights or vessels? Is this data used for intelligence or law enforcement purposes to screen travelers? Does host government have any existing treaties to share PNR data? Answer: The Kenyan Airport Authority (KAA) does receive the flight manifests but the information is not passed in a timely manner to security entities to pre-screen passengers. -- If applicable, have advance passenger information systems (APIS),interactive advanced passenger information systems (IAPIS),or electronic travel authority systems been effective at detecting other national security threats, such as wanted criminals? Answer: No information available. ¶C. Border Control and Screening: -- Does the host government employ software to screen travelers of security interest? Answer: Yes, they use the US funded PISCES system at three airports; JKIA, Mombasa and Wilson. The system is not deployed at any other sites. The sites without the PISCES system do not have any computer systems and the method of data collection is by hand. Each site has a printed "watchlist", which is only referenced when a traveler is sent to the Secondary for further questioning. -- Are all travelers tracked electronically or only non-host- country nationals? What is the frequency of travelers being "waived through" because they hold up what appears to be an appropriate document, but whose information is not actually recorded electronically? What is the estimated percentage of non-recorded crossings, entries and exits? Answers: At site where the PISCES system is in use approximately 95% of the travelers are entered into the system. They process all travelers, local and foreign. It has been observed on many occasions where the host nation personnel do not enter travelers into the system if they are in the line to obtain a entry visa and have a western (US, CAN, EU, JAP, etc.) passport. At the border crossings many travelers have been observed being waived through as "local traders". The rough estimate of these types of "local traders" passing through without being recorded can be as high as 70%. -- Do host government border control officials have the authority to use other criminal data when making decisions on who can enter the country? If so, please describe this authority (legislation, mandates, etc). Answer: Immigration has limited access to "other" databases. However, such access is often based on personal relationships of individual officers. Depending on the agency that made the discovery of a suspect individual it might take the involvement of the various heads of agencies in order for information be shared. The Kenyan Immigration Act Chapter 172 Laws of Kenya Section 10-16 gives the Kenya Immigration Department the authority to question, detain or deny entry into the country under and provides guidelines on the administration, offenses and legal proceedings. The same section also confers powers to the Kenya Police Service to perform the functions of immigrations officers. -- What are the host government's policies on questioning, detaining and denying entry to individuals presenting themselves at a point of entry into the country? Which agency would question, detain, or deny entry? Answer: Immigration would be the first to "detain" a traveler. They would then deny them entry and send them back onto the flight they arrived, pursue prosecution for violations of the "Immigration Act" or hand them over to the appropriate security office (Criminal Investigation Division (CID),Anti Terrorist Police Unit (ATPU), Police, etc.) -- How well does information sharing function within the host government, e.g., if there is a determination that someone with a valid host-government visa is later identified with terrorism, how is this communicated and resolved internally? Answer: The identifying office or agency would write a letter to Immigration and ask that the suspect be added to the "watchlist". This can be a very slow process and the finial decision to add a suspect to the "watchlist" is held by the Director of Immigration. ¶D. Biometric Collection: -- Are biometric systems integrated for all active POEs? What are the systems and models used? Anwswer: No, but at the PISCES sites the host nation officials can take digital fingerprints and photographs in secondary only but the data is not compared to any database. The users would have to send the data out for confirmation. -- Are all passengers screened for the biometric or does the host government target a specific population for collection (i.e. host country nationals)? Do the biometric collection systems look for a one to one comparison (ensure the biometric presented matches the one stored on the e-Passport) or one to many comparison (checking the biometric presented against a database of known biometrics)? Answer: Host nation does not have that capibilty. -- If biometric systems are in place, does the host government know of any countermeasures that have been used or attempted to defeat biometric checkpoints? Answer: N/A -- What are the host government's policies on collecting the fingerprints of travelers coming into the country? Anaswer: Only those found with immigration offenses are finger- printed. There is no policy on fingerprinting regular travelers. -- Which agency is responsible for the host government's fingerprint system? Answer: The CID, under the Kenya Police Service, is responsible for the criminal fingerprint system, while the Kenya National Registration Bureau under the Ministry of Immigration and Regristration of Persons collects fingerprints for the issuance of National Identification Cards. -- Are the fingerprint programs in place NIST, INT-I, EFTS, UK1 or RTID compliant? Answer: Unknown -- Are the fingerprints collected as flats or rolled? Which agency collects the fingerprints? Answer: Fingerprints are rolled. ¶E. Passports: -- If the host government issues a machine-readable passport containing biometric information, does the host government share the public key required to read the biometric information with any other governments? If so, which governments? Answer: The host nation passport do not currently contain any biometric information. -- Does the host government issue replacement passports for full or limited validity (e.g. the time remaining on the original passports, fixed validity for a replacement, etc.)? Answer: The GOK issues a (1) one year replacement passport which requires the holder to renew the limited validity passport. -- Does the host government have special regulations/procedures for dealing with "habitual" losers of passports or bearers who have reported their passports stolen multiple times? Answer: No, there is an annotation on the replacement passport stamped in by Kenyan Immigration indicating that the holder was previously issued a passport and the previously issued pasport number. -- Are replacement passports of the same or different appearance and page length as regular passports (do they have something along the lines of our emergency partial duration passports)? Answer: The replacement passports are the same in appearance and page length of regular passports, with a stamp indicating the previously issued passport. -- Do emergency replacement passports contain the same or fewer biometric fields as regular-issue passports? Answer: Same. -- Where applicable, has Post noticed any increase in the number of replacement or "clean" (i.e. no evidence of prior travel) passports used to apply for U.S. visas? Answer: No. Kenyan citizens are aware of the fingerprint scan required during the visa interview process and its ability to cross reference previous applications. Passports are either newly issued or older passports are provided. -- Are replacement passports assigned a characteristic number series or otherwise identified? Answer: Replacement passports are characterized by the stamped annotation from Kenyan Immigration indicating the bearer was previously issued a passport and it will only be valid for (1) one year. ¶F. Fraud Detection - How robust is fraud detection and how actively are instances of fraud involving documents followed up? Answer: The host government will follow up on all requests from post's fraud detection unit; however, post would spend too much time following up on all instances of fraud involving fraudulent documents so applicants who provide questionable documents are denied during the visa interview and post maintains files to identify specific trends. -- How are potentially fraudulently issued documents taken out of circulation, or made harder to use? Answer: Documents are not taken out of circulation and Kenya has a number of document vendors that will sell forged or poorly copied documents even after they are identifiable by Kenyan authorities and post officials. ¶G. Privacy and Data Security -- What are the country's policies on records related to the questioning, detention or removal of individuals encountered at points of entry into the country? How are those records stored, and for how long? -- What are the country's restrictions on the collection or use of sensitive data? -- What are the requirements to provide notice to the public on the implementation of new databases of records? -- Are there any laws relating to security features for government computer systems that hold personally identifying information? -- What are the rules on an individual's ability to access data that homeland security agencies hold about them? -- Are there different rules for raw data (name, date of birth, etc.) versus case files (for example, records about enforcement actions)? -- Does a non-citizen/resident have the right to sue the government to obtain these types of data? Answer: Unknown. ¶H. Immigration Data Bases: -- What computerized immigration databases are used to track entries and exits? Answer: PISCES and MSAccess -- Is the immigration database available at all ports of entry (POEs)? Answer: No. -- If immigration databases are available at some POEs, but not all, how does the host government decide which POEs will receive the tool? Answer: PISCES in deployed and in use at; JKIA, Mombasa and Wilson (NBO) Airports. Where PISCES is in use in a function of US funding of the project. -- What problems, if any, limit the effectiveness of the systems? For example, limited training, power brownouts, budgetary restraints, corruption, etc.? Answer: Power availability and brownouts, limited budgets and corruption are all issues. -- How often are national immigration databases updated? Answer: Where PISCES is installed it occurs in near real-time. ¶I. Watchlist and Information Sharing: -- Is there a name-based watchlist system used to screen travelers at POEs? Answer: Yes, at sites where PISCES is installed it is via computer software and at other sites it is in written form generated with MSAccess and delivered to the site. -- What domestic sources of information populate the name-based watchlist, i.e. names of deported persons, terrorist lookouts, criminal wants/warrants? Answer: All of the above mentioned -- What international watchlists do the host government use for screening individuals, e.g. Interpol or TSA No Fly lists, UN, etc.? Answer: The Host nation does have access to the Interpol database but not at the POE. The host nation has not entered the Interpol data in the PISCES system. The Airlines have access to the TSA No SIPDIS Fly lists but it appears that the host nation officials do not. -- What bilateral/multilateral watchlist agreements exist between host government and its neighbors? Answer: Unknown. ¶J. Biometrics: -- Are biometric systems in place at ports of entry (air, land, sea)? If no, does host government have plans to install such a system? Answer: No and unknown. -- If biometric systems are available at some POEs, but not all, how does the host government decide which POEs will receive the tool? Answer: N/A -- What biometric technologies, if any, does the host government use, i.e. fingerprint identification, facial recognition, iris recognition, hand geometry, retinal identification, DNA-based identification, keystroke dynamics, gait analysis? Are the systems ICAO compliant? Answer: N/A -- Does the host government issue a machine-readable passport containing biometric information? If e-Passports are issued, what biometric information is included on the document, i.e. fingerprint, iris, facial recognition, etc? If not, does host government plan to issue a biometric document in the future? When? Answer: The Host nation does not currently issue machine-readable passportcontaining biometric information. The host nation just awarded a tender for a new passport issuance system and it does not currently include biometrics. It is unknown when the host nation will have a system to issue passport containing biometric information. ¶K. Identifying Appropriate Partners: Department would appreciate post's assessment of whether host government would be an appropriate partner in data sharing. Considerations include whether host government watchlists may include political dissidents (as opposed or in addition to terrorists),and whether host governments would share or use U.S. watchlist data inappropriately, etc. Answer: In recent years Kenya has emerged from a long period in which political oppression was common. While the government has largely moved away from many such practices it is yet to be seen if the reforms will be permanent. The question of whether or not the Kenyan government would be an appropriate partner for data sharing would require careful evaluation, with a close eye on the attitudes and practices of whoever wins the upcoming presidential elections. -- Are there political realities which would preclude a country from entering into a formal data-sharing agreement with the U.S? Answer: Very possible, as counterterrorism in general and accusations of "profiling" and "targeting" of Muslims are major political issues. -- Is the host country's legal system sufficiently developed to adequately provide safeguards for the protection and nondisclosure of information? Answer: Legal safeguards are not fully developed. -- How much information sharing does the host country do internally? Is there a single consolidated database, for example? If not, do different ministries share information amongst themselves? Answer: The information sharing function within the government is still wanting. There are no formal standard operating procedures for sharing of information and therfore consistency is lacking. -- How does the country define terrorism? Are there legal statutes that do so? Answer: There is no fixed legal definition of terrorism. This was one of the features of the counter terrorism legislation that is languishing in the Parliament. RANNEBERGER RANNEBERGER