KENYA: ETHNIC MAKE UP OF THE GOK

UNCLAS NAIROBI 000424 SIPDIS SENSITIVE SIPDIS LONDON AND PARIS FOR AFRICA WATCHERS E.O. 12958: N/A TAGS: KDEM PGOV PREL KE SUBJECT: KENYA: ETHNIC MAKE UP OF THE GOK REF: A. ANDRE-AF/E EMAIL DATED 22JAN07 ¶B. 06 NAIROBI 05388 ¶C. 06 NAIROBI 05393 ¶D. 06 NAIROBI 05112 Note: Ref A contains data supporting the conclusions in this message. Refs B - D are recent cables on ethnicity and politics in Kenya. End Note. ¶1. (SBU) Summary: Kenyans often accuse the Kibaki administration of stacking the government with fellow Kikuyus. Our study of the top 198 government positions indicates that in fact Kikuyu representation is in line with their share of the general population. However, Kikuyu ministers run the key Defense, Internal Security (police), Justice and Finance ministries. Also, Kikuyus, their close cousins the Embu and Meru, and Bantu ethnic groups more generally, are grossly over-represented in senior, politically-appointed positions in Kenya's top 20 parastatal companies. In sharp contrast, the Luo ethnic group is seriously underrepresented in government. While there is a widespread tendency in Kenya to "favor one's own," it is important to remember that ethnicity does not always predetermine political positions. End Summary. Bantu/Kikuyu Representation ¶2. (SBU) The Kenyan media and public often claim that Kikuyus are over-represented in government. Our study shows that this is not exactly the case. Kikuyus account for about 22 percent of Kenya's population. They account for 24 percent of the top 198 positions in the Government of Kenya (GoK; see ref A). These 198 GoK positions include the cabinet, assistant ministers, permanent secretaries, provincial commissioners and district commissioners. In the top 20 parastatals, however, the Chief Executive and Chairman positions, which are politically appointed, are held overwhelmingly by members of Bantu ethnic groups. Whereas Bantus make up 67 percent of Kenya's population, they hold 84 percent of these positions. Kikuyus and the closely related and politically aligned Meru and Embu communities account for 32 percent of the general population and 52 percent of these positions. Bantu representation as a whole in the top ranks of GoK is in line with their share of the population. ¶3. (SBU) Several of the parastatals, such as the Kenya Pipeline Company and the Kenya Ports Authority, among others, were notable loss makers when run by President Moi's appointees, most of whom were from Moi's Kalenjin community. Kibaki's appointees, disproportionately drawn from his ethnic group, have transformed these companies into earners for the GoK. ¶4. (SBU) Comment: During Moi's 24 year rule, there was systematic discrimination against the Kikuyu in government employment. The end of such discrimination under the Kibaki administration has resulted in Kikuyu numbers at the top of the GoK reaching, but not significantly exceeding their share of the general population. This reappearance of Kikuyus in government after a long absence may account for the public perception of "Kikuyu dominance." Another factor for this perception may be the fact that Kibaki has placed his fellow Kikuyus at the head of the four most influential ministries: Defense, Internal Security (police),Justice and Finance. End Comment. Nilotic/Luo & Kalenjin Representation ¶5. (SBU) Nilotes, particularly the Luos, are underrepresented in the senior ranks of the GoK. Whereas nilotic ethnic groups make up about 30 percent of Kenya's population, they make up only 21 percent of the top 198 positions in the GoK and only 16 percent of the top parastatal jobs. The Luos, considered political rivals of the Kikuyu, account for 14 percent of the population, but staff only 5 percent of the top positions in government. The Kalenjin, who greatly benefited in government employment under Moi's patronage prior to Kibaki's election in 2002, now account for only 9 percent of top GoK jobs. They make up about 11 percent of the population. ¶6. (SBU) Luo representation in the GoK was much greater in the first Kibaki cabinet. However, once Raila Odinga left the government in 2005, nearly all his fellow Luos followed him. Odinga commands a very loyal following among the Luos. The few Luo politicians who did not quit government in solidarity with Odinga, such as Foreign Minister Tuju, are expected to fare poorly in the politics of their native Nyanza province. Cushitic/Somali Representation ¶7. (SBU) Cushitic ethnic groups make up only 3 percent of Kenya's population, yet they account for 10 percent of the top GoK positions. Somali Kenyans represent only 2 percent of the population, but hold 8 percent of top GoK jobs. Several Somali and Borana (Oromo) politicians benefited from Kibaki's decision to "poach" members of parliament from the official opposition KANU party to staff jobs abandoned by his erstwhile Luo allies. Other Ethnicities ¶8. (SBU) Less than one percent of Kenya's population is made up of members of the diminishing South Asian origin and European origin communities along with the coastal Bajun/Arab community. Two Kenyan Arabs hold jobs within the senior ranks of the GoK, one as an Assistant Minister and the other as a District Commissioner. Gender & Religious Balance ¶9. (SBU) Of the GoK's top 229 jobs, only 7 percent are held by women. Among these are the Ministers of Justice and of Health. Kibaki has announced the goal of women staffing one-third of government positions. The GoK has far to go to meet that goal, but it does have more women in top jobs than the Moi administration did. ¶10. (SBU) Kenya's religious demographics are roughly 80 percent Christian, 10 percent Muslim and 10 percent other (mostly traditional African religions). Of the top 229 GoK jobs, 90 percent are held by Christians and 10 percent are held by Muslims. Koigi wa Wamwere, Assistant Minister for Information, who practices the traditional Kikuyu faith, is the only representative of the "other" religious category within the senior ranks of the GoK. Comment: Ethnicity Remains Key to Kenyan Politics, But Does Not Always Determine Political Positions ¶11. (SBU) While there continues to be a widespread tendency in Kenya to "favor one's own," it is important to remember that ethnicity does not always predetermine political positions. Polling data indicates that increasing numbers of Kenyan voters are rising above the traditional attachment to ethnic politics and embracing truly national politics. ¶12. (SBU) Within the senior ranks of the GoK there are a few well known cases of individuals refusing to don the straightjacket of ethnically predetermined political loyalties. Foreign Minister Tuju, a Luo, is one such example. The Chairman of the Human Rights Commission of Kenya, Maina Kiai, is another. He is an ethnic Kikuyu, but has not shown a pro-Kibaki bias in his leadership of this key institution. In fact, he is regularly branded a Kikuyu "traitor" for his outspoken critiques of the GoK's human rights lapses. Exactly the same charge is made against former Permanent Secretary of Governance and Ethics John Githongo, a Kikuyu who spurned appeals to ethnic loyalty and went public a year ago with damning evidence of grand-scale corruption within the ranks of Kibaki's inner circle. ¶13. (SBU) As a historical aside, it is worth noting that in the latter years of Jomo Kenyatta's life, when Kikuyu chauvinists around Kenya's first president were frantically (and unsuccessfully) searching for a way to retain the presidency for their community after Kenyatta's eventual demise, Kibaki himself was publicly branded a Kikuyu traitor and placed on a death list for his support of the ethnic Kalenjin Vice President, Daniel arap Moi. RANNEBERGER