KENYA ELECTIONS: A GUIDE FOR THE PERPLEXED

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 04 NAIROBI 003969 SIPDIS SENSITIVE SIPDIS LONDON AND PARIS FOR AFRICA WATCHERS E.O. 12958: N/A TAGS: KDEM KE PGOV PHUM SUBJECT: KENYA ELECTIONS: A GUIDE FOR THE PERPLEXED REF: A. NAIROBI 3897 AND PREVIOUS ¶B. NAIROBI 3675 ¶1. (SBU) Summary: The protagonists in Kenya's election drama have known one another for decades. At various times they were both allies and rivals. Incumbent President Mwai Kibaki will present himself as a stable, mature and dependable leader who reversed Kenya's downward spiral under Moi and is above tribalism. Challenger Raila Odinga will present himself as the champion of the common man against the forces of the elite. He (or his lieutenants) will also play on anti-Kikuyu resentments, especially in vote-rich districts where Kikuyu "settlers" are resented by "locals," such as Kalenjin areas of Rift Valley Province. Third place Kalonzo Musyoka will strive to capture all of the ethnic Kamba vote (8 percent of projected voters) and have his allies elected as MPs from Kambaland, but is unlikely to register significant support elsewhere in the country. The election may be closer than many observers expected. This calls for even closer scrutiny of the process and intense advocacy for free, fair and peaceful conduct of the elections. End Summary. ¶2. (U) Ref A provides a projection of likely voters and references for previous election-related messages. Changing Dance Partners -------------- ¶3. (SBU) In 2002, President Daniel arap Moi, in his 24th year of rule and recently term-limited, announced to startled leaders of his party that Uhuru Kenyatta, a relative political newcomer and son of the founding President, was his chosen successor. This led to a walk-out of the party by those who insisted that the ruling party candidate be chosen by a secret ballot at a party convention. The leader of the walk-out was Raila Odinga, then one of Moi's ministers and a former Moi regime political prisoner. In the 1960s, Odinga's father had served as a prominent minister in Kenya's first post-independence government, alongside Moi, before the elder Odinga had a bitter falling out with the elder Kenyatta. Among those who followed Odinga out of the party was Kalonzo Musyoka. Earlier, Musyoka had made his name in the ruling party by vociferously defending Moi and calling for Odinga's imprisonment for subversive activities, a reference to Odinga's agitation for multiparty democracy and against Kenya's one-party constitution in force at that time. ¶4. (SBU) Late in 2002, Odinga helped unite the opposition behind a single candidate: Mwai Kibaki. The opposition had lost Kenya's first two multiparty elections, in '92 and '97, largely due to their failure to unite (and Moi's willingness to use violence against entire communities of presumptive opposition supporters). Kibaki had served in parliament since independence in '63. He had served as a minister under both Jomo Kenyatta and Moi. He spent 10 years as Moi's Vice-President. In 1982, he gave an impassioned speech in parliament about the necessity of moving Kenya from a de facto one-party state to a de jure one-party state, and then formally made the motion in favor of the one-party amendment to the constitution. Nine years later, Kibaki left the ruling party to enter opposition politics. On occasion he was beaten by police while leading anti-Moi, pro-democracy demonstrations. ¶5. (SBU) Fast forward to 2007: Former 2002 allies Kibaki, Odinga and Musyoka are now running for President against one another. Their opponents from 2002, Moi and Uhuru Kenyatta, are now allied to Kibaki. Odinga and Musyoka (along with their allies) fell out with the President when Kibaki reneged on promises he had made to them about the positions they would hold in government. The moral of the story is that while Kenya's senior politicians all know one another quite well, there are no permanent allies or enemies, only permanent interests, particularly when it comes to preserving or improving one's position within the ranks of the traditional political elite. Unspoken Political Motivations -------------- NAIROBI 00003969 002 OF 004 ¶6. (SBU) Among Kenya's politicians, the three largest land owners, according to widespread public perception, are Kenyatta, Moi and Kibaki, in that order. The Kikuyu and their close socio/linguistic/political allies and Mount Kenya neighbors, the Meru and the Embu, together make up about one-third of registered voters. The next largest group of registered voters is the Kalenjins, at only 13 percent of registered voters. The Kikuyu are Kenya's best educated, most commercially active and most dispersed community. They have a strong cultural imperative to acquire land. They are often resented by "locals" when they acquire land, businesses and jobs outside their home districts. Kikuyus have a linguistic and cultural affinity with Kenya's other Bantu ethnic groups. Together, the Bantus make up 67 percent of Kenya's population. Anti-Kikuyu sentiments are less pronounced among their fellow Bantus than among the Nilotes (Maasais, Luos, Kalenjins and others). ¶7. (SBU) Kikuyu interests are 1) retain control of the government, 2) maintain social peace (good for business and necessary to protect Kikuyu minorities living throughout Kenya),and 3) improve the business climate (through better government services and infrastructure). Many Kikuyu were dispossessed of their lands in the 1990s through violence and intimidation organized by President Moi (an ethnic Kalenjin), yet there is very little appetite among the Kikuyu political elite to redress this injustice. Elites fear an across-the-board review of the land issue, such as in the commissioned, but never implemented, Ndungu Report. Several Kikuyu land barons, whose acquisitions date back to the Kenyatta era, could be threatened by such a legal review. Revisiting the land issue is widely considered by the Kenyan elite to be "dangerously destabilizing." ¶8. (SBU) Odinga is the uncrowned King of the Luos. He has committed and nearly universal backing from his community. The Luos are a highly homogenous group (as distinct from such heterogeneous groups as the Luhyas, Kalenjins and Mijikendas) with a strong identity and cultural features that distinguish them from the rest of Kenya. They see themselves as chronically oppressed underdogs whose leaders are assassinated (Tom Mboya, Robert Ouko) or chased from power (Jaramogi Odinga, Raila's father). Raila presents himself as a national leader with a vaguely social democratic agenda, ready to fight the traditional elite on behalf of ordinary Kenyans. He is linked to the failed '82 coup attempt against Moi. He played an important role in the fight for multiparty democracy in Kenya and is closely associated with the high hopes and expectations for dramatic reforms that characterized the Kenyan public after the 2002 election. However, he is also viewed as an untrustworthy political opportunist. He has a strong motivation to play on anti-Kikuyu resentments, especially among the Kalenjin, the coastal communities and among his own Luos. ¶9. (SBU) Kalonzo Musyoka has seen his political standing and poll numbers tumble over the past year. He began his political career in KANU under Moi. He then switched to the Liberal Democratic Party alongside Raila Odinga in 2002. He joined the victorious NARC coalition and was made a minister in Kibaki's first cabinet. He joined Raila Odinga and other fellow ministers in campaigning against the draft constitution backed by the government he was serving in. When the draft constitution was voted down in the referendum, handing Kibaki a demoralizing defeat, Musyoka, Odinga and others were dismissed from government. Following their referendum victory, Musyoka and Odinga formed a new party, the Orange Democratic Movement of Kenya (ODM-K). (Uhuru Kenyatta of KANU initially joined up with ODM-K, but later switched to Kibaki's coalition at Moi's insistence.) Musyoka sought the ODM-K presidential nomination, but saw that Odinga's supporters had captured all the party machinery. His attempt to block Odinga's nomination for the ODM-K presidential candidacy, led Odinga and nearly all other prominent ODM-K leaders to decamp to yet another party, the Orange Democratic Party (ODM). That move left Musyoka holding onto ODM-K, which was reduced to a regional/ethnic party consisting only of his own Kamba ethnic group (8 percent of projected voters). It is assumed Musyoka plans to NAIROBI 00003969 003 OF 004 elect a slate of members of parliament loyal to him, whom he can then use to bargain for a prominent cabinet position from either Kibaki or Odinga. No objective observers are predicting a Musyoka victory at this point. The Two Major Campaigns: Narratives & Strategies -------------- --- ¶10. (SBU) Noting that a presidential candidate need only obtain a plurality of the vote plus at least 25 percent of the vote in five of Kenya's eight provinces to win, here is how we see the campaigns: Kibaki and his Party of National Unity coalition Strengths: Growing economy, introduction of free primary education with promise of free secondary education as well, appreciation for Kibaki's dismantling of Moi-era abuses (cult of personality, systematic torture, political detainees, etc.),expansion of democratic freedoms, traditional Kenyan cultural deference toward elders (at 76, Kibaki is by far the oldest of the three candidates). Allegiance of the largest ethnic voting bloc, Kikuyus and their close allies, at about one-third of registered voters. Weaknesses: Widespread perception of favoritism toward fellow Kikuyus, indulgence of high-level corruption, continued high rates of violent crime, poor infrastructure. Campaign narrative: When my government came to power, the national economy was shrinking, the treasury was empty and the country had suffered years of social and political turmoil. I have revived the economy, brought stability, greatly increased revenue collection, introduced free primary education and improved the incomes and living standards of the eighty percent of Kenyans who live in rural areas. I am well known to you. I am moderate, stable and honorable. You can depend on me to maintain our country's stability and keep the economy growing. Mine are a safe pair of hands. Some of my ministers may have said or done things that offended some of you. They did not take these positions at my instruction. Note that these hardline, controversial figures (all Kikuyus) are not among my leadership team in the Party of National Unity coalition. (This team features balanced regional/ethnic representation and does not include such controversial figures as Internal Security Minister Michuki or Justice Minister Karua. This public re-election committee does not necessarily reflect who actually has the president's ear.) Strategy: Begin with the 40 percent of the vote from the November 2005 referendum (Kikuyu, Embu, Meru, principally), add KANU's residual support, which polls at about 3 percent. Increase support from Coast Province by recruiting small regional parties to the coalition and through distribution of land titles to squatters. Increase support in Western Province through vigorous campaigning. Minimize the number of Kikuyu faces in the campaign team. Attempt to undermine Odinga's position among Coast and Western Province Bantus. Count on Moi (an ethnic Kalenjin) to increase support for the presidential coalition among Rift Valley province Kalenjins. As long as Musyoka stays in the race, a score of at least 47 percent would do. A Musyoka switch to Kibaki ensures victory. Do not name a running mate, hold the slot open for Musyoka in case he can be enticed to serve as Vice-President. Odinga and his Orange Democratic Movement Strengths: Inspiring orator, brilliant campaigner, represents for many Kenyans the high hopes of the 2002 election, compelling campaign biography of "lifetime of struggle for democracy and justice," natural pick for Kenyans who resent perceived Kikuyu commercial and government dominance. Weaknesses: Anti-Luo sentiments are nearly as common as anti-Kikuyu sentiments. History of changing parties and supporting 1982 coup attempt leave image of recklessness, untrustworthiness and opportunism. Strongly distrusted by NAIROBI 00003969 004 OF 004 the private sector. Country's largest ethnic community, the Kikuyu/Embu/Meru, is opposed to him. Campaign narrative: My father was one of the leaders who made Kenya independent. He was betrayed by President Jomo Kenyatta (a Kikuyu),thrown out of the government and the party and persecuted all of his days. He taught me to fight for the people. I suffered imprisonment under the Moi regime as a result of my leadership in the fight for multiparty democracy. My team is made up of leaders from every part of the country. I am a Kenyan nationalist, a reformer and a champion of the common man against the traditional elite. I will right all the wrongs, without causing instability. I am young and energetic. I am ready to lead the country to the next level of development. Kibaki's economic gains are only enjoyed by the rich. I will fight to bring prosperity to all Kenyans. Strategy: Begin with the 60 percent "Orange" vote in the November 2005 referendum. Subtract those who have now publicly switched to the Kibaki camp (principally KANU, 3 percent),and also subtract Musyoka's Kambas (8 percent). That comes to 49 percent, more than enough to win in a three way race. (Evidence indicates that the 60 percent "Orange" vote in 2005 also included pro-Kibaki voters who disliked the draft constitution due to perceived privileges granted the Muslim community. These voters can be expected to line up with Kibaki during the election.) Undermine Moi's position in Kalenjin-populated regions of Rift Valley Province by fanning traditionally high anti-Kikuyu sentiment and calling into question his reasons for supporting a Kikuyu government that has "chased the Kalenjin from power." (The Kalenjin account for 13 percent of projected voters, the second largest group after Kikuyu/Embu/Meru). Keep Musyoka in the race, since his voters would likely otherwise vote for Kibaki. Comment: Shifting Alliances -------------- ¶11. (SBU) In 2002, the election did not come into focus until about one month prior to voting, once the pro-Kibaki coalition was formed. Apparent bitter political rivals becoming close allies overnight is a common occurrence in Kenyan politics. Over the next few weeks we will see defections and reunions aplenty, especially following the fights over who gets the nod to compete for parliamentary seats on behalf of each coalition. The election may be closer than many observers expected. This calls for even closer scrutiny of the process and intense advocacy for free, fair and peaceful conduct of the elections. ¶12. (SBU) Our greatest concern at this point is that ethnic rhetoric will get out of hand and lead to serious violence. We are taking a number of initiatives to discourage this, including a youth-centered concert series on the theme of peaceful political participation. We are also speaking out against every prominent act of political violence that occurs (ref B). RANNEBERGER